Egypt Warns of Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in U.S., by Ryan Mauro

January 17, 2015, 10:14 am

≫ Next: French Prime Minister: 'I Refuse to Use This Term Islamophobia', by Jeffrey Goldberg

≪ Previous: Who ordered the attack against Charlie Hebdo? by Thierry Meyssan

$

0

0

 An Egyptian government website features a warning that the Muslim Brotherhood has a lobby in the U.S. disguised as civil society organizations. The United Arab Emirates has made similar statements and the U.S. Justice Department has confirmed the existence of a Muslim Brotherhood branch in America.


The Egyptian government’s State Information Service has an entire section devoted to documenting the violence and terrorism of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt is furious with the U.S. for its stance on the Brotherhood. President El-Sisi told the Washington Post in December 2013, then as Defense Minister, that the U.S. has turned its back on Egypt and is misunderstanding the Islamist group.
The documentation includes a timeline  of violence perpetrated by Brotherhood members since July 2014, a statement from the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood condemning the Brotherhood’s exploitation of children, and  many videos documenting the Brotherhood’s extremism and the justifications for overthrowing it and banning it.
Most importantly, the section prominently features an article about the Muslim Brotherhood operating in America and influencing U.S. policy through various fronts. It cites a study done by the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, a highly-respected organization in Cairo.
“She [Center executive director Dalia Zeyadah] warned that the MB has a network based in the US and operating through civil society organizations engaged in community service domains there. These organizations, she also warned, aim to spread the MB's extremist ideologies in the US,” the Egyptian government website says.
The article from June 2014 states that the Brotherhood is moving to Turkey to set up the “nucleus of its European headquarters which would be operating under the cover of charity work to carry out terrorist acts across the region.”
The Cairo Postreported in February 2014 that the Ibn Khaldoun Center director Dalia Zeyadah “[asserted] that the Brotherhood are still trying to impact decisions of the White House, noting that campaigns against Brotherhood ‘terrorism’ must continue.”
The Egyptian government often talks about the International Muslim Brotherhood to emphasize that it is not just an Egyptian organization. In his interview with the Washington Post, El-Sisi said it operates in 60 countries and that Hamas is one of its branches. He warned that the group is “based on restoring the Islamic religious empire.”
The Clairon Project’s research into the Brotherhood sympathies of a senior adviser to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was covered in the Egyptian media in 2013, specifically by the Al-Nahar television network.
The U.S. government confirmed the existence of a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood with a network a fronts under different names during the prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation, one such trial.
The Justice Department’s list of unindicted co-conspirators in that trial includes a list a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entities and members. The list includes the Islamic Society of North America, the North American Islamic Trust and the Council on American-Islamic Relations. The lattermost organization was listed as an entity of the U.S. Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee, a sub-section set up to support Hamas.
The United Arab Emirates caused a stir recently when it banned the Brotherhood and some of its most powerful affiliates in the U.S. and Europe, including CAIR, the Muslim American Society and Islamic Relief.
The UAE justified its designation of the U.S-based groups as terrorist organizations despite the immense backlash. The Foreign Minister of the country said it was based on the group’s incitement and funding of terrorism.
Another UAE official said the objective is “putting a cordon around all subversive entities.” And UAE State Foreign Affairs Minister Anwar Gargash said the backlash was being orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood lobby in the West.
“The noise (by) some Western organizations over the UAE’s terrorism list originates in groups that are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and many of them work on incitement and creating an environment of extremism,” Gargash tweeted.
The U.S. Justice Department, countless terrorism experts and the governments of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have confirmed the existence of a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. The U.S. Brotherhood’s own documents are even publicly available.
Yet, those who point this out are ridiculed by these Islamist groups and their allies as bigoted “Islamophobes.” The accusation is even nonsensically made about Muslims who point this out.
The refusal of the U.S. government to recognize the toxic ideology of the Brotherhood is undermining America’s ability to have a frank discussion about the issue of Islamism.
Muslim governments are providing verifiable evidence about the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, but their warnings are ignored or rejected. Americans (Muslim and non-Muslim) who voice these same concerns are personally attacked.
Terms like Islamism and Political Islam are used regularly in the Muslim world and even on the Brotherhood’s own website, but the U.S. Brotherhood and its apologists say we can’t.  CAIR has waged a campaign to make the media stop using the “Islamist” term.
America is in the middle of a heated debate about the defining the threat. We should listen to our Muslim allies and let the facts speak for themselves, instead of letting Islamists and their apologists edit our vocabularies.

 Ryan Mauro is ClarionProject.org’s national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security. Mauro is frequently interviewed on top-tier television and radio. 

Source:  http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/egypt-warns-muslim-brotherhood-organizations-us

---

French Prime Minister: 'I Refuse to Use This Term Islamophobia', by Jeffrey Goldberg

January 18, 2015, 10:25 am

≫ Next: Islam in Austria with a pan-European focus, by Ioannis Michaletos

≪ Previous: Egypt Warns of Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in U.S., by Ryan Mauro

$

0

0

Manuel Valls argues that the charge of 'Islamophobia' is often used to silence critics of Islamism.


The prime minister of France, Manuel Valls, has emerged over the past tumultuous week as one of the West’s most vocal foes of Islamism, though he’s actually been talking about the threat it poses for a long while. 






During the course of an interview conducted before the Charlie Hebdo attacks, he told me—he went out of his way to tell me, in fact—that he refuses to use the term 'Islamophobia' to describe the phenomenon of anti-Muslim prejudice, because, he says, the accusation of Islamophobia is often used as a weapon by Islamism's apologists to silence their critics.


Most of my conversation with Valls was focused on the fragile state of French Jewry—here is my post on his comments, which included the now-widely circulated statement that, “if 100,000 Jews leave, France will no longer be France”—and I didn’t realize the importance of his comment about Islamophobia until I re-read the transcript of our interview.

“It is very important to make clear to people that Islam has nothing to do with ISIS,” Valls told me. “There is a prejudice in society about this, but on the other hand, I refuse to use this term 'Islamophobia,' because those who use this word are trying to invalidate any criticism at all of Islamist ideology. The charge of 'Islamophobia' is used to silence people. ”



Valls was not denying the existence of anti-Muslim sentiment, which is strong across much of France. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack, miscreants have shot at Muslim community buildings, and various repulsive threats against individual Muslims have been cataloged. President Francois Hollande, who said Thursday that Muslims are the “first victims of fanaticism, fundamentalism, intolerance,” might be overstating the primacy of anti-Muslim prejudice in the current hierarchy of French bigotries—after all, Hollande just found it necessary to deploy his army to defend Jewish schools from Muslim terrorists, not Muslim schools from Jewish terrorists—but anti-Muslim bigotry is a salient and seemingly permanent feature of life in France. Or to contextualize it differently: Anti-Muslim feeling appears to be more widespread than anti-Jewish feeling across much of France, but anti-Jewish feeling has been expressed recently (and not-so-recently) with far more lethality, and mainly by Muslims.



It appears as if Valls came to his view on the illegitimacy of 'Islamophobia' after being influenced by a number of people, including and especially the French philosopher Pascal Bruckner and the writer (and fatwa target) Salman Rushdie. Rushdie, along with a group of mainly Muslim writers, attacked the use of the term 'Islamophobia' several years ago in an open letter: “We refuse to renounce our critical spirit out of fear of being accused of ‘Islamophobia’, a wretched concept that confuses criticism of Islam as a religion and stigmatization of those who believe in it.”



Bruckner argued that use of the word 'Islamophobia' was designed to deflect attention away from the goals of Islamists: “[I]t denies the reality of an Islamic offensive in Europe all the better to justify it; it attacks secularism by equating it with fundamentalism. Above all, however, it wants to silence all those Muslims who question the Koran, who demand equality of the sexes, who claim the right to renounce religion, and who want to practice their faith freely and without submitting to the dictates of the bearded and doctrinaire.”


READ MORE: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/french-prime-minister-manuel-valls-on-islamophobia/384592/

Islam in Austria with a pan-European focus, by Ioannis Michaletos

January 24, 2015, 9:12 am

≫ Next: Muslim Brotherhood Founded 50% of the Mosques in the West, by Ryan Mauro

≪ Previous: French Prime Minister: 'I Refuse to Use This Term Islamophobia', by Jeffrey Goldberg

$

0

0

The turmoil in the European states due to the return of Jihadists of ISIS from the Middle Eastern battlefields has resulted in a wide range of security measures aimed to curb the operational capabilities of those. 






In parallel, there are hundreds of independent extremist cells across the Continent and a well-formed infrastructure by which even terrorist attacks can be staged, despite restrictive and surveillance measures put forward by authorities.

On a strategic level, the situation can be viewed in an even more negative manner, if we take into account that subversion and infiltration of extremists has been gradual and rather successive process that is maturing for decades now and well before the effects of the so-called "Arab Spring".

In Austria in particular, we have a nexus and a hub between radical Sunni formations from the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East and the main coordination centers of a multitude of activities concerning Western Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular. 

Already Islamic mainstream presence in Austria is clearly not integrated in the local society and has been running its daily and social life, in parallel to the rest of the citizens, whilst keeping close in contact and cooperation with foreign "patronizing" powers of Islamic origin. 

The Turkish-Islamic Union for social and cultural cooperation (ATIB) controls 64 mosques in Austria, having around 80,000 members and is closely related to the governing AKP party in Turkey and has a long-standing collaboration with the Turkish "Presidency of Religious Affairs". The latter is a state institution in Turkey under the authority of the President and has an estimated budget for 2014 in excess of 1.5 billion Euros.  

The Islamic Federation in Vienna controls another 59 mosques, with ties to numerous international Islamic networks, most importantly the Muslim Brotherhood (M.B.). Moreover the Islamic cultural center control another 43 mosques, also related to M.B. The Islamic Association of Bosnia is another strong organization with 41 mosques in control. 


The total number of Muslims in Austria numbers around 600,000 people, out of which more than 25% descent from Bosnia, whilst news reports from that country, indicate that over the past few years 5% of the total can be classified as either radically-politicized or extremists, most of them congregated in Vienna metropolis and Graz. The president of the Turkish cultural community in Austria, Birol Kilic, recently stated that many Islamic groups oppose Austria's open society and run parallel structures of segregation and exclusion on purpose having no role in a secular society. 

Mili Gorus, a German based Turkish-Islamic organization, has gained considerable ground in Austria over the years and aligns itself presently with the global Muslim Brotherhood network. Although its membership cannot be estimated exactly, it can be roughly said that it enjoys the support of more than 15,000 mostly Turkish immigrants in the country, and has over the years established close contacts with Hamas and in direct collaboration with the Turkish IHH organization in Istanbul. 


The snapshot of the above main groups, indicate two main features. Firstly Austria has a considerable infiltration of strong Turkish state interests in its territory, filled with Sunni Islamic aura, which makes them especially influential if one adds a pragmatic analysis by approaching these phenomena. Secondly Muslim Brotherhood has made itself attached to these groups that enlarging its support base in Europe and having created the “perfect” hub and coordination centers relating to its activities in Bosnia where it also enjoys a strong clout. 


In sort Austria could be the next country to host the headquarters of the global M.B. a hypothesis that was widely talked about in 2014 by mostly UK pundits, but has not been fully materialized as of yet. In the meantime a steady influx of refugees and illegal immigrants from Syria, Iraq, Western Balkans and Central Asian countries, ensures that the membership of the aforementioned organizations, along with multiple smaller groups will enlarge and Vienna would be the unquestionable center of political-or even radical Islam" in continental Europe in the coming 10 years at most. 

Due to the proximity of the county to the Western Balkans, the overall situation concerning both organized groups of "EU Jihadists" and the seemingly proliferation of "lone wolf" type of culprits, as far as , EU's security agenda is concerned and in a tactical level; Austria will certainly be in the spotlight in the coming years. 

Muslim Brotherhood Founded 50% of the Mosques in the West, by Ryan Mauro

January 6, 2015, 1:14 pm

≫ Next: Turkey Tries to Cover Up Arming of Al-Qaeda, by Ryan Mauro

≪ Previous: Islam in Austria with a pan-European focus, by Ioannis Michaletos

$

0

0

The Brotherhood has established the most powerful Islamic institutions in the West, even though Muslims are not necessary on board. 


A prominent Muslim leader in the United Kingdom with links to the Muslim Brotherhood estimates that half of the mosques in the West were founded by Brotherhood members. The Brotherhood presents itself as moderate, but it supports violent jihad and is the parent organization of Hamas.
The estimate was made by Mohamed Ashmawey, CEO of London-based Islamic Relief Worldwide, the world’s largest Muslim charity.
He was responding to his organization’s admitted Muslim Brotherhood origins and its designation as a terrorist entity by the United Arab Emirates and Israel. The Israeli government says Islamic Relief Worldwide sends “millions” of dollars to Hamas every year.
“If this is a crime to have someone as a founder as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, they will have to close 50 percent of the mosques in the West because they also had founders from this group,” he said.
The Muslim Brotherhood is responsible for establishing the most powerful Islamic institutions in the West, though that does not mean that most Muslims or most mosque attendees subscribe to its Islamist ideology. Surveys consistently show that Muslim-Americans largely reject extremism, though a formidable minority remains committed to it.
A 1991 U.S. Muslim Brotherhood memo discusses how the group established a network of front organizations in America for “unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts” under an“an effective and a stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood.”
The Brotherhood hoped that its control of the main infrastructure would enable it to lead the growing community.
The struggle that followed is encapsulated in this 2004 Chicago Tribune story about Islamists taking control of the Mosque Foundation in Bridgeview, Illinois. A 2003 St. Petersburg Times article also reports on the Islamist challenges for the leaderships of mosques in Florida, California, Illinois, Texas and Arizona.
The Brotherhood’s purpose, as stated in the 1991 memo, is to wage “a kind of grand jihad, in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers…”
One of the organizations listed in the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood memo as a front for this purpose is the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), an organization that owns mosques across America. Its offices were raided in 2002 as part of a terrorism-financing investigation.
Its website says:
“Since NAIT's founding, Muslim communities have entrusted the titles of over 325 properties in 42 States to NAIT. More are added every year. Market value of these Waqf  [NAIT] properties is several hundred million dollars.”
Another U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), has said that NAIT owns about 27% of mosques in America. National security expert Dr. J. Michael Waller had a higher estimate of 50% to 79% of mosques being owned by NAIT.
NAIT’s status as a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity was confirmed by federal prosecutors during the prosecution of another U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entity named the Holy Land Foundation. The Justice Department designated NAIT as an unindicted co-conspirator in that case.
NAIT’s designation as an unindicted co-conspirator was upheld in a 2009 ruling because of “ample evidence” linking it to the Hamas-financing network of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood. A NAIT bank account gave the checks for the “Palestinian mujahideen” to the Holy Land Foundation, which then distributed the funds to Hamas.
In the documentary The Grand Deception, former FBI special agent Robert Stauffer talks about taking part in an investigation into the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, including NAIT. He said that many millions of dollars were donated to NAIT from foreign countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran.
A declassified FBI document from 1987 summarizes intelligence provided by an informant inside the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood who adamantly stated that NAIT is a Brotherhood front with a “secret agenda” that includes supporting terrorism and a long-term Islamic revolution in America.
“[NAIT wants] all the mosques to be ideologically pure in their own Wahhabist line. They want to prevent others from having influence,” said Islamic scholar Khalid Duran.
There are also mosques and Islamic centers that are not technically owned by NAIT but are officially affiliated with other U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entities.
Another significant problem within U.S. mosques is the widespread presence of radical literature. A 2011 survey of 100 U.S. mosques found that only 19% of mosques were completely absent of texts promoting violence, and only a mere 15.5% had imams who did not recommend violent texts for studying.  In addition, just 42% of mosques did not have guest speakers known for promoting violent jihad.
About 51% of U.S. mosques were found to have texts that “severely advocate” violent jihad, preaching that supporting it is an obligation of Muslims. Literature in this category includes texts like Milestones by Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb and those by Jamaat-e-Islami founder Abdul Ala Maududi/Mawdudi.
About 30% of U.S. mosques were found to have texts that “moderately advocate” violence, such as Fiqh us-Sunnah by Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Sabiq and Tafsir Ibn Kathir.
This shocking number is substantiated by SufiSheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America. Kabbani has founded 28 Sufi Islamic centers in North America and is listed as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world.
In 1999, Kabbani said during an event at the State Department that 80% of U.S. mosques follow an extremist Saudi-sponsored form of Islam. He said that 90 of the 114 U.S. mosques he visited had a radical ideology.
A 2006 study by Freedom House likewise found that Saudi-sponsored extremist texts are widely present in U.S. mosques. The study was based on a survey of over 200 books from 15 major mosques in seven states.
Readers can learn about the Islamist mosques in their state through the Clarion Project’s Islamist Organizations in America page.
In addition, the following is an incomplete list of over 60 mosques and organizations known to be affiliated with NAIT and other U.S. Muslim Brotherhood entities like the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA); Muslim Students Association (MSA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), Muslim American Society (MAS) and the now-defunct Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA).

Read more: http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/muslim-brotherhood-founded-50-mosques-west

Turkey Tries to Cover Up Arming of Al-Qaeda, by Ryan Mauro

February 1, 2015, 1:36 am

≫ Next: Η Μέση Ανατολή εγγύτερα στα κεντρικά Βαλκάνια, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Muslim Brotherhood Founded 50% of the Mosques in the West, by Ryan Mauro

$

0

0

The Turkish government, ostensibly a NATO 'ally,' has been forced to admit that its intelligence service funneled arms to Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. 

The Turkish government, ostensibly a NATO “ally,” has been forced to admit that its intelligence service funneled arms to Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. The so-called “moderate” Islamist government has been caught in a long cover-up and is threatening to shut down social media outlets that don’t block the reporting of the scandal.


The scandal began goes back to 2013 when Turkish police searched trucks headed to Syria to deliver weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria.
On November 7, 2013, Turkish police stopped a convoy of three trucks supposedly delivering humanitarian aid to Syria. The convoy was led by personnel from the country’s MIT intelligence service. The police found 935 mortar shells inside the convoy, believed to be headed for Jabhat al-Nusra.
The MIT personnel told the police that they had no authority to search the truck and a tense standoff followed that almost turned into a brawl. It ended when the governor of the province intervened and sent a threatening message to the police. It said, “MİT personnel works in direct connection with the Prime Ministry and their detention requires punishment.”
The public prosecutor who authorized the search, Ozcan Sisman, subsequently filed a complaint accusing the government of obstruction of justice. He and five other prosecutors involved in investigating various arms shipments to Syria were suspended earlier this month. Thirteen soldiers are also facing espionage charges.
Two similar incidents happened on January 1 and January 19, 2014.
On January 1, the Turkish police stopped  a truck headed to Syria supposedly with humanitarian supplies. It was believed to be owned by the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), an organization closely linked to Turkish President Erdogan (who was then Prime Minister) and linked to Hamas. The police found weapons inside and IHH said it had no connection to the vehicle.
The driver said he worked for MIT and tried to stop the search. A thorough search was again prevented on the governor’s orders. The involved police officers were reassigned. Chiefs and deputy chiefs in the Hatay Province’s Terror and Organized Crime Department had the same done to them.
On January 19, the Turkish police searched seven trucks delivering supplies to Syria. Two vehicles had ammunition inside and one had weaponry. A separate car following the trucks belonged to MIT.
According to one of the other suspended prosecutors, Aziz Takci, the vehicles used in these two incidents were owned by the government and officials were involved in their shipments but these facts were left out of court filings.
At around the same time in January 2014, Turkish police arrested 23 people in raids on IHH for allegedly being involved with Al-Qaeda. The responsible police chief was fired and the Deputy Prime Minister condemned the raids. Two involved police officers were fired, as were bodyguards for eight involved prosecutors.
Now, one year later, government documents have leaked online proving that the Turkish intelligence service was orchestrating the arms deliveries to Al-Nusra. One report from the Gendarmerie General Command flatly states, “The trucks were carrying weapons and supplies to the al-Qaeda terror organization.”
In September, the former U.S. ambassador to Turkey said Erdogan’s government had been working with Al-Nusra and other Islamist extremist groups like Ahrar al-Sham, a group linked to Al-Qaeda. He said that Turkey resisted American pressure to stop the support and to prevent their use of the Turkish-Syrian border.
In December, a United Nations report confirmed that arms continue to reach Al-Nusra and the Islamic State through the Turkish border. It did not state whether the Turkish government is actively involved in those shipments. Erdogan’s government rejected the report’s conclusion.
The Turkish media has been banned from reporting on the arms shipments after new documents leaked out, citing national security. Google Plus and Facebook caved. Twitter responded by deleting some posts about the al-Nusra scandal but refused to block the newspaper’s account.
Erdogan is using a law that says the Prime Minister’s approval is required for an investigation into MIT personnel and public officials following his orders. His opposition sees this as confirmation that the MIT arms shipments were following Erdogan’s instructions.
“You can take these trucks illegally all the way to Syria. But their journey will not end there. They will carry this government and a lot of public servants to the court in The Hague as war criminals. But those tried there will not just be individuals, but the Republic of Turkey,” said one opposition leader.


Turkey’s Drift Away from Democracy
The cover-up is part of a pattern where Erdogan and his Islamist allies continuously move in an anti-Western, anti-democratic direction as they solidify their grip on power.
Freedom House says that Erdogan’s government is overseeing “an increasingly aggressive campaign against democratic pluralism." Its new report says:
"He openly demanded that media owners censor coverage or fire critical journalists, told the Constitutional Court he does not respect its rulings, threatened reporters (and rebuked women journalists) and ordered radical, even bizarre changes to the school curriculum. Having risen from the premiership to the presidency in August, he formed a 'shadow cabinet' that allows him to run the country from the presidential palace, circumventing constitutional rules and the ministries of his own party's government.”
In March 2013, Erdogan vowed to “eradicate” Twitter as part of his campaign to squash social media. The U.S. State Department described the temporary blocking of social media as “21^st century book burning.”
He was apparently aware of what was about to come. Massive protests soon erupted against the Turkish government’s suppression of freedom. Erdogan and his party successfully put down these demonstrations and went on to win the presidency and local elections, thanks to a mixture of growing Islamist sentiment and an unfair playing field.
In December 2013, a massive corruption probe began with police arresting dozens of Erdogan allies, including some high-level officials involved in underhanded dealings with Iran. Erdogan and his inner circle are accused of spending $140 million in bribes.
Leaks also revealed that top officials are collaborating with Iranian intelligence and a terrorist group linked to the Iranian regime. The documents’ allegations are substantiated by the former chief of the Istanbul Police Department Intelligence Unit.
A new recording has leaked of Erdogan talked on the phone with his son on the day of the first corruption investigation raids. Erdogan told his son to get rid of $1 billion in cash stored in their home. Erdogan says the recording is fake but the public prosecutor says the recording is from a legitimate wiretap authorized as part of the investigation.
The Turkish government retaliated with a purge, claiming it was facing a coup orchestrated by a powerful U.S.-based Turkish cleric named Fethullah Gulen.
The overseeing public prosecutor was fired. According to Freedom House, the Erdogan government has changed the positions of 45,000 police officers and 2,500 judges and prosecutors over the past year as part of this purge.
Recordings were then leaked proving that the Turkish government is trying to control the media. The allegation is supported by the former editor-in-chief of the Hurriyet newspaper who said, ““We need to underline that the Turkish press is no longer doing investigative reporting.”
According to one opposition figure, almost 900 journalists were fired due to state pressure last year and 21 were imprisoned. He claims that 217 were beaten.
There were also efforts seize control of the court system and the Internet. Legislation was passed that allowed the Turkish government to block websites without judicial oversight on vague national security grounds. The content that was predictably blocked was criticism of the government and reporting on the Turkish government’s corruption and involvement with terrorists.
On October 2, the Constitutional Court overturned the Internet censorship legislation. The Turkish government is pursuing a new law that will permit a one-day ban on websites that can be extended with a judge’s approval.
Expect the Turkish government to look for ways to seize control of the Constitutional Court. In the meantime, it is using favorable judges and police forces to its advantage.
One court is requiring Facebook to block posts denigrating the Prophet Mohammed and is threatening to completely block the social media site in the country if it fails to do so. A new round of arrests of journalists has just happened. Police are even arresting teenagers who “insult” Erdogan.
A bipartisan group of two dozen members of Congress have signed a letter calling on the Treasury Department to sanction entities in Turkey providing material support to the Hamas terrorist group.
The Clarion Project has consistently documented Turkey’s involvement with terrorism and promotion of Islamist extremism. It is arguably the biggest ally of the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan is suggesting that the terrorist attacks in Paris are part of a secret Western conspiracy against Islam. Top officials and clerics are encouraging vile anti-Semitism.
These are not the actions of an authentic NATO “ally.” The NATO website does not identify a process to kick Turkey out of the alliance. It’s about time that we come up with one.

 Ryan Mauro is ClarionProject.org’s national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security. Mauro is frequently interviewed on top-tier television and radio.

Source:  http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/turkey-tries-cover-arming-al-qaeda

Η Μέση Ανατολή εγγύτερα στα κεντρικά Βαλκάνια, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

February 1, 2015, 7:31 am

≫ Next: Οι Τουρκικοί σύνδεσμοι, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Turkey Tries to Cover Up Arming of Al-Qaeda, by Ryan Mauro

$

0

0

Η  "όσμωση"Βαλκανίων και Μέσης Ανατολής και ειδικότερα σε θέματα ασφάλειας, συνεχίζεται με νεώτερα στοιχεία που προέρχονται από τις Αρχές της Βοσνίας-Ερζεγοβίνης αλλά και της Αυστρίας που δέχεται άμεσα τις επιπτώσεις.






-  Η εισαγωγή και το πέρασμα ηρωίνης (και λοιπών οπιούχων) προερχόμενη από το Αφγανιστάν μέσω Βαλκανίων,υπολογίζεται το 2014 ότι ξεπέρασε τα 27 δις. Δολάρια σε αξία με τη Τουρκική και Αλβανική μαφία να γίνονται  ολοένα και ισχυρότερες, μαζί με δίκτυα Ισλαμιστών που εδρεύουν στο Σάντζακ της Σερβίας αλλά και τη Βοσνία.



Σ.Σ (Ασφαλώς τα καθαρά ποσά που διανέμονται στους ανωτέρω είναι πολύ μικρότερα καθότι διεθνή χρηματοικονομικά συμφέροντα παρακρατούν εν είδει "ξεπλύματος"τη λεόντειο μερίδα.) 






- Ξεπερνούν τα 4,5 εκ. κομμάτια τα όπλα που βρίσκονται σε παράνομη διακίνηση σε Βαλκανικές χώρες, ενώ οι λιμένες του Δυρραχίου στην Αλβανία, του Μπάρ στο Μαυροβούνιο και τις Ριγιέκα στη Κροατία αποτελούν μεγάλους πλέον κόμβους στη Μεσόγειο στη διακίνηση λαθραίου οπλισμού με άξονες προς τη Βόρεια Αφρική και τη Μέση Ανατολή, εξοπλίζοντας τους Ισλαμιστές αντάρτες.





- Αυξάνεται διαρκώς ο αριθμός των προσφύγων και παράνομων μεταναστών που οδεύουν από τα Βαλκάνια προς τη Κεντρική Ευρώπη. Μόνο τα τελευταία 5 έτη, 200.000 άτομα πέρασαν τη Σερβία και την Ουγγαρία προς άλλες χώρες της ΕΕ, ενώ συχνότερο είναι το φαινόμενο εντοπισμού "καραβανιών"σε Αλβανία και το Κόσοβο, Σύρων, Πακιστανών και Αφγανών που διέρχονται από εκεί για να μεταβούν βορειότερα. Αυτό έχει ως συνέπεια την περαιτέρω ενδυνάμωση του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος στην περιοχή που βρίσκει νέες κερδοφόρες προσόδους προς εκμετάλλευση.





- Τα συστήματα άτυπης χρηματοδότησης -μεταξύ των άλλων και τρομοκρατικών πράξεων- γνωρίζουν άνθηση στα Βαλκάνια με έμφαση στις Δυτικές περιοχές,με την εγκαθίδρυση ενός καλά δομημένου συστήματος "Χαβάλα"που είναι σε απευθείας σύνδεση με τη Μέση Ανατολή , αλλά και τα υπόλοιπα στη Γερμανία, Αυστρία, Βρετανία, Ιταλία και Γαλλία. 





- Ταυτοχρόνως το τελευταίο έτος υπάρχει μεγάλη εισροή κεφαλαίων από χώρες του Κόλπου για την αγορά γης στη Βοσνία και ιδιαίτερα στις περιοχές Pazarić, Hadžiæi, Tarčina, Žunovnica, Drozgometa, Osenik, Ilidži, Blažuju. Στη συντριπτική πλειονότητα οι Άραβες κατά βάση αγοραστές πληρώνουν σε Δολάρια και τοις μετρητοίς χωρίς καμία απόδειξη πόθεν έσχες ενώ είναι προφανές ότι δεν επιδιώκουν αποδόσεις ή επενδύσεις γιατί πρόκειται για αγροτικές περιοχές δίχως υποδομές. Επιπλέον μεγαλύτεροι "παίχτες"υπό τη μορφή εταιρειών-βιτρινών από το Ντουμπάι εξετάζουν επενδύσεις άνω των 50 εκ. Δολαρίων για τη δημιουργία ξενοδοχείων αποκλειστικά για Μεσανατολίτες πελάτες στη κεντρική Βοσνία.




- Υπήκοοι του Κουβέιτ ολοένα και περισσότερο ανοίγουν εταιρείες στη Βοσνία με 232 από αυτές να έχουν λειτουργήσει το 2014, όλες εξυπηρετώντας το σκοπό απόκτησης βίζας και άδειας παραμονής, καθότι δεν έχουν άλλη παραγωγική δραστηριότητα. 



- Εξαιρετικό ενδιαφέρον έχει ότι οι αγορές γης και ακινήτων λαμβάνουν χώρα σε περιοχές με Σερβικούς πληθυσμούς και μάλιστα οι Άραβες πληρώνουν ποσά πολύ μεγαλύτερα από την αγοραία αξία προκειμένου να τις αποκτήσουν από τους ντόπιους. 




- Από την απαρχή της "Αραβική Άνοιξης", έχουν αυξηθεί οι ιδρύσεις εταιρειών - βιτρινών από υπηκόους κρατών του Κόλπου σε Λίχτενστάιν, Αυστρία και Βοσνία με παράλληλες μεγάλες τριγωνικές συναλλαγές μεταξύ των τριών αυτών κρατών όπως και μεταφορές κεφαλαίων εκατέρωθεν. Πρόσφατη έρευνα του Αυστριακού τύπου βεβαιώνει ότι το ξέπλυμα χρήματος προερχόμενο κατά βάση από διεθνείς οργανωμένες εγκληματικές δραστηριότητες που σχετίζονται με υπηκόους κρατών που αναφέρθηκαν, λαμβάνει χώρα δίχως προβλήματα και με αυξανόμενη ένταση στις προαναφερόμενες περιοχές. 





- Για όλα τα ανωτέρω έχουν εκκινηθεί έρευνες από υπηρεσίες ασφαλείας Ευρωπαικών και Βαλκανικών χωρών, αλλά με χαρακτηριστική αδιαφορία μιας καθόλα ενδιαφερόμενης "Δύναμης". 




- Παραπλήσια φαινόμενα παρατηρούνται σε όλα τα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια και θα αποτελέσουν μέρος έρευνας που θα παρουσιαστεί εν ευθέτω χρόνω.

Οι Τουρκικοί σύνδεσμοι, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

February 8, 2015, 4:09 pm

≫ Next: Gulen's strong base in the Balkans, by Ioannis Michaletos

≪ Previous: Η Μέση Ανατολή εγγύτερα στα κεντρικά Βαλκάνια, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

Ο ρόλος της Τουρκίας στον εξοπλισμό τρομοκρατών και ανταρτών στη Λιβύη και τη Συρία, υπήρξε και εξακολουθεί να είναι εξόχως σημαντικός, από το 2011 και εντεύθεν.







Χρησιμοποιούνται κατά κύριο λόγο οργανώσεις όπως η IHH και το πολυπλόκαμο δίκτυο της Μουσουλμανικής Αδελφότητας, ταυτοχρόνως με την υποστήριξη εξτρεμιστών και από την "αντίπαλη"πλευρά αυτή των ελεγχόμενων οργανώσεων της Σαουδικής Αραβίας και των κρατών του Κόλπου.


Ορισμένα ονόματα που έπαιξαν ρόλο στο ειδικότερο κομμάτι της μεταφοράς οπλισμού από τη Λιβύη στη Συρία προς εξοπλισμό των εκεί οργανώσεων παρουσιάζεται.


Ο ρόλος της Τουρκίας ήταν αυτός του συντονιστή και του κύριου διαμεσολαβητή, ενώ είναι βέβαιο ότι δεν κατέληξαν όλα τα όπλα στη Συρία, αλλά ορισμένα (αντί-αεροπορικά) παρέμειναν σε Τουρκικό έδαφος και μπορεί να εξοπλίσουν στο μέλλον έτερες τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις.  


Να σημειωθεί ότι το παρόν κείμενο δεν αναφέρεται στα του "Ισλαμικού Κράτους"δίκτυα, υποστήριξη και ονόματα. 







- Okab Sakr  (ΛΙΒΑΝΟΣ)


- Jamal Maarouf (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Riad al-Asaad (ΣΥΡΙΑ)

- Salim Idris  (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Afif Suleiman (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Molham Aldrobi (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Rasul Niyaz (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Abu Munther al Shanqiti (ΜΑΥΡΙΤΑΝΙΑ)


- Malek al-Kurdi (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Irshid al-Hajri (ΚΟΥΒΕΙΤ)


- Mouaz Moustafa (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Hajjaj al-Ajmi (ΚΟΥΒΕΙΤ)



- Mahdi al-Harati (ΛΙΒΥΗ)



- Ibrahim Ayoub (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Abdul Razzaq Tlass (ΣΥΡΙΑ)


- Abdullah Awda  (ΣΥΡΙΑ)



- Abdelhakim Belhadj (ΛΙΒΥΗ)



- Ali Akin Sait (Τούρκος διπλωμάτης-ο τελευταίος που είδε τον Αμερικανό Πρεσβευτή Κρίστοφερ Στέβενς πριν τη δολοφονία του το 2012)


- Mansour Kadasa (ΣΑΟΥΔΙΚΗ ΑΡΑΒΙΑ)


- Muhammad Hassan (ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΣ)


- Hazim Salih Abu Ismail (ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΣ)


- Safwat Hegazi (ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΣ)

Gulen's strong base in the Balkans, by Ioannis Michaletos

February 12, 2015, 10:36 am

≫ Next: Ισλαμική τρομοκρατία στην Ευρώπη,μια σύντομη αναφορά, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Οι Τουρκικοί σύνδεσμοι, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

Fetullah Gulen's international Islamic movement is for the past few years in the spotlight in Turkey due to his para-state mechanism he was able to orchestrate, with multiple layers of influence within the Police and state security forces and the education apparatus of the country. 




Although for years Erdogan's AKP political base was collaborating with Gulen, on a common global platform and in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood's global Islamic ambitions, the rift seems to have surpassed the level of compromise and a bitter fight ensues nowadays in Turkey.


Gulen's adherents and networks have flourished in the Balkans for years and constitute nowadays a formidable nexus of NGO's, religious centers, schools and colleges, as well as, private companies. The following passages outline their reach, with a focus in Albania.






Albania


Since the early 1990's and after the collapse of Communism in Albania, Gulen through the support of the Turkish state made his entrance in the country and has since then, created a multilayered parallel educational structure to the country's state school system.

Religious madrassas have been established in Berat, Tirana, Korca, Elbasan, Pogradec. Higher education colleges in Tirana, Durres, Skondra such as Turgut Ozal, Mehmet Akif, Hashan Risa Pasha respectively. Gulen places special attention into reaching out to the country's emerging elite, thus the highly -pursued private school for the local elite, that of the International School of Tirana, is a Gulen-owned one, whose graduates get access to either local or international universities that belong to the global Gullen system. 

NGO such as the Yeni Ufuklar, play a crucial role into cementing interpersonal relations between students and alumni, whilst local Sunni religious structures have been effectively influenced to a great extent by the people associating themselves with Gulen in Albania. 





Organization: Sema Foundation (Fondacioni Sema)


Mehmet Akif College (Kolegji Mehmet Akif) Tirana (1993)


Hasan Riza Pasha College (Shkolla Hasan Riza Pasha) Shkoder (2001) primary and secondary school, and kindergarten 


Institucioni Parashkollor M. Akif, Tirana (2006)


Meridian Course Center, a.k.a. Meridian Foreign Language and Training Courses Center (Qendër Kursesh Meridian) Tirana   http://www.meridian.edu.al/


Medresas operated by Sema Foundation in partnership with Komuniteti Musliman:


-Elbasan – Cerrik, Liria

-Kavajë, Hafiz Ali Korça,

-Tiranë, H. Mahmud Dashi

-Buharaja-Berat, Medrese Vexhi

-Korça





Epoka University, Tirana    http://www.epoka.edu.al/new/


Beder University   http://www.beder.edu.al   (opened April 2011; Sema Foundation)

Organization: Turgut Ozal Education Company    http://www.turgutozal.edu.al/

Turgut Ozal  kindergarten, primary and secondary school, high school, Tirana

Turgut Ozal College, kindergarten, primary, secondary and high school, Durres

Memorial International School of Tirana (secondary and high school)  http://www.mistedu.com/








Bosnia and Herzegovina


Organization: Bosna-Sema Educational Institutions  www.bosnasema.com

International Burch University   http://www.ibu.edu.ba/

Una Sana College (Unsko-Sanski Koledz)  http://www.unasanacollege.edu.ba/

International School of Sarajevo - Vraca http://internationalschool.ba/ips/eng/

International School of Sarajevo - Ilidza http://internationalschool.ba/iss/eng/

International School of Tuzla  http://internationalschool.ba/ist/eng/

International School of Zenica   http://internationalschool.ba/isz/eng/







Bulgaria


Umbrella organization:  Drujba Schools   http://www.drujba.org

Drujba Private School, Sofia   http://www.sofia.drujba.org

Drujba Private School, Plovdiv   http://www.plv.drujba.org

Drujba Study Center, Sofia   http://www.ec.drujba.org

Drujba Study Center, Plovdiv   http://www.ecp.drujba.org






Kosovo

Organization: Gülistan Educatıon Center  http://www.gulistan.edu.al/
http://www.gulistankosova.eu/
Mehmet Akif College, Prishtina     http://www.mackosova.com/default.asp
Mehmet Akif College, Prizren    http://www.mackosova.com/prizren/
International School of Prishtina    http://www.ispkosova.com/








FYROM

International Balkan University, Skopje   http://www.ibu.edu.mk

Private Yahya Kemal Colleges, Skopje  http://www.yahyakemalcollege.edu.mk    http://www.ykc.edu.mk
YKC ÜsküpAvtokomanda Lisesi  (high school)
YKC Gostivar Lisesi   (high school)
YKC Struga Lisesi   (high school)
YKC Üsküp Butel Lisesi   (high school)
YKC Üsküp İlkokulu   (primary school)
YKC Struga İlkokulu   (primary school)
YKC Strumica Lisesi   (high school)
YKC Tetova Bölgesi Lisesi   (high school)








Montenegro

University Mediterranean Podgorica (Atlas group)   http://www.unimediteran.net







Romania 

Umbrella organization: Lumina Educational Institutions  http://www.lumina.ro/
Scoala Spectrum Bucaresti   http://bucuresti.spectrum.ro
Scoala Spectrum Constanta   http://constanta.spectrum.ro
Scoala Internationala Spectrum Iasi   http://iasi.spectrum.ro/
Scoala Internationala Spectrum Cluj   http://cluj.spectrum.ro/
Scoala Internationala Spectrum Timisoara   http://timisoara.spectrum.ro/
Scoala Internationala Spectrum Ploiesti   http://ploiesti.spectrum.ro/
International Computer High School of Bucharest (ICHB) (Liceul International de Informatica Bucaresti)www.ichb.ro
International Computer High School of Constanta  (Liceul International de Informatica Constanta) www.ichc.ro
International School of Bucharest  http://www.isb.ro/
ISB Early Learning Centre  http://www.isb.ro/early-learning-centre/early-learning-centre

University:  University of Southeast Europe - Lumina University (Universitatea Europei de Sud-Est Lumina)   http://www.lumina.org








Serbia

Bejza Educational Center (languages, IT)    http://bejza.edu.rs/
Bejza Primary School   http://www.bejza.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=34&lang=rs









A safe estimation that can be mad at this point, is that the ongoing struggle between Erdogan and Gulen will spill over to the latter's Balkan networking leading to dissatisfaction of Ankara of his presence in the aforementioned countries, signaling an eventual decrease in Gulen's movement capabilities, especially those in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia. 



That does not mean that the infrastructure will vanish, on the contrary it will be directed into serving AKP's agenda by pushing out Gulen's directorship over it. As a result that will further enchase anxienty of the local governments of the subversion on long-term basis of the Turkish state in their societies. 

---

Ισλαμική τρομοκρατία στην Ευρώπη,μια σύντομη αναφορά, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

February 15, 2015, 8:55 am

≫ Next: Η "Έξοδος"των Κοσοβάρων και η Ελλάδα του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Gulen's strong base in the Balkans, by Ioannis Michaletos

$

0

0

Η τρομοκρατία στην Ευρώπη, που εκπορεύεται ή εμπνέεται από Ισλαμικούς κύκλους, συνεχίζει αμείωτα τη δράση της με πρόσφατο παράδειγμα την επίθεση στη Δανία που έρχεται να προστεθεί σε δεκάδες ενέργειες ή απόπειρες τους τελευταίους μήνες σε χώρες όπως η Γαλλία Αυστραλία, ΗΠΑ, Καναδάς, Βέλγιο και άλλες.






Παρόλα αυτά οι πολιτικές ηγεσίες της Ευρωπαικής Ένωσης και των γραφειοκρατών στις Βρυξέλλες, δείχνουν αδυναμία κατανόησης του φαινομένου και αρέσκονται σε κοινοτυπίες και σε στείρα εμμονική αντιγραφή αντί-τρομοκρατικών μεθόδων που προέρχονται από τις ΗΠΑ και τον λεγόμενο Αγγλοσαξωνικό κόσμο, αλλά δεν είναι πρακτικές για την Ηπειρωτική Ευρώπη.



Ειδικότερα, το τελευταίο διάστημα, έρχεται για πολλοστή φορά στην επιφάνεια το σχέδιο της Ε.Ε. για τον σχεδόν πλήρες φακέλωμα των εισερχομένων και εξερχομένων αεροπορικών πτήσεων από τη ζώνη του Σένγκεν προς τρίτες χώρες,με σκοπό να χαρτογραφηθεί και να αναλυθεί η τυχόν είσοδος Τζιχαντιστών στην Ε.Ε. και ειδικότερα στις χώρες που δεν διαθέτουν διαβατηριακούς ελέγχους μεταξύ τους, δηλαδή όλες, πλην της Βρετανίας-Ιρλανδίας, συν της Νορβηγίας, Ισλανδίας και Ελβετίας.



Το μέτρο αυτό θα επιβαρύνει τα μάλα τις Αρχές ασφαλείας με αρκετά δισεκατομμύρια "μετά-δεδομένα"ανά έτος, δίχως σοβαρή πρακτική αξία.


Ενώ στις ΗΠΑ, αλλά και στο Καναδά, Αυστραλία,Νέα Ζηλανδία και Βρετανία ο κύριος όγκος και σε αρκετές περιπτώσεις και ο μοναδικός που ένας ταξιδιώτης από το εξωτερικό μπορεί να εισέλθει είναι μόνο μέσω διεθνών πτήσεων-και σε επιλεγμένα αεροδρόμια- στην Ε.Ε υπάρχουν πολλαπλοί τρόποι μαζικής διεθνούς μετακίνησης και ιδιαίτερα από χώρες που βρίσκονται σε ζώνης υψηλού κινδύνου, λόγου χάρη από τη Μέση Ανατολή.


Ως εκ τούτου οι Αγγλοσάξωνες δίνουν πολύ μεγάλη έμφαση στα αεροδρόμια,ενώ στην υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη, η κατάσταση είναι εντελώς διαφορετική.



Επιπλέον, ο κύριος όγκος υπόπτων , ειδικότερα στις ΗΠΑ, προέρχεται εκτός των συνόρων, ενώ το μείζων πρόβλημα στην Ευρώπη, είναι οι εξτρεμιστές δεύτερης και τρίτης γενιάς, που λαθεμένα αποκαλούνται "ριζοσπάστες"ενώ στην πραγματικότητα είναι το εντελώς αντίθετο, και έχουν μια διαστρεβλωτική, παραμορφωμένη εικόνα του πλέον συντηρητικού Ισλάμ και όχι μια "ρίζο-σπαστική", καθότι θεωρούν οι ίδιοι ότι είναι σε πλήρη συνταύτιση με το πολεμικό Τζιχάντ του 7ου αιώνα μ.Χ. και δη στην Ευρώπη.




Προσέτι, ένα κορυφαίο ζήτημα αυτό των δουλεμπορικών δικτύων-λαθρομετανάστευσης που συνδέεται με την εισροή τόσο Τζιχαντιστών όσο και σημαντικών ομάδων πληθυσμού που ρέπουν στην δευτερογενή υποστήριξη των τρομοκρατών, έχει εντελώς διαφορετική πρακτική σημασία στην Ευρώπη από ότι στις ΗΠΑ.


Στην πρώτη περίπτωση ο κύριος όγκος των μεταναστών έρχεται οδικών ή δια θαλάσσης και όχι αεροπορικώς, ενώ είναι στη πλειονότητα τους Μουσουλμάνοι, ενώ στις ΗΠΑ ο κύριος όγκος είναι Μεξικανοί, Καθολικοί, που έρχονται δια ξηράς και βεβαίως δεν σχετίζονται με τρομοκρατικά δίκτυα (πολλοί όμως με εγκληματικά).



Πρέπει επίσης να σημειωθεί ότι τα Ευρωπαικά αεροδρόμια, χαρακτηρίζονται σε μεγάλο βαθμό από τη λειτουργία τους ως υπερατλαντικοί κόμβοι μη-Ευρωπαίων διερχόμενων επιβατών. Η Φρανκφούρτη, το Άμστερνταμ, η Ζυρίχη, το Λονδίνο, η Βιέννη, το Παρίσι και άλλα, δέχονται αρκετά εκατομμύρια επιβατών τράνζιτ από την Αμερικανική ήπειρο λόγου χάρη προς την Ασία ή από την Αφρική προς άλλους τρίτους προορισμούς και ούτω καθεξής. 


Σε αυτή την περίπτωση η παρακράτηση ταξιδιωτικών δεδομένων θα είχε καθόλα πρακτική αξία με σκοπό τόσο τη στρατηγική όσο και την τακτική αξιολόγηση και αντιμετώπιση τρομοκρατικών δικτύων σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο, όμως κάτι τέτοιο δεν προβλέπεται να γίνει γιατί αφορά και άλλα κράτη, ενώ δεν βρίσκεται και στην Ατζέντα της Ε.Ε. Εξ'άλλου οι ΗΠΑ δεν θα ήθελαν ποτέ τα κράτη μέλη της Ε.Ε να αποκτήσουν τόσο ευρεία "επισκόπηση"των πραγμάτων που την κρατούν για τον εαυτό τους εν είδει παγκόσμιου επιτηρητή, επιθεωρητή και κριτή.





Τέσσερις είναι οι βασικοί λόγοι που η Ε.Ε. αδυνατεί να παράξει πρακτική εφαρμογή αντί-τρομοκρατικής πολιτικής και αναλώνεται σε αντιγραφή Αμερικανικών προτύπων.





- Πίεση από τις ΗΠΑ, καθότι συνταιριάζει με τη δική τους εξειδίκευση και επιδιώξεις



- Έλλειψη Ευρωπαίων πολιτικών που να έχουν την παραμικρή σχέση με θέματα ασφάλειας και πληροφοριών,οπότε αναμασούν στη κυριολεξία ότι αντιλαμβάνονται από τα ΜΜΕ και κύκλους (αναρμόδιων) συμβούλων



- Έλλειψη "ανεξάρτητων" ιδρυμάτων και δεξαμενών σκέψεως στην Ευρώπη που να ασχολούνται με πρακτική πρωτογενή έρευνα, ανάλογα με τις ανάγκες κάθε χώρας και όχι με την αναμετάδοση σχολών σκέψης και εφαρμογής στις ΗΠΑ (φαινόμενο ακαδημαικού πιθηκισμού)



- Έλλειψη θάρρους από τους αξιωματούχους ασφαλείας και πληροφοριών των Ευρωπαικών κρατών να αναλάβουν να "επιμορφώσουν"τους πολιτικούς ηγήτορες για την διαμορφούμενη κατάσταση, παραλλήλως με την άκριτη υποστήριξη εισερχομένων μη-πρακτικών προτύπων, όπως προαναφέρθηκε.



Το πρόβλημα της τρομοκρατίας στην Ε.Ε. μόλις τώρα αρχίζει και θα συνεχιστεί εκτιμάται με πολλαπλές επιθέσεις μικρού και μεσαίου βεληνεκούς όπως αυτές στη Κοπεγχάγη και στο Παρίσι αντίστοιχα.



Επιπλέον η διάλυση της Λιβύης, η αστάθεια στην Αίγυπτο αλλά και στο Μαγκρέμπ και τη Νιγηρία, ο πόλεμος στη Συρία και το Ιράκ, σε συνδυασμό με τη διάλυση της Ουκρανίας, αλλά και τη εύθραυστη κατάσταση σε Λίβανο, Σουδάν, Σομαλία, Υεμένη και -μελλοντικά στην Αραβική Χερσόνησο-προιδεάζει για τα χειρότερα. 









Ζώνες κινδύνου με ταξινόμηση σε σχέση με την Ισλαμική τρομοκρατία στην Ευρώπη




Α ζώνη - υψηλός κίνδυνος

Βρετανία,Γαλλία, Βέλγιο, Ολλανδία, Βοσνία, Κόσοβο, Ευρωπαικό τμήμα Τουρκίας, Ευρωπαικό τμήμα Ρωσίας





Β ζώνη Μεσαίος κίνδυνος


Γερμανία,Ιταλία,Ισπανία,Δανία, Νορβηγία,Σουηδία, Αυστρία, Δανία, Ελβετία, Αγία Έδρα, Μονακό,ΠΓΔΜ






Γ ζώνη Χαμηλός κίνδυνος


Ελλάδα, Βουλγαρία, Ρουμανία, Ουγγαρία, Κροατίά, Πορτογαλία, Λουξεμβούργο, Φινλανδία, Λιχτενστάιν, Τσεχία, Πολωνία, Μάλτα, Κύπρος, Ιρλανδία, Αλβανία,Μαυροβούνιο, Αζερμπαιτζάν, Γεωργία,Αρμενία,Μολδαβία, Λευκορωσία






Δ ζώνη ελάχιστος κίνδυνος


Σλοβακία, Σλοβενία, Άγιος Μαρίνος, Ανδόρα, Εσθονία, Λετονία, Λιθουανία, Νησιά Φαρόε, Γροιλανδία, τμήματα Ε.Ε υπερπόντια (Καραιβική, Ειρηνικός ωκεανός, κτλ)

Η "Έξοδος"των Κοσοβάρων και η Ελλάδα του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

February 17, 2015, 2:28 pm

≫ Next: Countering Violent Extremism the Right Way, by Michael Rubin

≪ Previous: Ισλαμική τρομοκρατία στην Ευρώπη,μια σύντομη αναφορά, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

Το τελευταίο τρίμηνο, ένα αξιοσημείωτο φαινόμενο λαμβάνει χώρα στο Κοσσυφοπέδιο με ευρύτερες προεκτάσεις στην Ευρώπη.





Μαζικά και φαινομενικά απρογραμμάτιστα, φεύγουν κατά κύματα οι Αλβανοί κάθε ηλικίας και κυρίως διαμέσου Σερβίας-ακόμα και πεζή- κατευθύνονται στην Ουγγαρία. Στη συγκεκριμένη χώρα που είναι ο πρώτος σταθμός της Κεντρικής Ευρώπης στη ζώνη του Σένγκεν, οι περισσότεροι συλλαμβάνονται και εν συνεχεία αιτούνται άσυλο, το οποίο όμως δεν γίνεται αποδεκτό από τις τοπικές αρχές γιατί δεν θεωρούνται πρόσφυγες αλλά παράνομοι μετανάστες.



Εν συνεχεία οι πλειονότητα βρίσκει τρόπο μετάβασης στην Αυστρία και από εκεί κυρίως προς τη Γερμανία. Υπολογίζεται ότι τις τελευταίες 15 εβδομάδες πάνω από 70.000 Κοσοβάροι επέλεξαν τη φυγή από το τόπο τους, με το φαινόμενο να εντείνεται κυριολεκτικά μέρα με την ημέρα.



Χρόνια σοβαρά προβλήματα της περιοχής, όπως υψηλότατη ανεργία, διαφθορά και σχετικά υψηλό κόστος ζωής,καθότι το μη-αναγνωρισμένο αυτό κράτος από τον Ο.Η.Ε. έχει υιοθετήσει ως Ντε Φάκτο νόμισμα του το Ευρώ, έχουν βεβαίως συντελέσει στα ανωτέρω.



Ο κύριος όμως λόγος της μαζικής και ξαφνικής φυγής έγκειται στην ίδια τη βούληση της τοπικής ηγεσίας να μειώσει κάθετα την ανεργία ιδιαίτερα στις νεαρές ηλικίες όπου αγγίζει το 80%, καθότι είχαν αρχίσει να δημιουργούνται σοβαρότατα θέματα αμφισβήτησης της τοπικής "ελίτ"από ομάδες πολιτών. 


Επιπροσθέτως, έχουν μειωθεί οι χρηματοοικονομικές "μεταγγίσεις"από τη διεθνή κοινότητα όπως το ΝΑΤΟ και την Ε.Ε με αποτέλεσμα να μην είναι πλέον δυνατή η παροχή επιδομάτων, επισήμων και ανεπισήμων, σε μια ευρεία κατηγορία πολιτών,με σκοπό την εξαγορά της συναίνεσης τους.



Σε αυτό το σημείο έρχεται και ο Ελληνικό ρόλος. Η Αυστρία, η Γερμανία, η Ουγγαρία, αλλά και η Σερβία αποφάσισαν να δημιουργήσουν πλέον ένα αυστηρό πλαίσιο εξάλειψης του φαινομένου με περιπολίες, συλλήψεις των παράνομων μεταναστών και την όσο το δυνατόν διατάραξη αυτού του δρομολογίου που οδηγεί προς το Σένγκεν.



Ως εκ τούτου και καθόσον η έξοδος θα συνεχιστεί σύμφωνα με όλες τις διαθέσιμες πληροφορίες, η επόμενη εγγύτερη περιοχή-στόχος είναι η Ελλάδα κυρίως μέσω ΠΓΔΜ προς τη Θεσσαλονίκη και τη Μακεδονία. 



Αυτό αναμένεται να λάβει χώρα το θέρος του 2015 και δεν είναι βέβαιο ότι η Ελληνική Πολιτεία είναι προετοιμασμένοι για ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο. Σε αδρές γραμμές υπολογίζεται ότι 500.000 Κοσοβάροι επιθυμούν/προτρέπονται να μεταναστεύσουν. Συνεπώς το θέμα αυτό είναι σημαντικό όχι μόνο ως κοινωνικό αλλά και ως ζήτημα ασφάλειας. 




Πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι αρκετοί Κοσοβάροι θα έχουν τη δυνατότητα-αναλόγως και των διαθέσεων της Αλβανίας- να προμηθευτούν Αλβανικά διαβατήρια και κατά αυτό το τρόπο να εισέρχονται και από τα Ελληνό-Αλβανικά σύνορα. Σε γενικές γραμμές είναι φρόνιμο να υφίσταται προεργασία για πάσα περίπτωση. 

Countering Violent Extremism the Right Way, by Michael Rubin

February 20, 2015, 5:04 am

≫ Next: Why USA can and Egypt can't? by Giovanni Giacalone

≪ Previous: Η "Έξοδος"των Κοσοβάρων και η Ελλάδα του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the offices of French satirical paper Charlie Hebdo and the subsequent attack by Islamist extremists on a kosher market, President Barack Obama invited political and religious leaders to a Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. The whole summit is a bit amorphous and unfortunately seems to be the latest example of foreign policy by photo-op rather than substance.

 Crippling the U.S. effort is an unwillingness to address the theological component: violent interpretations of Islam. I have spent the last several days in Morocco, witness to the academic and diplomatic effort to counter extremism which was a major subject of discussion at the Marrakech Security Forum, and then in Rabat, where I was able to sit in on workshops in which Moroccan graduates of religious studies programs and peer leaders addressed strategies to identify and counter radicalism among their peers.
I have previously addressed some aspects of Morocco’s strategy to promote religious moderation, here. Morocco has pioneered the Mourchidat program, in which both men and women together study the same religious curriculum, but combine it with instruction in psychology, sociology, and history so that they can discuss and explain religion to ordinary people so that extremists do not have a blank slate upon which they can declare their interpretation of Islam to be the correct one.
In addition, the Moroccans have set up networks to reach across society in order to nip radicalization in the bud, and provide alternatives. Think a religious equivalent of Boys and Girls Clubs, one in which young people undertake activities that provide alternatives to the Islamist vision. Other groups reach out via children’s books, cartoons, and interactive websites, some for children, and others for serious discussion and debate about religion and radicalism. See, for example, www.chababe.ma, whose offices I visited today.
Many Western diplomats and experts understand that change will have to come from within. Moroccan religious leaders recognize there is no single summit or call for international attention which can moderate growing extremism within Islam. Rather, it is a decades-long struggle that requires building a group of religious scholars that have credibility to push back upon those Saudi- and Qatar-funded and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented scholars inclined either to politicize Islam or to push more intolerant lines.
It also means not dismissing moderation in places such as Morocco as simply peripheral to the world of Islam. Today, the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina lay in Saudi Arabia, but that is only because Ibn Saud in 1925 conquered the previous Kingdom of Hejaz. The reality is that Nejd, from where the Saudis came, was long obscure and marginal to Islamic history, and that Saudi Arabia itself and the brand of Islam which it (and Qatar) promotes was not relevant until they used oil wealth to promote it. Morocco and Moroccan religious scholars have traditionally been far more influential throughout Africa and during both the Umayyad and Fatimid eras, as well as under the Almoravids. In many ways, the Islam practiced in and increasingly promoted by Morocco is far more authentic than the Wahhabism espoused by Saudi Arabia.
Nor should Western officials dismiss voices of moderation simply because calls for moderation against extremism occur alongside political agendas. Here, the case of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is instructive. In late December, Sisi made an extraordinary speech at Al-Azhar University calling upon theologians to revolutionize and modernize religion. His speech was largely ignored in the United States and the West, but it reverberated across the Maghreb and the Middle East. American diplomats seem more intent on antagonizing and isolating Sisi or dismissing his call to revolutionize Islam as a political ploy to further undercut the Muslim Brotherhood. Even if that were the case, however, what’s wrong with that? Radical Islamism and the theology preached by the Muslim Brotherhood are inherently political. The only difference between Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood is that Sisi seeks to promote a vision of religion which embraces tolerance and enables greater individual liberty, while the Brotherhood seeks to constrain interpretations and de-legitimize those who seek interpretations of Islam which conform with individual liberty and broader religious tolerance.
In sum, there’s no shortage in the Middle East of efforts to counter violent extremism. Those in the region who seek to counter violent extremism don’t tie their hands with political correctness: They recognize that the problem lies within interpretations of Islam, and simply seek to counter those interpretations with better ones. Denying the legitimacy of the religious basis for extremism, however, is counterproductive. It is also arrogant, as the people who least have credibility to define what Islam is or is not are those like President Obama whose legitimacy is entirely political and not based in theology.
So what should the West do? We must embrace those like the Moroccan and Egyptian governments which actively seek to promote moderation. Moroccan King Mohammed VI and Sisi—and the religious scholars who work alongside them—have much greater standing to lead the drive than a White House intent on a photo-op or an easy answer. We must not stand in the way of those voices who acknowledge the need for contemporary interpretations that focus on the present and future rather than the past.
And we must not fall into the trap of assuming compromise means finding the lowest common denominator. Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) might be the loudest in the United States because their financiers provide the resources to enable them to be, but that does not mean anyone should treat them as sincere in the effort to counter radicalization; rather, we should recognize that their main goal is to obfuscate the theological roots of radicalism and undercut the sincere efforts of moderates across the Middle East and elsewhere to promote moderation, modernity, and tolerance within Islam.

Source:  http://www.aei.org/publication/countering-violent-extremism-right-way/

Why USA can and Egypt can't? by Giovanni Giacalone

February 20, 2015, 6:04 am

≫ Next: Stopping the Islamic State, by Ioannis Michaletos

≪ Previous: Countering Violent Extremism the Right Way, by Michael Rubin

$

0

0

The ISIS beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts on a beach in Libya has generated rage and disdain among the international community, as well as in the Arab world and a strong reaction from Cairo. The Egyptian and Emirates Air Force attacks on several sites of the group's stronghold in Derna, killed over 50 jihadists and destroyed a good part of their infrastructure. In addition, on Wednsday, Egyptian special forces raided Derna and captured a vast number of ISIS members.

 The Obama Administration immediately condemned the Egyptian and Emirate attacks in retaliation for the slaughter of the Christian Copts. According to Pentagon spokesman Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby, the U.S. believes the crisis in Libya must be solved politically and without outside interference:

"We discourage other nations from taking a part in Libya's issues through violence," Kirby said. "We want the issues solved in Libya to be done peacefully and through good governance and politics and not violence."[1]

At this point it is more than legitimate to raise a question: why would the United States be allowed to strike wherever they want, such as Iraq for instance, while other countries like Egypt, who are facing eminent threats, shouldn't be authorized to attack?

According to Kirby the circumstances that brought Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to carry out airstrikes in Libya were different from U.S. airstrikes against ISIS as the U.S. was acting in Iraq, in a "very targeted" manner, at the request of Baghdad's government and not with some unilateral decision.

As more details emerge, it seems that the U.S. went beyond the condemnation of the attacks. In fact, according to former US Marines officer, Oliver North, the Obama administration refused to assist Egypt with information on ISIS targets in Libya; same thing with Jordan in relation to the raids carried out by Amman in retaliation for the brutal execution of its Air Force pilot Moaz al-Kasabeh, burnt alive by ISIS.

Obama's links with the Muslim Brotherhood count more than an alliance with Egypt

Kirby's explanation makes no sense since the Obama administration has been constantly targeting objectives in various countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but going beyond Kirby's poor justification, it is more than obvious that Obama and his entourage have two major reasons to object Egypt's intervention against ISIS:

1. In the first place Obama cannot digest the recent deal between Russia and Egypt. In fact it is essential to recall that Abdelfattah al-Sisi has recently received in Cairo Russian President Vladimir Putin and the two countries signed an agreement for military and economic cooperation, that includes the construction of a nuclear energy plant in the northern city of El-Dabaa; an extremely important project for a country like Egypt, that often has to deal with energetic blackouts.

Al-Sisi is well aware that Russia is a serious and reliable ally that has always been in first line against terrorism and facts speak out: Russia outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and several other terror organizations in far 2003 with a law of the Supreme Court, while in the West several of them (including the MB) are still free to operate. In the northern Caucasus, Russia has responded firmly and strongly against the Caucasus Emirate, crushing the organization and eliminating its historical leader Dokku Umarov. Operations against what's left of the jihadi jamaats in the northern Caucasus are constantly underway with positive results.

In addition it is important to keep in mind that two Isis high members, Umar al-Shishani (who had threatened to bring jihad in Russia), and Abu Saad al-Daghestani (who was filmed in a video handing a gun to a young boy who executed two Russian citizens in Syria), were both eliminated.

Egypt needs a strong and reliable economic and military partner as, since the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherood-led government, the country has been facing a wave of terror attacks perpetrated by Islamist terrorists.

2. The reason why Egypt slipped out of the United States' hands also must be attributed to Obama and his stubborn alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact it is important to recall that during the July 2013 protests in Egypt, when the people, led by the Tamarrod movement, took the streets to ask for the resignations of the Muslim Brotherhood government led by Mohamed Morsy, the Obama administration refused to recognize the popular demands and supported the Islamist government until the last minute. When the Egyptian army intervened, the Obama administration immediately condemned the so called "coup" but forgot to keep in mind that millions of people took the streets to ask for new democratic elections. Quite strange for a nation that has always insisted on "exporting" democracy.

The Egyptian people in the streets were so upset by the behavior of former US ambassador to Cairo, Anne Patterson, who sided with the Morsy's government up to the point, that she had to quickly leave Egypt.

A few fat facts

The same Obama administration refused to take strong action when a group of Jihadists attacked the US embassy in Benghazi, Libya and slaughtered former ambassador Chris Stevens. Incredibly, while it was obvious that the attack had been coordinated and perpetrated by a large number of militants with trucks and RPG's, the Obama administration tried to define it as a spontaneous - not a premeditated - response to what had transpired in Cairo; a violent protest that had taken place in reaction to a video that had offended Muslim sensibility (Innocence of Muslims). [2]

Hence it is evident that Obama preferred to remain loyal to his Muslim Brotherhood fellows, even if it meant losing a key regional ally such as Egypt and for those who still have doubts about it, there are more interesting facts.

In the last week of January 2015, the US State Department hosted a delegation of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-aligned leaders for a meeting about their ongoing efforts to oppose the current government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The delegation included Waleed Sharaby, Gamal Heshmat, Abdel Mawgoud al-Dardery e Maha Azzam, all well-known MB activists. Sharaby even took a picture in front of the US State Department logo while flashing the four-finger symbol in front of the camera. The same gesture was also performed in a recent event by former US ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson.

These facts should not be a surprise; in fact another Muslim Brotherhood-aligned member, Mohamed Elbiary, had made it all the way to a high position in the United States Homeland Security Department and had to resign in September 2014 after some embarrassing comments in favor of the Caliphate, of the Muslim Brotherhood and against the protests of Egyptian Copts in Egypt. Elbiary had also taken part in the DHS Countering Violent Extremism Working Group and in the DHS Faith-Based Security and Communications Advisory Committee.

Another interesting member is Dalia Mogahed, Obama's advisor to Islamic issues, Muslim Brotherhood supporter and associate of Georgetown University professor John Esposito, who has also expressed strong positions in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood on several occasions.

In 2009, Dalia Mogahed appeared in a London-based television broadcast presented by Ibtihal Bsis, deputy media representative for Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization that has been black listed in several countries including Russia. [3] [4]

At this point it is not hard to understand why Obama does not want to support Egypt and does not want other state-actors to attack jihadists in Libya. The US Administration discourages any type of military intervention, which is the same message that has been given to Italy by the Arabic website of the Muslim Brotherhood. [5]

---

[1] http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/pentagon-egypt-uae-attacking-islamists-libya-differs-us-bombing-isis

[2] http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/11/16/flashback-what-susan-rice-said-about-benghazi/

[3] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/6274387/Obama-adviser-says-Sharia-Law-is-misunderstood.html

[4] http://icsr.info/2009/10/obama-must-fire-dalia-mogahed/

[5] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtID=223170&SecID=480

Source: http://english.pravda.ru/world/africa/19-02-2015/129869-usa_egypt_libya_isis-0/

Stopping the Islamic State, by Ioannis Michaletos

February 20, 2015, 8:39 am

≫ Next: Το Ισλαμικό κράτος στη Μεσόγειο:Σενάρια δράσεως, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Why USA can and Egypt can't? by Giovanni Giacalone

$

0

0

The formidable expansion and mutation of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) deriving from the "ISIS" group, also known simply as "Daesh", is heading into a point where important and decisive measures by the international community must be taken.







The costs of a non-combat of the IS, greatly exceeds its tolerance. It has already established a firm root in both Syria and Iraq, and it has expanded its presence in Lebanon and Libya, whilst it aligned itself and collaborates with Jihadist groups in Yemen, Sinai Peninsula and Afghanistan. 




Furthermore it retains cells of supporters in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and in many EU countries. The phenomena which has been numerously analyzed, of the "Jihadi volunteers" coming from dozens of countries across the world, ensures that IS has now a virtual global networking, making it far more dangerous than any other previous Jihadi structure, most notably Al Qaeda. 



Already IS has either by itself or through willing co-opts staged attacks in France, Australia, Canada, Belgium and Denmark, while numerous attempts have been canceled or been presently monitored by authorities. The costs of alerting the EU countries in particular has been already enormous and it will get worse if we take into account that IS prepares to stage spectacular destabilization campaigns against European countries by using Libya as a springboard.


Up to date the policies of all countries involved in the MENA regions conflict have been a spectacular failure. The aftermath of the "Arab Spring" has resulted - to paraphrase- in an "Afghan winter". Libya is officially classified as a failed state, Syria is already the largest training ground for terrorism in the world, and Iraq has been severely traumatized. Concurrently Egypt is still experiencing aftershocks of the 2011 "revolution", while Yemen is on the brink of collapse. Eventually the overall instability in a region from Nigeria (Boko Haram) to Pakistan will result in massive refugee waves, great upward in the global energy index and a series of peripheral wars.



Despite all the above, the international community fails until the present day to take bold steps to put an end, or at least minimize the consequences. Iraq's parliamentary commission in a recent research assess that arms shipments regularly are being sent to the IS fighters, presumably from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States supporters. In the meantime IS continues to receive "donations “made by various supporters across the Islamic communities in MENA, mostly via Hawala networks. That explains the vitality of the IS despite the significant drop in oil crude prices over the past few months and how the organization kept a tight grip and was able to further finance recruitment of new fighters, to train them and also to wage even more sophisticated attacks both physical and propaganda ones. 




Moreover Iran, Iraq but also Lebanon and Syria are still left outside a thorough security planning concerning the combat of IS, despite being the prime targets of its aggression. Thus instead of these countries to be used as a bulwark, so as to, stop the Islamic State from expansion, they are left with their own devices to deal with the situation. In sort, IS plays with little restrictions and it is a matter of time before it unleashes further destructive attacks in the region and beyond.


The Assad's regime in Damascus, has proved capable beyond any doubt to withstand pressure from all sides, thus even the most cynical adversary of the Syrian government would have realized and estimated by now, that Islamic State is no longer a threat of overtaking the main urban centers in this country and toppling the government. Therefore any support either direct or indirect of IS, cannot be correlated with any geopolitical advantages by groups aiming to achieve an administration change in Syria. 


Even the so-called "Moderate Islamic opposition" is an essentially non-existent force in the Syrian battlefield, since most of them have been absorbed either willingly or enforced into the ranks of IS. In the meantime a steady flow of volunteers from across the planet, ensures that IS has an increased fighting force which vastly exceeds the small numbers of infantry that are supposed to oppose them, via mostly US aid. In reality the ration is more than 50/1, thus there is no comparison between the fighting strength of IS against Western lead rebels. 


Air bombing campaigns; have also limited effect to IS, since it operates in a decentralized mode and in multiple state jurisdictions, being able to shift in a fast mode its mobile logistical bases and various "min-headquarters". More than 10 million USD are being spent daily for dozens of weeks by the American air force, with no practical effect so far. On the other hand, a land campaign involving "boots on the ground" would prove to be even costlier both in terms of lives lost-injured and capital expenditures. More importantly it will re-ignite "Jihadism" in the MENA region and result in multiple and unpredictable geopolitical complications.


A basic road map for the combat of IS, should first of all include the UN's general assembly, so as for the world community to show a unified diplomatic face against the threat and isolate in an immediate and absolute fashion, those supporting the Islamic State. 


Secondly intermediates, donors and all kinds of supporters should be tracked and penalized, so as to cause a major setback in IS's logistic and operational capabilities. Hostage ransoms should be universally banned from being paid-as brutal as this may seem at first glance- whilst all necessary measures should be taken to exclude IS from selling oil in the international contraband market. 

International authorities should also set up a process by which Syrian government and its secular opposition would be able to sit down and negotiate a peaceful resolution and thereafter join forces against IS. In parallel cells in Europe and in Turkey should be mapped and arrested under special judicial provisions and as a top priority.

Regarding Libya in particular, an international diplomatic process, by which leading tribe figures and the current government would be cajoled into agreeing for a unified stance and combat of IS offshoots is greatly needed. 


Turkey in particular should also be made to realize that Islamic State is a factor of instability that would make its move against Ankara sooner or later, since that is the nature of this Jihadi movement and it cannot be controlled, contained, or made into following a specific agenda, in this case that of "Neo-Ottomanism". 


Should all the above conditions are set, the decline of IS would be inevitable and will not be able to last more than a few months ahead. Otherwise the stakes are high and destabilization may hit particularly hard, even seemingly solid in political terms countries, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. 



Recent history has proved that the Middle East regimes are extremely susceptible in grass roots movements and those of trans-border nature, especially when filled and boosted with religious fanaticism. 

Το Ισλαμικό κράτος στη Μεσόγειο:Σενάρια δράσεως, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

February 22, 2015, 10:46 am

≫ Next: Bibliography: Terrorism Originating from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia

≪ Previous: Stopping the Islamic State, by Ioannis Michaletos

$

0

0

Η έλευση του λεγόμενου Ισλαμικού Κράτους (Ι.Κ) στη Μεσόγειο και ειδικότερα στη Λιβύη, αλλά και η σύμπραξη του με Τζιχαντιστικές ομάδες στη Χερσόνησο του Σινά και  ευρύτερα στην περιοχή του Μαγκρέμπ με την Αλ Κάιντα, εντείνει τις ανησυχίες των Ευρωπαϊκών κρατών για νέες τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις.






Το θέμα έχει ευρύτερες προεκτάσεις, καθότι υπάρχουν σενάρια και σχέδια επί χάρτου που μελετώνται από Αρχές ασφαλείας αρκετών κρατών, σχετικά με πιθανολογούμενες ενέργειες του Ι.Κ και των υποστηρικτών του στην περιοχή της Μεσογείου και σε άμεση συνάρτηση με επιθέσεις, κυρίως μη-συμβατικού τύπου, δια θαλάσσης. 



Το παρόν κείμενο παρουσιάζει ορισμένα από τα πιο βασικά σενάρια τα οποία μελετώνται τόσο για το προσεχές μέλλον, όσο και μεσοπρόθεσμα, βασιζόμενα στις επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες αυτών των Τζιχαντιστών, τα αδύνατα σημεία των υπαρχόντων Ευρωπαϊκών συστημάτων ασφαλείας, αλλά και των τάσεων που δύναται να αναπτυχθούν από τη δράση των τρομοκρατικών ομάδων σε συνδυασμό με δυνατότητες περαιτέρω εξάπλωσης τους, μέσω στρατολογήσεων και προσέγγισης και άλλων φίλιων δυνάμεων.







ΣΕΝΑΡΙΑ




- Το Ι.Κ. βοηθά αποφασιστικά στη μαζική έξοδο παράνομων μεταναστών από τη Λιβύη με σκοπό να δημιουργήσει συνθήκες μεγάλης ανθρωπιστικής κρίσης με στόχευση την Ιταλία και τη Μάλτα.

+

Τζιχαντιστές σε σημαντικό αριθμό υποδύονται τους μετανάστες και εν συνεχεία πραγματοποιούν επιθέσεις σε δυνάμεις του Λιμενικού που βοηθούν στη δάσωση μεταναστών




- Τ ο Ι.Κ. ετοιμάζει επίθεση επιπέδου "Βομβάης 2008"που περιλαμβάνει αμφίβιες δυνάμεις που θα προκαλέσουν μεγάλα πλήγματα σε τουριστικά θέρετρα της Μεσογείου






- Το Ι.Κ. εφαρμόζει καταδρομικές θαλάσσιες επιδρομές κυρίως σε πετρελαιοφόρα και πλοία LNG που διατρέχουν τη θαλάσσια γραμμή Γιβραλτάρ -Σουέζ




- Το Ι.Κ. προχωρά σε απαγωγές ψαράδων και πληρωμάτων μικρών και τουριστικών πλοίων στη Μεσόγειο




- Το Ι.Κ τοποθετεί νάρκες στη Μεσόγειο



- Το Ι.Κ. ανατινάζει αγωγούς φυσικού αερίου που συνδέουν το Μαγκρέμπ με Ιταλία και Ισπανία.




- Το Ι.Κ. προμηθεύεται από τη διεθνή "μαύρη αγορά όπλων"πυραύλους μέσου βεληνεκούς και χτυπά κατοικημένες περιοχές στη Μάλτα-Σικελία



- Επιπλέον προχωρά σε πυραυλικές επιθέσεις και σε διερχόμενα πλοία και ιδιαίτερα κρουαζιερόπλοια



- Επιθέσεις με ρουκέτες,πυραύλους ή/και τοποθέτηση ναρκών στο Κανάλι του Σουέζ



- Επίθεση με χημικά/βιολογικά όπλα στο ποταμό Νείλο και σε κλειστές θαλάσσιες περιοχές στη Μεσόγειο




- Τοποθέτηση πολύ μεγάλης ποσότητας εκρηκτικών (άνω των 1.000 τόνων) σε εμπορικά πλοία τα οποία θα συντονιστούν να εκραγούν είτε σε λιμένες της Μεσογείου είτε στο Κανάλι του Σουέζ. Επιπλέον μικρότερες επιθέσεις με ψαράδικα και γιότ εξοπλισμένα με εκρηκτικά σε ανάλογους στόχους. 






Τα σενάρια αυτά υποθέτουν ότι ο σκοπός του Ι.Κ. είναι η πρόκληση μεγάλου κόστους στις χώρες του ΝΑΤΟ/ΕΕ και των "Κοσμικών Αραβικών κρατών"σε βαθμό της οικονομικής αποσταθεροποίησης στρατηγικής φύσεως. 


Επιπλέον τέτοιου είδους επιθέσεις θα καθιερώσουν το Ι.Κ. στην αδιαμφισβήτητη πρώτη βαθμίδα του διεθνούς Τζιχαντιστικού κινήματος και θα προκαλέσουν μεγάλα κύματα στρατολόγησης υπέρ του.


Ακόμα, θα προσδώσουν μεγάλα διαπραγματευτικά χαρτιά στο Ι.Κ. που εδρεύει σε Συρία-Ιράκ σε σχέση με πιθανή διεθνή αναγνώριση του.



Στην περίπτωση που το ΝΑΤΟ επιχειρήσει επέμβαση στη Λιβύη με χερσαίες δυνάμεις θα εμπλακεί σε έναν ακόμα αγώνα με αντάρτες με απροσδιόριστη χρονική κατάληξη, ενώ περαιτέρω θα φανατιστούν μάζες εκατομμυρίων που τηρούν το λιγότερο "συμπαθή"στάση ως προς το Ι.Κ.



Εν ολίγοις μπορεί να λεχθεί ότι η καλύτερη αντιμετώπιση του Ι.Κ. είναι η ταχύτατη και άμεση σε παρόντα χρόνο εξουδετέρωση του τόσο στη Λιβύη όσο και στη Συρία-Ιράκ από όλη τη διεθνή κοινότητα, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και των κυβερνήσεων της Συρίας, Αιγύπτου, Ιράκ και των κοσμικών δυνάμεων της Λιβύης. 


Οποιαδήποτε αβελτηρία μπορεί να στοιχίσει πολύ ακριβά, ιδιαίτερα στις χώρες της Νότιας Ευρώπης. 

Bibliography: Terrorism Originating from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia

February 23, 2015, 7:27 am

≫ Next: List of People and Organizations Financing Terrorism

≪ Previous: Το Ισλαμικό κράτος στη Μεσόγειο:Σενάρια δράσεως, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

Compiled and Selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorism in the Caucasus region, Central Asia, and Russia as well as terrorist activity originating from these regions abroad. 

Though focusing on recent (non-Russian language) literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to December 2014. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; Caucasus; Central Asia; Russia, terrorism

NB: All websites were last visited on 01.01.2015.

Bibliographies and other Resources

Alizada, Afa et al. (Eds.) (2009-): Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation. [ISSN: 2155-5478]. URL:http://caucasusedition.net

American Research Institute of the South Caucasus (ARISC) (2006-): URL: http://arisc.org

Aris, Stephen et al. (Eds.) (2006-): Russian Analytical Digest (RAD). [ISSN: 1863-0421]. URL:http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/RAD_EN

Books for Understanding (2014, August): Chechnya. URL: http://www.booksforunderstanding.org/chechnya/list.html

Broers, Laurence et al. (Eds.) (2013, October-): Caucasus Survey. URL: http://www.caucasus-survey.org

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Staff of CSIS’s Human Rights and Security Initiative (2007): Northern Caucasus and Russia. In: Counterterrorism Research Bibliography, 15-16. URL:http://csis.org/images/stories/hrs/counterterrorismbibliography.pdf

Chitashvili, Marine; MacFarlane, S. Neil (Eds.) (2013-): Caucasus Social Science Review. [ISSN: 2233-3223]. URL:http://openjournals.gela.org.ge/index.php/CSSR

Cornell, Svante E.; Nilsson, Niklas (Ed.) (2002, March-): The Central Asia-Caucasus ANALYST: A Biweekly Briefing on Current Affairs. URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org

Demirtepe, Turgut; Hatipoğlu, Esra (Eds.) (2006-): Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları [Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies]. [ISSN: 1306-682X]. URL: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/publicationdetails.aspx?publicationId=585b10bd-da4b-4d11-80b9-d933bfbf1f75

Hahn, Gordon M. (Author & Ed.) (2009-): Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER). URL:http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report

Jackson, Alexander; Tatum, Jesse (Eds.) (2006-): Caucasian Review of International Affairs. [1865-6773]. URL:http://cria-online.org

Murphy, Paul; Mitchell, L. (2005-): Russia-Eurasia Terror Watch (RETWA). URL: http://www.retwa.com

Books and Edited Volumes

Anemone, Anthony (Ed.) (2010): Just Assassins: The Culture of Terrorism in Russia. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Aydin, Mustafa (Ed.) (2011): Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus.(NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 77). Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Bascio, Patrick (2007): Defeating Islamic Terrorism: The Wahhabi Factor. Wellesley: Branden Books.

Bichsel, Christine (2009): Conflict Transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation Disputes in the Ferghana Valley. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 14). Abingdon: Routledge.

Blank, Stephen J. (Ed.) (2012, October): Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus. [e-Book]. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1116

Bowker, Mike (2007): Russia, America and the Islamic World. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bugajski, Janusz (2014, February): Conflict Zones: North Caucasus and Western Balkans Compared. [e-Book]. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. URL: http://jamestown.org/uploads/tx_jamquickstore/Balkans-NC_Book_-_text.pdf

Bullough, Oliver (2010): Let Our Fame Be Great: Journeys among the Defiant People of the Caucasus. New York: Basic Books.

Burger, Ethan S.; Cheloukhine, Serguei (2013): Counterterrorism in Areas of Political Unrest: The Case of Russia’s Northern Caucasus. (Springer Briefs in Criminology). New York: Springer. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5140-2

Companjen, Françoise; Marácz, László; Versteegh, Lia (Eds.) (2010): Exploring the Caucasus in the 21st Century: Essays on Culture, History and Politics in a Dynamic Context. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications.

Dannreuther, Roland; March, Luke (Eds.) (2010): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge.

Derluguian, Georgi M. (2005): Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

de Waal, Thomas (2010): The Caucasus: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Donaldson, Robert H.; Nogee, Joseph L.; Nadkarni, Vidya (2014): The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. (5th ed.). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Dunlop, John B. (1998): Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ergun, Ayça; Isaxanli, Hamlet (Eds.) (2013): Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 107). Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Evangelista, Matthew (2002): The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Fitz, Duncan; Sanderson, Thomas M.; Marshall, Sung In (2014, May): Central Asian Militancy: A Primary Source Examination. [e-Book]. Washington, DC; Lanham: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/140509_Fitz_CentralAsianMilitancy_WEB.pdf

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Ed.) (2011): South Caucasus: 20 Years of Independence. [e-Book]. Tbilisi: Editor. URL:http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/georgien/08706.pdf

Gammer, Moshe (1994): Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan. London: Frank Cass.

Gammer, Moshe (2006): The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule. London: Hurst.

Geifman, Anna (1993): Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Geifman, Anna (2010): Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.

Gilligan, Emma (2010): Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War. (Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grant, Bruce (2009): The Captive and the Gift: Cultural Histories of Sovereignty in Russia and the Caucasus. (Culture and Society after Socialism). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Griffin, Nicholas (2001): Caucasus: A Journey to the Land between Christianity and Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hahn, Gordon M. (2007): Russia’s Islamic Threat. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Heathershaw, John (2009): Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 16). Abingdon: Routledge.

Hughes, James (2007): Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Johnson, Rob (2007): Oil, Islam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945. London: Reaktion Books.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2010): Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 21). Abingdon: Routledge.

Khalid, Adeeb (2007): Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khodarkovsky, Michael (2011): Bitter Choices: Loyalty and Betrayal in the Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

King, Charles (2008): The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knezys, Stasys; Sedlickas, Romanas (1999): The War in Chechnya. (Eastern European Studies, Vol. 8). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Le Huérou, Anne et al. (Eds.) (2014): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge.

Malek, Martin; Schor-Tschudnowskaja, Anna (Eds.) (2008): Europa im Tschetschenienkrieg: Zwischen politischer Ohnmacht und Gleichgültigkeit. (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 84). Stuttgart: ibidem.

McKay, George et al. (Eds.) (2009): Subcultures and New Religious Movements in Russia and East-Central Europe.(Cultural Identity Studies, Vol. 15). Bern: Peter Lang.

Menon, Rajan; Fedorov, Yuri E.; Nodia, Ghia (Eds.) (1999): Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Murphy, Paul J. (2004): The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism. Dulles: Brassey’s.

National Research Council; Russian Academy of Sciences (Eds.) (2009): Russian Views on Countering Terrorism during Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Naumkin, Vitaly V. (2005): Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle. (The Soviet Bloc and After). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Ó Beacháin, Donnacha; Polese, Abel (2010): The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 23). Abingdon: Routledge.

Olcott, Martha Brill (2012): In the Whirlwind of Jihad. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2011): Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 25). Abingdon: Routledge.

Oskanian, Kevork (2013): Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. (New Security Challenges). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oushakine, Serguei Alex. (2009): The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia. (Culture and Society after Socialism). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Politkovskaya, Anna (2003): A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya. [Alexander Burry; Tatiana Tulchinsky, Trans.]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Rashid, Ahmed (2002): Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New York: Penguin Books.

Rashid, Ahmed (2008): Descent into Chaos: The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. (Rev. ed.). New York: Penguin Books.

Rich, Paul B. (Ed.) (2010): Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West. Abingdon: Routledge.

Richmond, Walter (2008): The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 12). Abingdon: Routledge.

Russell, John (2007): Chechnya – Russia’s “War on Terror”. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 34). Abingdon: Routledge.

Saparov, Arsène (2014): From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 29). Abingdon: Routledge.

Schaefer, Robert W. (2011): The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.

Schweitzer, Glenn E. et al. (2006): Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the United States: Proceedings of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Shishkin, Philip (2013): Restless Valley: Revolution, Murder and Intrigue in the Heart of Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Simons, Greg (2010): Mass Media and Modern Warfare: Reporting on the Russian War on Terrorism. Farnham: Ashgate.

Tanrisever, Oktay F. (Ed.) (2013): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Tishkov, Valery (2004): Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. (California Series in Public Anthropology, Vol. 6). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Toft, Monica Duffy (2003): The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Trenin, Dmitri V.; Malashenko, Aleksei V.; Lieven, Anatol (2004): Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Verhoeven, Claudia (2009): The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity and the Birth of Terrorism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ware, Robert Bruce (Ed.) (2013): The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Yemelianova, Galina (Ed.) (2010): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge.

Theses

Archbold, Kenneth Ora (2012, December): A Bear in the Mountains: Russian Policy in the Caucasus Region. (Master’s Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/19656

Bernard, Andrew T. (2005, June): The Eagle, the Bear, and the Yurt: Evaluating Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Policy Behavior with the United States and Russia in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2185

Bond, Dottie (2009, April): Negotiating with Separatist Terrorists. (Master’s Thesis, University of Denver, Denver, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10176/codu:63302

Burns, Nathan L. (2009, Summer): An Uncertain Place in Uncertain Times: The South Caucasus. (Master’s Thesis, University of Central Florida, Orlando, United States). URL: http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2570

Chapman, James Lawson (2006, Autumn): The Modern Great Game in Central Asia. (Master’s Thesis, The University of Montana, Missoula, United States). URL: http://etd.lib.umt.edu/theses/available/etd-12152006-214828

Dennis, Michael Patrick (2011, December): Attitudes in Transition: Chechen Refugees and the Politics of Violence.(Doctoral Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL:http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4703

Edwards, Kimberly G. (2013, August): A Necessary Monster? Vladimir Putin’s Political Decisions Regarding the “Secession” of Chechnya and the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). (Master’s Thesis, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, United States). URL: http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1690

Edwards, Michael (2012, June): Collective Political Violence in the North Caucasus: Chechen Conflict and Insurgency Analysis. (Bachelor’s Thesis, Linnaeus University, Kalmar, Sweden). URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-20765

Fischl, Kurt E. (2002, June): Nato-Russian Relations: Opportunities and Obstacles. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA405832

Garvie, Brett A. (2002, December): Chechnya and Russia: Conflict and Self-Determination. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3914

Grandstaff, John M. (2011, April): Russia’s Wild Wild South: Two Tales of Economic Woes, Political Corruption and Spreading Insurgent Violence in Ingushetia and Dagestan. (Master’s Thesis, University of Kansas, Lawrence, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/8071

Heywood, Emma (2014): Foreign Conflict Reporting Post-9/11 and Post-Cold War: A Comparative Analysis of European Television News Coverage of the Middle East Conflict. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom). URL: https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/uk-ac-man-scw:229014

Isakiewicz, Maja (2012): State-Sponsored Terrorism: An Effective Tool of Conducting International Relations? The Implications of Soviet Support for International Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, West Virginia University, Morgantown, United States). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 1520599)

Johnston, William Jerry, Jr. (2007, April): From Revolution to Realpolitik: Iran’s Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991. (Master’s Thesis, Florida State University, Tallahassee, United States). URL:http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/etd/3443

Koch, Natalie Rochelle (2009): Nation-Building, Geopolitics, and the Andijon Uprising: Securitizing Discourses in Uzbekistan. (Master’s Thesis, University of Colorado, Boulder, United States). URL:http://www.nataliekoch.com/docs/Koch_2009_MA_thesis.pdf

Lutsenko, Olga Olegovna (2008, September): Terrorism from a Russian Legal Perspective: The Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism into the Russian Legislation. (Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway). URL: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/22762

Lydic, Lauren Janora-Leigh (2010): Metaphor and Gender in Conflict: Discourse, the Bosnian War, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Chechen Wars. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada). URL:http://hdl.handle.net/1807/32943

Mahalik, Debendra (2009): Russia-India Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism, 1991-2006. (Doctoral Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India). URL: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/18325

Marksberry, Brian Robert (2011): Russian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus. (Master’s Thesis, Miami University, Oxford, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1323399479

Miner, Jonathan Samuel (2007): Spokes of a Wheel: The Cooperative Response of Government and Civil Society to International Terrorism in Indonesia, Russia, Spain, Turkey and the United States. (Doctoral Thesis, University of South Carolina, Columbia, United States). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3272470)

Mitchell, Shenequa L. (2007, December): Unresolved Ethnic Conflict and Religious Revival in Russia: The Chechen Element. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3093

Moore, Christopher David (2008): Beyond a Contest of Wills: A Theory of State Success and Failure in Insurgent Conflicts. (Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, United States). URL:http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1211875453

Oermann, Ross Laurence (2010, May): Russia’s Federal Security Service in the Twenty-First Century: Terrorism, the Political Manipulation of Domestic Intelligence, and the Dramatic Expansion of the FSB. (Master’s Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-917

Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2007): Counterterrorism and Human Rights: Explaining Differences in the Scope and Brutality of States’ Responses to Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, Purdue University, West Lafayette, United States). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3291087)

Osborne, Paul Kenneth (2012, August): Ethnic Conflict and its Connection to Terrorism in the Republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. (Master’s Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States). URL:http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-08-6354

Petykowski, Jennifer L. (2004, September): Russia’s Interests in the Global War on Terrorism: Implications for a Continuing US-Russian Partnership. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL:https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=450663

Pokalova, Elena (2011): Shifting Faces of Terror after 9/11: Framing the Terrorist Threat. (Doctoral Thesis, Kent State University, Kent, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1322435499

Ratelle, Jean-François (2013): Radical Islam and the Chechen War Spillover: A Political Ethnographic Reassessment of the Upsurge of Violence in the North Caucasus since 2009. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada). URL:http://hdl.handle.net/10393/23791

Renaud, Sean (2010): A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency during the Two Chechen Wars and Future Implications. (Master’s Thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand). URL:http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/1804

Russo, Michael C. (2007): The Chechen Revolution(s) and the Future of Instability in the North Caucasus. (Master’s Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, United States). URL: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/7740

Shannon, William D. (2008, June): Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void Lessons from the Chechen Wars. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4005

Skrzypek, Janina Karolina (2013): Is Terrorism Theatre? Dramaturgical Metaphor in the Cases of Budyonnovsk, Dubrovka and Beslan. (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom).

Sumner, Dianne Leigh (1999, September): Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9039

Tewell, Zachary (2014): Digital Discourse, Online Repression, and Cyberterrorism: Information Communication Technologies in Russia’s North Caucasus Republics. (Master’ Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 1557209)

Vishnevetsky, Michael (2009): A Socio-Historical Study into the Emergence and Development of Terrorist Networks in the Post-Soviet Chechen Republic. (Doctoral Thesis, Keele University, Newcastle-under-Lyme, United Kingdom). URL:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.499342

Watts, Stephen Baldwin (2007, May): Constructing Order Amid Violence: Comparative Military Interventions in the Era of Peacekeeping and Counter-Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, Cornell University, New York, United States). URL:http://hdl.handle.net/1813/5297

Yandaş, Osman Gökhan (2005, June): Emerging Regional Security Complex in Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Challenges of the Post 9/11 World. (Master’s Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey). URL: http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12606201/index.pdf

Zaonegin, Oleg (2011): Islamic Factors in the Socio-Political Life of Post-Soviet Russia. Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3494344)

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Abdullaev, Nabi; Saradzhyan, Simon (2006): Russia’s Responses in the War on Terror: Legal, Public Policy, Institutional and Operational Strategies. In: Robert W. Orttung; Andrey Makarychev (Eds.): National Counter-Terrorism Strategies.(NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 14). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 191-202.

Abdullaev, Nabi; Saradzhyan, Simon (2008): Trade-Offs between Security and Civil Liberties in Russia’s Counter-Terrorist Campaign in 2000-2004: Six Regional Case Studies. In: Robert W. Orttung; Anthony Latta (Eds.): Russia’s Battle with Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism. (Routledge Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Series). Abingdon: Routledge, 144-198.

Akaev, Vahit (2010): Islam and Politics in Chechniia and Ingushetiia. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 62-81.

Akchurina, Viktoria; Lavorgna, Anita (2014): Islamist Movements in the Fergana Valley: A New Threat Assessment Approach. Global Crime, 15(3-4), 320-336. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2014.924406

Akhmedova, Khapta; Speckhard, Anne (2006): A Multi-Causal Analysis of the Genesis of Suicide Terrorism: The Chechen Case. In: Jeff Victoroff (Ed.): Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 11). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 324-354.

Aliyev, Fuad (2013, January): The Gülen Movement in Azerbaijan. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 14, 90-103. URL:http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1145/20130124_ct14final.pdf

Aliyev, Huseyn (2010, Autumn): Peace-Building from the Bottom: A Case Study of the North Caucasus. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 4(4), 325-341. URL: http://cria-online.org/13_2.html

Allan, Stuart (2014, August): Witnessing in Crisis: Photo-Reportage of Terror Attacks in Boston and London. Media, War & Conflict, 7(2), 133-151. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635214531110

Allison, Graham (2006): Globalization, Terrorism, and the U.S. Relationship with Russia. In: Richard N. Rosecrance; Arthur A. Stein (Eds.): No More States? Globalization, National Self-Determination, and Terrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 95-110.

al-Shishani, Murad Batal (2014, February): Islamist North Caucasus Rebels Training a New Generation of Fighters in Syria. Terrorism Monitor, 12(3), 7-9. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue3.pdf

Arquilla, John; Karasik, Theodore (1999): Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,22(3), 207-229. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/105761099265739 URL:http://nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Cebrowski/Research/ArquillaIO/Arquilla%20Chechnya%20article.pdf

Asif, Farhat (2011, January-March): Pakistan’s Ties with Central Asian States Irritants and Challenges. Conflict and Peace Studies, 4(1). URL: http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=165.pdf

Awofeso, Niyi; Ritchie, Jan; Degeling, Pieter (2003): The Almajiri Heritage and the Threat of Non-State Terrorism in Northern Nigeria: Lessons from Central Asia and Pakistan. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26(4), 311-325. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100390208260

Bakke, Kristin M. (2010): The Turn to Violence in Separatist Struggles in Chechnya and Punjab. In: Erica Chenoweth; Adria Lawrence (Eds.): Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict. (Belfer Center Studies in International Security). Cambridge: The MIT Press, 221-248.

Bakke, Kristin M.; O’Loughlin, John; Ward, Michael D. (2009): Reconciliation in Conflict-Affected Societies: Multilevel Modeling of Individual and Contextual Factors in the North Caucasus of Russia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(5), 1012-1021. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00045600903260622

Balci, Bayram (2014, January): Turkey’s Religious Outreach in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 16, 65-85. URL:http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1393/ct_16_posting.pdf

Barbashin, Maxim U. (2008): Informal Power Structures in Russia and Ethno-Political Conflict in the Northern Caucasus. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 1-18. URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323324

Basnukaev, Musa (2014): Reconstruction in Chechnya: At the Intersection between Politics and the Economy. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 76-90.

Beckman, James (2007): Russia. In: Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism.(Homeland Security Series). Aldershot: Ashgate, 125-136.

Bedford, Sofie (2008): “Wahhabis”, Democrats and Everything in between: The Development of Islamic Activism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 194-211.

Berger, J. M. (2013, April 22): Boston’s Jihadist Past. Foreign Policy. URL:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/22/bostons_jihadist_past

Binnie, Jeremy; Wright, Joanna (2009, August): The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan.CTC Sentinel, 2(8), 5-7. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolving-role-of-uzbek-led-fighters-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan

Blank, Stephen (2012, January): Rethinking Central Asia and its Security Issues. UNISCI Discussion Papers, 28, 9-33. URL: http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/38463

Blank, Stephen (2013, March): Facing the “Permanent Arab Spring”: Terrorism and Russia’s Evolving Threat Assessment. Terrorism Monitor, 11(6), 6-8. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_011_Issue06_03.pdf

Blank, Stephen (2013, October): Russian Defence Policy in the Caucasus. Caucasus Survey, 1(1), 75-89. URL:http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no1/stephen-blank-Russian-defence-policy-in-the-Caucasus.php

Bloom, Mia (2011): The Black Widow Bombers. In: Bombshell: Women and Terrorism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 35-67.

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir (2011): “Ordinary Wahhabism” versus “Ordinary Sufism”? Filming Islam for Postsoviet Muslim Young People. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 281-301. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.588065

Borkoev, Bakyt (2013): The Problem of Terrorism in Central Asia and Countering Terrorist Activities in Kyrgyzstan. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 72-79. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-72

Braginskaia, Ekaterina (2010): State Approaches to Muslim Integration in Russia, France and Britain in Comparative Perspective. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism.(BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 44-62.

Bram, Chen; Gammer, Moshe (2013): Radical Islamism, Traditional Islam and Ethno-Nationalism in the Northern Caucasus. Middle Eastern Studies, 49(2), 296-337. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.763797

Call, Charles T. (2012): Chechnya: Reneging and Resistance. In: Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 106-110.

Call, Charles T. (2012): Georgia and South Ossetia: Integration Backfires. In: Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 110-115.

Campana, Aurélie (2013): Beyond Norms: The Incomplete De-Securitisation of the Russian Counterterrorism Frame.Critical Studies on Terrorism, 6(3), 457-472. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2013.836308

Campana, Aurélie (2014): The Multiple Contexts of Russian Counterterrorism Frames: The Framing Process and Discursive Field. In: Daniela Pisoiu (Ed.): Arguing Counterterrorism: New Perspectives. (Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 247-269.

Campana, Aurélie; Ratelle, Jean-François (2014): A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(2), 115-134. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.862901

Cheloukhine, Serguei; Lieberman, Charles A. (2009): Reforming Power Structures: Russian Counter-Terrorism Response to Beslan. In: M. R. Haberfeld; Agostino von Hassell (Eds.): A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned. New York: Springer, 249-270. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0115-6_14

Cherkasov, Alexander (2006, August): Looking Back at Beslan. [Robert Orttung, Trans]. Russian Analytical Digest, 5, 2-4. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-5.pdf

Closson, Stacy (2008, December): The North Caucasus after the Georgia-Russia Conflict. Russian Analytical Digest, 51, 2-5. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-51.pdf

Cornell, Svante E. (2012, October): The “Afghanization” of the North Caucasus: Causes and Implications of a Changing Conflict. In: Stephen J. Blank (Ed.) Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus. [e-Book]. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 121-154. URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1116

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2007): Russia and Chechnya. In Robert J. Art; Louise Richardson (Eds.): Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 383-424.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009): Russia and Chechen Leaders. In: How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 28-29.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009): Russia and Chechnya. In: How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 131-137.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009): Russia and Narodnaya Volya. In: How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 123-125.

Cross, Sharyl N. (2013, Winter): Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Social Media: Exploring Prospects for U.S.-Russia Cooperation beyond the “Reset”. Journal of Strategic Security, 6(4), Article 1. URL:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/1/

Cunningham, Karla (2008): The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement. In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 84-99.

Danilova, Nataliya (2014): Victims and Heroes: Commemorating the Russian Military Casualties in the Chechen Conflicts. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 58-75.

Dannreuther, Roland (2010): Russian Discourses and Approaches to Islam and Islamism. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 9-25.

Dannreuther, Roland; March, Luke (2010): Conclusion. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 222-229.

Dannreuther, Roland; March, Luke (2010): Introduction. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 1-8.

Dickerson, Danny (2014, Fall): Growing Threats of Terrorism from the North Caucasus. The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, 20(3), 36-40. URL: http://issuu.com/fusteros/docs/iacsp_magazine_v20n3

Dolnik, Adam (2007): The Siege of Beslan’s School No. 1. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. (Vol. 3: Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism). Westport: Praeger Security International, 176-201.

Dolnik, Adam (2010): Negotiating in Beslan and beyond. In: Guy Olivier Faure; I. William Zartman (Eds.): Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics. (Cass Series on Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 125-147.

Donnelly, Ted (2011, Winter): Fergana as FATA? Central Asia after 2014: Outcomes and Strategic Options. Connections,11(1), 11-27. URL: https://pfpconsortium.org/de/journal-issue/connections-quarterly-journal-winter-2011

Driedger, Jonas J. (2014, September): Geopolitics and Transnational Threats: Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Syrian Civil War. per Concordiam, 5(3), 30-35. URL:www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V5N3_en.pdf

Dronzina, Tatyana; Bolanos, Jorge (2012): Dagestani Female Bombers. In: Tatyana Dronzina; Rachid El Houdaigui (Eds.):Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tackling it. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 101). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 82-101. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-109-0-82

Duncan, Peter J. S. (2013): Russia, NATO and the “War on Terror”: Competition and Co-Operation in Central Asia after 11 September 2001. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 129-142. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-129

Dzutsev, Valeriy (2013, August): A Post-Mortem Sketch of Khasanbi Fakov: Leader of the United Insurgency Movement of Kabardino-Balkaria. Militant Leadership Monitor, 4(8). URL: http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41292

Dzutsev, Valeriy; Dzutsev, Khasan (2013, October): Comparative Analysis of Public Opinion and Hostage Attack Victims’ Attitudes: Evidence from Beslan, September 2004. Caucasus Survey, 1(1), 27-42. URL: http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no1/valeriy-khasan-dzutsev-beslan-attitudes-survey.php

Ergueshev, Zairbek (2012): Criminal Groups, Terrorist Organizations and Drug Trade and Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. In: Tatyana Dronzina; Rachid El Houdaigui (Eds.): Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tackling it.(NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 101). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 158-163. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-109-0-158

Evangelista, Matthew (2005): Is Putin the New de Gaulle? A Comparison of the Chechen and Algerian Wars. Post-Soviet Affairs, 21(4), 360-377. URL: http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/mae10/Is-Putin-the-New-de-Gaulle.pdf

Evsikov, Egor; Shafir, Leonid (2011, Summer): Joint Security Cooperation or Regional Disintegration? Why the West Should Engage Russia in Central Asia. Connections, 10(3), 37-57. URL: https://pfpconsortium.org/de/journal-issue/connections-quarterly-journal-summer-2011-0

Falkenburg, Luke (2013): On the Brink: The Resurgence of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Small Wars & Insurgencies,24(3), 375-393. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802603

Falkenburg, Luke (2013, July-August): Trafficking Terror through Tajikistan. Military Review, 7-8/2013, 7-15. URL:http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art005.pdf

Fawn, Rick (2008): Chechnya, the Council of Europe, and the Advocacy of Human Rights in the Toughest of Cases. In: Douglas W. Blum (Ed.): Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change. Washington, DC; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 259-286.

Fettweis, Christopher J. (2006): The Fergana Valley of Central Asia. In: Derek S. Reveron; Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (Eds.): Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 117-136.

Finke, Peter (2011): Central Asian Attitudes towards Afghanistan: Perceptions of the Afghan War in Uzbekistan. In: Robert L. Canfield; Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek (Eds.): Ethnicity, Authority, and Power in Central Asia: New Games Great and Small. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 24). Abingdon: Routledge, 61-76.

Flood, Derek Henry (2014, March): The Caucasus Emirate: From Anti-Colonialist Roots to Salafi-Jihad. CTC Sentinel, 7(3), 13-17. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caucasus-emirate-from-anti-colonialist-roots-to-salafi-jihad

Forsberg, Tuomas; Herd, Graeme P. (2005, Fall): The EU, Human Rights, and the Russo—Chechen Conflict. Political Science Quarterly, 120(3), 455-478. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2005.tb00554.x

Freni, Salvatore J. (2010): Examining the Radicalization of Chechen Separatists during the Resistance Movement.Student Pulse, 2(2). URL: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/182/2/examining-the-radicalization-of-chechen-separatists-during-the-resistance-movement

Fumagalli, Matteo (2010): Islamic Radicalism and the Insecurity Dilemma in Central Asia: The Role of Russia. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 191-208.

Gammer, Moshe (2008): From the Challenge of Nationalism to the Challenge of Islam: The Case of Daghestan. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 179-193.

Gammer, Moshe (2014, April): Separatism in the Northern Caucasus. Caucasus Survey, 1(2), 37-47. URL:http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no2/gammer-separatism-in-the-northern-caucasus.php

Garagozov, Rauf (2013): Implicit Measures of Attitude Change via Narrative Intervention in the Karabakh Conflict.Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 6(1-3), 98-109. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2013.861919

Garb, Paula (1998): Ethnicity, Alliance Building, and the Limited Spread of Ethnic Conflict in the Caucasus. In: David A. Lake; Donald Rothchild (Eds.): The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 185-200.

Garner, George (2013): Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution of Nationalism to Jihad and beyond. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(3), 419-434. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.664202

Gerber, Theodore P.; Mendelson, Sarah E. (2009): Security Through Sociology: The North Caucasus and the Global Counterinsurgency Paradigm. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(9), 831-851. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100903116656

German, Tracey (2007): Terrorism in the Caucasus: A Western Perspective. In: Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE–DAT) (Ed.): The Media: The Terrorists’ Battlefield. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 17). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 131-140.

Gilligan, Emma (2014): Russia’s War on Terror: Nationalism, Islam and Chechenization. In: Alex Houen (Ed.): States of War since 9/11: Terrorism, Sovereignty and the War on Terror. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 47-66.

Giragosian, Richard; Minasyan, Sergey (2011, Winter): Recent Trends in Security and Stability in the South Caucasus.Connections, 11(1), 69-76. URL: https://pfpconsortium.org/de/journal-issue/connections-quarterly-journal-winter-2011

Gorenburg, Dmitry (2009, January): The Causes and Consequences of Beslan: A Commentary on Gerard Toal’s Placing Blame: Making Sense of Beslan. Political Geography, 28(1), 23-27. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.01.003

Goyushov, Altay (2008): Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 7, 66-81. URL:http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1173/200811111_ct7.pdf

Griffin, Roger (2012): Chechen Rebels and Tamil Tigers Revisited. In: Terrorist’s Creed: Fanatical Violence and the Human Need for Meaning. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 116-121.

Griffin, Roger (2012): Chechen Terrorists as Modern Zealots. In: Terrorist’s Creed: Fanatical Violence and the Human Need for Meaning. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 39-43.

Grinyaev, Sergey (2003): The Mass Media and Terrorism: A Russian View. European Security, 12(2), 85-88. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830412331308086

Gunaratna, Rohan; Haynal, Cleo (2013, June): Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the Boston Bombings. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(3), 44-63. URL:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/267

Hahn, Gordon M. (2012, October): The Caucasus Emirate Jihadists: The Security and Strategic Implications. In: Stephen J. Blank (Ed.) Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus. [e-Book]. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 1-97. URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1116

Halbach, Uwe (2014, July): The North and the South in the Caucasus: Separated or Interlinked? Russian Analytical Digest, 153, 2-4. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-153.pdf

Hapke, Andrea (2009): The Responsibility of “Mothers”: Gendered Discourses of Women’s Peace Organisations in the North-Caucasus/Russia. In: Christine Eifler; Ruth Seifert (Eds.): Gender Dynamics and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 199-218.

Hashimy, Sayed Mujtaba (2014, October): Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: A Strategy of Survival in Afghanistan-Pakistan Region: Re-Shift of Focus to Central Asia. (CAPS Commentary). URL: http://www.caps.af/Doc/0002.pdf

Hendrix, Cullen S.; Young, Joseph K. (2014): State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach. Security Studies, 23(2), 329-363. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.905358 URL:http://nw18.american.edu/~jyoung/documents/hendrix_young_secstud_2014.pdf

Henkin, Yagil (2008): “I Can Fight, Army against Army”: The 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen War, Strategies and Misconceptions. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder.(Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 148-155.

Hertog, Katrien (2005, September): A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: The Seeds of Islamic Radicalisation in Chechnya.Religion, State and Society, 33(3), 239-252. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637490500225029 URL:http://www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/rss/33-3_239.pdf

Holland, Edward C.; O’Loughlin, John (2010, September): Ethnic Competition, Radical Islam, and Challenges to Stability in the Republic of Dagestan. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43(3), 297-308. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.07.006 URL:http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/waroutcomes/docs/HollandOLoughlin_EthnicCompetition.pdf

Horvath, Robert (2013): The “Extremists”: “The Other Russia” and the Struggle for the Streets. In: Putin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 82). Abingdon: Routledge, 171-205.

Hutchings, Stephen et al. (2010): The Performance of Tolerance in European Television News, Responses to the “Islamic Threat”: Russia, Britain, France. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 63-83.

Imamkhodjaeva, Oidinposha (2007): Russia, Chechnya, and the Global War against Terrorism. In: Gail M. Presbey (Ed.):Philosophical Perspectives on the “War on Terrorism”. (Value Inquiry Book Series). Amsterdam: Rodopi, 255-288.

Imamkhodjaeva, Oidinposha (2007): The Role of Central Asia in the “War against Terrorism”. In: Gail M. Presbey (Ed.):Philosophical Perspectives on the “War on Terrorism”. (Value Inquiry Book Series). Amsterdam: Rodopi, 325-360.

Isaeva, Manarsha (2014, July): Religious Identity and Conflict in Dagestan. Russian Analytical Digest, 153, 5-8. URL:http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-153.pdf

Janeczko, Matthew N. (2012, October): The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 1: Winning the Battle, Losing the War, 1994-1996. Small Wars Journal, 10/2012. URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-russian-counterinsurgency-operation-in-chechnya-part-1-winning-the-battle-losing-the-wa

Janeczko, Matthew N. (2012, November): The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 2: Success, but at what Cost? 1999-2004. Small Wars Journal, 11/2012. URL: http://smallwars.org/jrnl/art/the-russian-counterinsurgency-operation-in-chechnya-part-2-success-but-at-what-cost-1999-%E2%80%93-

Janeczko, Matthew N. (2014): “Faced with Death, even a Mouse Bites”: Social and Religious Motivations behind Terrorism in Chechnya. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(2), 428-456. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.903975

Jasutis, Grazvydas (2014, June): Armed Violence in Dagestan: The Role of the Caucasus Emirate. Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, 2(1), 85-102. URL: http://aripd.org/journals/jgpc/Vol_2_No_1_June_2014/4.pdf

Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2012, Fall-Winter): The New Political Islam in Central Asia: From Radicalism to the Ballot Box?The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 19(1), 71-82. URL: http://brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-affairs/191/new-political-islam-central-asia-radicalism-ballot-box

Kasim, Kamer (2013): Central Asian Neighbours and the 3R Process in Afghanistan. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.):Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 35-44. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-35

Kasun, G. Sue (2013): “We are not Terrorists,” but more likely Transnationals: Reframing Understandings about Immigrants in Light of the Boston Marathon Bombings. Multicultural Perspectives, 15(4), 227-233. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15210960.2013.844611

Kemoklidze, Nino (2009, Spring): Victimisation of Female Suicide Bombers: The Case of Chechnya. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 3(2), 181-188. URL: http://www.cria-online.org/Journal/7/CRIA%20Spring%2009%20Full%20Issue.pdf

Kendzior, Sarah (2006, Fall): Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre.Demokratizatsiya, 14(4), 545-562. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.14.4.545-562

Khan, Raza (2014, August): The Death Knell for Foreign Fighters in Pakistan? CTC Sentinel, 7(8), 20-22. URL:https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-death-knell-for-foreign-fighters-in-pakistan

Khanbabaev, Kaflan (2010): Islam and Islamic Radicalism in Dagestan. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 82-111.

Khurmatullin, Azat (2010): Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.):Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 103-121.

Kim, Younkyoo; Blank, Stephen (2013): Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(11), 917-932. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.832115

Knysh, Alexander (2012): Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: The Case of the Caucasus Emirate. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(4), 315-337. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656343

Komissarov, Vladimir S.; Stepanov-Egiyants, Vladimir G. (2013): The Anti-Terrorism Legislation of the Russian Federation. Megatrend revija, 10(1), 335-349. URL:http://www.megatrendreview.com/files/pdf/SR/Megatrend%20Revija%20vol%2010-1-2013.pdf#page=339

Koolaee, Elaheh (2010): Iran and Russia: From Idealism to Pragmatism. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.):Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 209-221.

Kramer, Mark (2004-2005, Winter): The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya. International Security,29(3), 5-63. URL: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/631/perils_of_counterinsurgency.html

Kramer, Mark (2007, June): The Russian-Chechen Conflict and the Putin-Kadyrov Connection. Russian Analytical Digest, 22, 2-6. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-22.pdf

Krasnov, Valery N. (2005): Approaches to the Study of Suicide Terrorism: A Perspective from Russia. In: Simon Wessely; Valery N. Krasnov (Eds.): Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 3). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 107-113.

Krasnov, Valery N. (2005): Social, Community and Individual Responses to Terrorist Attacks. In: Simon Wessely; Valery N. Krasnov (Eds.): Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 3). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 97-105.

Kurbanov, Ruslan (2010): The Information Jihad of “Shariat” jamaat: Objectives, Methods and Achievements. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 155-174.

Kurbanov, Ruslan (2011): “Urban” and “Rural” Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 347-365. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.597942

Lanskoy, Miriam; Zhemukhov, Sufian; Wallace, Don, Jr. (2013, June): The Boston Attack and the “Russian Connection”: An Assessment. Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base, 2(1). URL:http://www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org/terrorism-journal-1/volume-ii-number-1/boston

Laruelle, Marlene (2007): The Struggle for the Soul of Tatar Islam. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 5, 26-39. URL:http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/876/current_trends_vol5.pdf

Lefebvre, Stéphane; McDermott, Roger N. (2008): Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 21(2), 251-301. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600701648678

Le Huérou, Anne (2014): Between War Experience and Ordinary Police Rationales: State Violence against Civilians in Post-War Chechen Republic. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 152-175.

Le Huérou, Anne et al. (2014): Introduction. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 1-16.

Lévesque, Jacques (2008, July): Russia and the Muslim World: The Chechnya Factor and Beyond. Russian Analytical Digest, 44, 6-9. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-44.pdf

Lewis, David (2014): Crime, Terror and the State in Central Asia. Global Crime, 15(3-4), 337-356. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2014.927764

Lies, Paul (2008, July): Muslim Fundamentalism in Dagestan: A Movement on the Rise. Russian Analytical Digest, 44, 9-12. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-44.pdf

Lischin, Luke (2014, June): The IMU Ascendant: How Uzbek Autocracy Empowers Terrorist Entrepreneurs. Small Wars Journal, 6/2014. URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-imu-ascendant-how-uzbek-autocracy-empowers-terrorist-entrepreneurs

Logvinov, Michail (2010, March): Islamische Dschihad-Union: Ein greifbares Phantom. Die Kriminalpolizei, 3/2010. URL:http://www.kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2010/maerz/detailansicht-maerz/artikel/islamische-dschihad-union.html

Logvinov, Michail (2013, June): Das Kaukasus-Emirat: Eine neue Gefahrenquelle für Europa? Die Kriminalpolizei, 6/2013. URL: http://www.kriminalpolizei.de/index.php?id=376&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=484

Lokshina, Tanya (2014): Virtue Campaign for Women in Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov: Between War Backlash Effect and Desire for Total Control. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 236-255.

Luchterhandt, Otto (2006, June): Russia Adopts New Counter-Terrorism Law. [Christopher Findlay, Trans.]. Russian Analytical Digest, 2, 2-4. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-2.pdf

Lutz, James M.; Lutz, Brenda J. (2013): Russia’s Chechen Quagmire. In: Global Terrorism. (3rd ed.). Abingdon: Routledge, 209-212.

Lyall, Jason M. K. (2006, April): Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes. World Politics, 58(3), 378-412. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0003

Magomedov, Arbakhan (2009, December): Dagestan and the Russian State: “Stable Instability” Forever? Russian Analytical Digest, 70, 9-13. URL: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-70.pdf

Malashenko, Aleksei (2008, July): Islam and the State in Russia. [Robert Orttung, Trans.]. Russian Analytical Digest, 44, 2-5. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-44.pdf

Malashenko, Aleksei (2009, December): Chechnya after the Cancellation of Counter-Terrorist Operations. Russian Analytical Digest, 70, 2-5. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-70.pdf

Malthaner, Stefan (2014): Contextualizing Radicalization: The Emergence of the “Sauerland-Group” from Radical Networks and the Salafist Movement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(8), 638-653. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921767

March, Luke (2010): Modern Moscow: Muslim Moscow? In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 84-102.

Markedonov, Sergey (2009, December): Ingushetia: On the Road to Overcoming Social-Political Instability? Russian Analytical Digest, 70, 5-8. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-70.pdf

Markedonov, Sergey (2012, October): The North Caucasus in Russia and Russia in the North Caucasus: State Approaches and Political Dynamics in the Turbulent Region. In: Stephen J. Blank (Ed.) Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus. [e-Book]. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 99-119. URL:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1116

Matveeva, Anna (2013): The Northern Caucasus and Challenges of Minority Governance. In: Oleh Protsyk; Benedikt Harzl (Eds.): Managing Ethnic Diversity in Russia. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 40). Abingdon: Routledge, 130-150.

McCarthy, Sherri et al. (2013): Definitions of War, Terrorism, and Torture in the Balkan Peninsula and Russia. In: Kathleen Malley-Morrison; Sherri McCarthy; Denise Hines (Eds.): International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism. (Peace Psychology Book Series). New York: Springer, 49-62. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_4

McCarthy, Sherri et al. (2013): Perspectives on Invasion in Russia and the Balkans. In: Kathleen Malley-Morrison; Sherri McCarthy; Denise Hines (Eds.): International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism. (Peace Psychology Book Series). New York: Springer, 381-400. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_25

Mendelson, Sarah E. (2006, November-December): Anatomy of Ambivalence: The International Community and Human Rights Abuse in the North Caucasus. Problems of Post-Communism, 53(6), 3-15. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216530601 URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/Mendelson-ppc1106.pdf

Merlin, Aude (2014): Remembering and Forgetting in Chechnya Today: Using the Great Patriotic War to Create a New Historical Narrative. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 37-57.

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin (2013, October): Islam and Security Narratives in Eurasia. Caucasus Survey, 1(1), 5-26. URL:http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no1/mohiaddin-mesbahi-islam-security-narratives-in-Eurasia.php

Moghadam, Assaf (2008): Suicide Missions from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. In: The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 152-192.

Molodikova, Irina; Galyapina, Victoria (2011): Islamic Education among Chechens and Ingush: Pupils’, Teachers’ and Experts’ Opinions. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 263-279. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.584711

Moore, Cerwyn (2012): Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(9), 1780-1807. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.718421

Moore, Cerwyn (2013): A Practical Guide to Research on Terrorism in the North Caucasus. In: Adam Dolnik (Ed.):Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A Guide. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 124-139.

Moore, Cerwyn; Barnard-Wills, David (2010): Russia and Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal. In: Asaf Siniver (Ed.):International Terrorism Post-9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 144-167.

Moore, Cerwyn; Tumelty, Paul (2008): Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(5), 412-433. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100801993347

Moscardino, Ughetta et al. (2011): Are Beslan’s Children Learning to Cope? A 3-Year Prospective Study of Youths Exposed to Terrorism. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 72(9), 1277-1283. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.4088/JCP.10m06300

Mukhametshin, Rafik (2010): Islamic Discourse in the Volga-Urals Region. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 31-61.

Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson (2006): Caucasus. In: Derek S. Reveron; Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (Eds.): Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 87-116.

Nivat, Anne (2008): The Black Widows: Chechen Women Join the Fight for Independence – and Allah. In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 122-130.

Nourzhanov, Kirill (2014): Central Asia and the Arab Spring: Discourses of Relevance and Threat in the Region. In: Amin Saikal; Amitav Acharya (Eds.): Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia: Social Protest and Authoritarian Rule after the Arab Spring. (Library of International Relations, Vol. 72). London: I.B. Tauris, 121-142.

Oates, Sarah (2006, December): Comparing the Politics of Fear: The Role of Terrorism News in Election Campaigns in Russia, the United States and Britain. International Relations, 20(4), 425-437. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117806069404

Ó Beachàin, Donnacha (2013): The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus and Moldova. In: Ayça Ergun; Hamlet Isaxanli (Eds.): Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 107). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 42-57. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-42

Olcott, Martha Brill (2014): Religion and State Policy in Central Asia. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 12(4), 1-15. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2014.976087

O’Loughlin, John; Holland, Edward C.; Witmer, Frank D. W. (2011): The Changing Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, 1999-2011: Regional Trends and Local Dynamics in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52(5), 596-630. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.5.596

Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2009, April): Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy: Variations on an Imperial Theme. Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(1), 3-10. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/61

Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2013, Winter): Terrorism in Central Asia: Dynamics, Dimensions, and Sources. Education About Asia, 18(3). URL: https://www.asian-studies.org/eaa/18-3-Supplemental/Omelicheva.pdf

Onuchko, Marina; Nechaeva, Elena (2012): Main Factors in Preventing Radicalization of Religion in Kazakhstan. In: Tatyana Dronzina; Rachid El Houdaigui (Eds.): Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tackling it.(NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 101). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 117-136. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-109-0-117

Ó Tuathail, Gearóid (2009, January): Placing Blame: Making Sense of Beslan. Political Geography, 28(1), 4-15. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.01.007 URL: http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/waroutcomes/docs/GT_Beslan_09.pdf

Pape, Robert A.; Feldman, James K. (2010): Chechnya. In: Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 251-283.

per Concordiam Staff (2013, October): Central Asia Aids Afghanistan. per Concordiam. 4(3), 35-39. URL:http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V4N3_en.pdf

Perlmutter, Dawn (2013, Fall): Prelude to the Boston Bombings. Middle East Quarterly, 20(4), 67-77. URL:http://www.meforum.org/3618/boston-bombings-prelude

Perovic, Jeronim (2006, August): The North Caucasus: Taking Stock Two Years after Beslan. Russian Analytical Digest, 5, 4-8. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-5.pdf

Petrenko, Victor F.; Yartseva, Anna I. (2005): Cross-Confessional Investigation of Religious Visions of the World in the Context of the Fight against Terrorism. In: Simon Wessely; Valery N. Krasnov (Eds.): Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 3). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 115-123.

Peyrouse, Sebastien (2007): The Rise of Political Islam in Soviet Central Asia. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 5, 40-54. URL: http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/876/current_trends_vol5.pdf

Phares, Walid (2008): Russia’s War on Jihadism. In: The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 181-194.

Phillips, Andrew (2013, January): The Wars on Terror, Duelling Internationalisms and the Clash of Purposes in a Post-Unipolar World. International Politics, 50(1), 77-96. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.29

Pisoiu, Daniela (2013): Terror Superstars. JEX, 3/2013, 29-32. URL:http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/39

Polat, Abdumannob; Butkevich, Nickolai (2000): Unraveling the Mystery of the Tashkent Bombings: Theories and Implications. Demokratizatsiya, 8(4), 541-553. URL:http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/08-4_PolatButkevich.PDF

Polič, Marko et al. (2013): Views of National Security in Balkan and Russia. In: Kathleen Malley-Morrison; Sherri McCarthy; Denise Hines (Eds.): International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism. (Peace Psychology Book Series). New York: Springer, 223-238. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_15

Politkovskaya, Anna (2003): War, Terrorism and Journalists: The Chechen Experience. In: S. T. Kwame Boafo; John Maguire; Sylvie Coudray (Eds.): Media, Violence and Terrorism. [Proceedings of the Conference “Terrorism and Media”, Manila, Philippines, 2-3 May 2002]. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 89-90. URL:http://portal.unesco.org/ci/fr/files/16488/10897334065media_violence_and_terrorism.pdf/media%2Bviolence%2Band%2Bterrorism.pdf

Rahimov, Khurshed (2013): The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Fight against Terrorism in and around Central Asia. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11.(NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 215-229. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-215

Rakisheva, Botagoz; Shalova, Gulden (2012): Suicide Acts in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Chronology of Events (Content-Analysis of Mass-Media). In: Tatyana Dronzina; Rachid El Houdaigui (Eds.): Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tackling it. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 101). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 137-143. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-109-0-137

Ratelle, Jean-François (2013, July): The Insurgency in the North Caucasus: Putting Religious Claims into Context.Russian Analytical Digest, 131, 5-8. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-131-5-8.pdf

Ratelle, Jean-François (2014): The North Caucasus Insurgency: Understanding the Chechen Rebels in the Context of the Caucasus Emirate. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 176-198.

Regamey, Amandine (2014): Rereading Human Rights Reports: Material Violence in Chechnya, 1999-2001. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 201-219.

Richmond, Walter (2008): Russian Policies towards Islamic Extremism in the Northern Caucasus and Destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 86-101.

Robbins, James S. (2007): Insurgent Seizure of an Urban Area: Grozny, 1996. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. (Vol. 3: Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism). Westport: Praeger Security International, 88-102.

Roshchin, Mikhail (2014): Kidnapping and Hostage Taking between the Two Chechen Wars (1997-1999). In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 118-132.

Russell, John (2005): Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens before and since 9/11. Third World Quarterly, 26(1), 101-116. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000322937

Russell, John (2009): Case Study – Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya: Authoritarian Leadership in the Caucasus. In: David Canter (Ed.): The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 209-226.

Russell, John (2009): The Geopolitics of Terrorism: Russia’s Conflict with Islamic Extremism. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 50(2), 184-196. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.50.2.184

Russell, John (2010): Kadyrov’s Strategy against Extremism in Chechnya. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.):Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 175-190.

Russell, John (2014): Ramzan Kadyrov’s “Illiberal” Peace in Chechnya. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 133-151.

Rykhtik, Mikhail (2006): Asymmetric Threats and Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Russia. In: Robert W. Orttung; Andrey Makarychev (Eds.): National Counter-Terrorism Strategies. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 14). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 165-175.

Sagramoso, Domitilla; Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Islam and Ethno-Nationalism in the North-Western Caucasus. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 112-145.

Salmorbekova, Zumrat: Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Islam and Islamism in the Ferghana Valley. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 211-243.

Saradzhyan, Simon (2006): Russia’s System to Combat Terrorism and its Application in Chechnya. In: Robert W. Orttung; Andrey Makarychev (Eds.): National Counter-Terrorism Strategies. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 14). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 176-190.

Sattarov, Rufat (2010): Islamic Revival and Islamic Activism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.):Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 146-210.

Scrimin, Sara et al. (2009, September): Recognition of Facial Expressions of Mixed Emotions in School-Age Children Exposed to Terrorism. Developmental Psychology, 45(5), 1341-1352. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016689

Scrimin, Sara et al. (2011, March): Trauma Reminders and PTSD Symptoms in Children Three Years after a Terrorist Attack in Beslan. Social Science & Medicine, 72(5), 694-700. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.11.030

Shcheblanova, Veronika; Yarskaya-Smirnova, Elena (2009): Explanations of Female Terrorism: Discourses about Chechen Terrorists in the Russian Mass Media: “Easy Girls”, “Coarse Women” or Fighters? In: Christine Eifler; Ruth Seifert (Eds.): Gender Dynamics and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 245-268. URL:http://89.249.21.74/data/2010/03/16/1231582052/Shcheblanova_Yarskaya-Smirnova_2009.pdf

Sherlock, Thomas (2007): The Wars in Chechnya and the Decay of Russian Democratization. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.):Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. (Vol. 3: Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism). Westport: Praeger Security International, 334-351.

Shnirelman, Victor A. (2008): The Orstkhoy Revival: Identity and Border Dispute in the Northern Caucasus. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 139-147.

Shoigu, Yulia S. (2005): Special Features of Emergency Psychological Assistance during Acts of Terrorism. In: Simon Wessely; Valery N. Krasnov (Eds.): Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 3). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 125-127.

Shterin, Marat; Spalek, Basia (2011): Muslim Young People in Britain and Russia: Intersections of Biography, Faith and History. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 145-154. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.605926

Shterin, Marat; Yarlykapov, Akhmet (2011): Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: The New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 303-325. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.604512

Sidhu, Dawinder S. (2013, May): Lessons on Terrorism and “Mistaken Identity”: From Oak Creek, with a Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombings. Columbia Law Review – Sidebar, 113, 76-87. URL: http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Sidhu-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-76-2013.pdf

Simons, Greg (2006, Fall): The Use of Rhetoric and the Mass Media in Russia’s War on Terror. Demokratizatsiya, 14(4), 579-600. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.14.4.579-600

Simons, Greg; Strovsky, Dmitry (2006, June): Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in the Age of the War against Terrorism: A Historical Perspective. European Journal of Communication, 21(2), 189-211. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0267323105064045

Sinai, Joshua (2007): Terrorism and Usbekistan: The Threat and the Response. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. (Vol. 3: Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism). Westport: Praeger Security International, 508-513.

Sinai, Joshua (2013, Winter): The Terrorist Threats against Russia and its Counterterrorism Responses. The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 19(4), 22-23. URL:http://issuu.com/fusteros/docs/iacsp_magazine_v19n4

Snetkov, Aglaya (2007): The Image of the Terrorist Threat in the Official Russian Press: The Moscow Theatre Crisis (2002) and the Beslan Hostage Crisis (2004). Europe-Asia Studies, 59(8), 1349-1365. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130701655192 URL:http://www.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/llc/files/russian-media-conf/Snetkov_Aglaia.rtf

Snetkov, Aglaya (2012): When the Internal and External Collide: A Social Constructivist Reading of Russia’s Security Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(3), 521-542. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.661935

Sokirianskaya, Ekaterina (2014): State and Violence in Chechnya: 1997-1999. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.):Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 93-117.

Souleimanov, Emil (2011, Summer): The Upsurge of Islamist Violence in the North Caucasus: Exploring the Case Studies of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. Connections, 10(3), 117-126. URL: https://pfpconsortium.org/de/journal-issue/connections-quarterly-journal-summer-2011-0

Souleimanov, Emil (2011, Winter): The Caucasus Emirate: Genealogy of an Islamist Insurgency. Middle East Policy,18(4), 155-168. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00517.x URL: http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/caucasus-emirate-genealogy-islamist-insurgency

Souleimanov, Emil (2014, Fall): Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War. Middle East Policy, 21(3), 154-162. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12090

Souleimanov, Emil; Ditrych, Ondrej (2008): The Internationalisation of the Russian–Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality.Europe-Asia Studies, 60(7), 1199-1222. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802230739

Souleimanov, Emil; Ehrmann, Maya (2012, Summer): The Redeployment of Chechnya-Based Troops to Dagestan: Background, Motives, and Repercussions. Connections, 11(3), 67-75. URL: https://pfpconsortium.org/publication-article/redeployment-chechnya-based-troops-dagestan-background-motives-and-repercussions

Souleimanov, Emil; Ehrmann, Maya (2013, Fall): The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan and its Regional Implications. Middle East Policy, 20(3), 111-120. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12037 URL:http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/rise-militant-salafism-azerbaijan-and-its-regional-implications

Speckhard, Anne (2013, June): The Boston Marathon Bombers: The Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(3), 64-78. URL:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/268

Speckhard, Anne; Akhmedova, Khapta (2005): Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism: Trauma and Bereavement as Psychological Vulnerabilities in Human Security – The Chechen Case. In: Jill Donnelly et al. (Eds.): Developing Strategies to Deal with Trauma in Children: A Means of Ensuring Conflict Prevention, Security and Social Stability; Case Study: 12-15-Year-Olds in Serbia. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 1). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 59-64.

Speckhard, Anne; Akhmedova, Khapta (2006): The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(5), 429-492. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100600698550

Speckhard, Anne; Akhmedova, Khapta (2006): The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society. Democracy and Security, 2(1), 103-155. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419160600625116

Speckhard, Anne; Akhmedova, Khapta (2006, August): Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists. In: Yoram Schweitzer (Ed.): Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? (JCSS Memorandum No. 84). [e-Book]. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 63-80. URL:http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/91112/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/1ab5e58e-a465-4342-abb0-40b3fc22af3e/en/2006-08_Female+Suicide+Bombers_complete+document.pdf

Speckhard, Anne; Akhmedova, Khapta (2008): Black Widows and beyond: Understanding the Motivations and Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Terrorists. In: Cindy D. Ness (Ed.): Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 100-121.

Speckhard, Anne; Tarabrina, Nadejda; Mufel, Natalia (2005): Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists. In: Simon Wessely; Valery N. Krasnov (Eds.): Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 3). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 139-155.

Speckhard, Anne et al. (2004): Research Note: Observations of Suicidal Terrorists in Action. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2), 305-327. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550490490721

Speckhard, Anne et al. (2005, March): Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater. Traumatology, 11(1), 3-21. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/153476560501100102

Speckhard, Anne et al. (2005, June): Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicide Terrorists. Traumatology, 11(2), 121-140. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/153476560501100206

Sperling, Walter (2014): Grozny as it was before the War: Remembrance and Reconciliation in “Virtual” and “Real” Post-Soviet Communities. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 19-36.

Stack, Alisa (2011): Zombies versus Black Widows: Women as Propaganda in the Chechen Conflict. In: Laura Sjoberg; Caron E. Gentry (Eds.): Women, Gender, and Terrorism. (Studies in Security and International Affairs). Athens: University of Georgia Press, 83-95.

Stein, Matthew (2013): Unraveling the Violence in Kazakhstan. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(3), 394-412. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802610

Steinberg, Guido (2014): The German “Sauerland” Plot, Central Asia, and Turkey. In: Bruce Hoffman; Fernando Reinares (Eds.): The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press, 289-311.

Stenersen, Anne (2014, July): The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Role in Attacks in Pakistan. CTC Sentinel, 7(7), 4-8. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistans-role-in-attacks-in-pakistan

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2005): Russia’s Approach to the Fight against Terrorism. In: Jakob Hedenskog et al. (Eds.): Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 19). Abingdon: Routledge, 301-322. URL: http://www.estepanova.net/StepanovaRusTer.pdf

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2009): Islamist Terrorism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In: Alex P. Schmid; Garry F. Hindle (Eds.): After the War on Terror: Regional and Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy. [e-Book]. London: RUSI Books, 104-124. URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/After_The_War_On_Terror.pdf

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2014): Lone Wolves and Network Agents in Leaderless Jihad (The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombing Cell). In: Marko Milosevic; Kacper Rekawek (Eds.): Perseverance of Terrorism: Focus on Leaders. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 117). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 50-63. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-387-2-50

Sullivan, Charles J. (2014, July): Breakdownistan: U.S. Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan Going Forward. Small Wars Journal, 7/2014. URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/breakdownistan-us-concerns-in-central-asia-and-afghanistan-going-forward

Swift, Christopher (2010, November): Fragmentation in the North Caucasus Insurgency. CTC Sentinel, 3(11-12), 16-18. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/fragmentation-in-the-north-caucasus-insurgency

Sylvester, Christine (2014): TerrorWars: Boston, Iraq. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(1), 11-23. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.881202

Szczepanikova, Alice (2014): Chechen Refugees in Europe: How Three Generations of Women Settle in Exile. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 256-273.

Tanrisever, Oktay F. (2007): Mass Media and the Internal and External Dimensions of the Terrorist Threats to the Stability of the Caucasus. In: Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE–DAT) (Ed.): The Media: The Terrorists’ Battlefield. (NATO Security through Science Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 17). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 141-151.

Tanrisever, Oktay F. (2013): Introduction: NATO, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Security in the Aftermath of 9/11. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1-16. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-1

Tanrisever, Oktay F. (2013): Turkey’s Evolving Role in the Security of Afghanistan and Central Asia since 9/11: Sources and Limitations of Ankara’s Soft Power. In: Oktay F. Tanrisever (Ed.): Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security since 9/11. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 106). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 155-170. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-179-3-155

Tereshchenko, Natalia (2013, May): Beyond the North Caucasus: Lessons for Russia’s Counterterrorism Policies and Practices. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, 5(5), 14-16. URL: http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/CTTA/2013/CTTA-May13.pdf

Toft, Monica Duffy; Zhukov, Yuri M. (2012, November): Denial and Punishment in the North Caucasus: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Coercive Counter-Insurgency. Journal of Peace Research, 49(6), 785-800. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343312448389

Trochev, Alexei (2006, June): Fabricated Evidence and Fair Jury Trials: The Russian Fight against Terrorism: Case Studies from Dagestan. Russian Analytical Digest, 2, 7-9. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-2.pdf

Tsatsaroni, Charikleia et al. (2013): Perspectives on Torture in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula. In: Kathleen Malley-Morrison; Sherri McCarthy; Denise Hines (Eds.): International Handbook of War, Torture, and Terrorism. (Peace Psychology Book Series). New York: Springer, 565-582. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1638-8_36

Tsvetkova, Bilyana (2010): Disproving a Conventional Wisdom: Why Nuclear Terrorism Originating from Russia is a Myth. Security Index, 16(3), 19-37. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19934270.2010.507078

Türker, Tolga (2011): Radicalization of Islam in Central Asia: Theory, Trends and Prospects. Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları, 6(11), 51-74. URL: http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/2GdFRripMrq2cEBhmH6bMouLSG374K.pdf

Valiyev, Anar M. (2008): Foreign Terrorist Groups and Rise of Home‐Grown Radicalism in Azerbaijan. HUMSEC Journal, 2, 95-112. URL: http://www.humsec.eu/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Journal/Valiyev.pdf

Vartanova, Elena; Smirnova, Olga (2012): Covering Terrorism in Russian Media. In: Des Freedman; Daya Kishan Thussu (Eds.): Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives. London: SAGE, 184-205.

Vatchagaev, Mairbek (2014): Sufism in Chechnya: Its Influence on Contemporary Society. In: Anne Le Huérou et al. (Eds.): Chechnya at War and beyond. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 56). Abingdon: Routledge, 220-235.

Verkhovsky, Alexander (2010): Russian Approaches to Radicalism and “Extremism” as applied to Nationalism and Religion. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism.(BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 26-43.

Vinatier, Laurent (2008, December): War and Peace in Chechnya: The Role of Ramzan Kadyrov. Russian Analytical Digest, 51, 10-13. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-51.pdf

Vinson, Mark (2013, August): A Look at Tajikistan’s Jamaat Ansarullah Leader Amriddin Tabarov. Militant Leadership Monitor, 4(8). URL: http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41236

Vishnevetsky, Michael (2009): Case Study – Youth Gangs and Terrorism in Chechnya: Recruitment, Activities and Networks. In: David Canter (Ed.): The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 151-168.

Volf, Irina (2012): Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Press: A Transnational Perspective on what Made the Group Newsworthy in Germany, Great Britain, and Kyrgyzstan in 2002-07. conflict & communication online, 11(1). URL:http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2012_1/pdf/volf.pdf

Voloshin, Georgiy (2012, Winter): Kazakhstan and Central Asian Security: Ensuring Regional Stability in the Eurasian Balkans. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 36(1), 81-99. URL: http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Voloshin_36-1.pdf

Ware, Robert Bruce et al. (2003, March-April): Stability in the Caucasus: The Perspective from Dagestan. Problems of Post-Communism, 50(2), 12-23. URL: http://www.siue.edu/~rware/Stability_in_the_Caucasus.pdf

Wiktor-Mach, Dobrosława (2009, Winter): Competing Islamic Traditions in the Caucasus. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 3(1), 63-69. URL: http://www.cria-online.org/Journal/6/CRIA_Winter%2009_Full%20Issue.pdf

Williams, Brian Glyn (2008): Allah’s Foot Soldiers: An Assessment of the Role of Foreign Fighters and Al-Qa’ida in the Chechen Insurgency. In: Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. (Central Asian Studies, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge, 156-178. URL:http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/10_Ethno%20Ch10_962.pdf

Winslow, Donna; Moelker, René; Companjen, Françoise (2013): Glocal Chechnya from Russian Sovereignty to Pan-Islamic Autonomy. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(1), 129-151. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.763655

Yarlykapov, Akhmet A. (2007, June): Separatism and Islamic Extremism in the Ethnic Republics of the North Caucasus. [Robert Orttung, Trans.]. Russian Analytical Digest, 22, 6-11. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-22.pdf

Yarlykapov, Akhmet A. (2010): The Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims. In: Roland Dannreuther; Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 137-154.

Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Conclusion. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union.(Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 244-246.

Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Divergent Trends of Islamic Radicalization in Muslim Russia. In: Roland Dannreuther and Luke March (Eds.): Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism. (BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Vol. 66). Abingdon: Routledge, 122-136.

Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Introduction. In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.): Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union.(Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 1-10.

Yemelianova, Galina (2010): Islamic Radicalisation: A Post-Soviet, or Global Phenomenon? In: Galina Yemelianova (Ed.):Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge, 11-30.

Yemelianova, Galina (2014, April): Islam, Nationalism and State in the Muslim Caucasus. Caucasus Survey, 1(2), 3-23. URL: http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no2/yemelianova-islam-nationalism-state-muslim-caucasus.php

Zabyelina, Yuliya; Arsovska, Jana (2013, August): Rediscovering Corruption’s other Side: Bribing for Peace in Post-Conflict Kosovo and Chechnya. Crime, Law and Social Change, 60(1), 1-24. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9446-x

Zaytseva, Olga (2005, Fall): Beslan School Tragedy: The Rhetoric of the Russian Media. Young Scholars in Writing, 3, 38-45. URL: http://cas.umkc.edu/english/publications/youngscholarsinwriting/documents/BESLAN.pdf

Zenn, Jacob (2013): On the Eve of 2014: Islamism in Central Asia. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 15, 67-91. URL:http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1367/20140110_current_trends_vol15.pdf

Zenn, Jacob (2013, March): The Growing Alliance between Uzbek Extremists and the Pakistani Taliban. Terrorism Monitor, 11(5). URL: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40562&tx_ttnews[backPid]=684&no_cache=1#.VCar8q23LFZ

Zhemukhov, Sufian (2013, July): Nationalism and Islam in Russia’s North Caucasus. Russian Analytical Digest, 131, 2-5. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-131.pdf

Zhukov, Yuri M. (2012): Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State: The Russian Example. In: Paul B. Rich; Isabelle Duyvesteyn (Eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 286-300.

Grey Literature

Baev, Pavel K. (2013): Russia and Turkey in Conflict (Mis)management in the Caucasus. (PRIO Policy Brief 6/2013). URL:http://file.prio.no/Publications/PolicyBrief-6-2013

Balci, Bayram (2014, January): Turkey’s Religious Outreach in Central Asia and the Caucasus. (Carnegie Article). URL:http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/27/turkey-s-religious-outreach-in-central-asia-and-caucasus

Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) et al. (2003, December): Confidence-Building Measures Adopted by the Participants of an Informal Secular-Islamic Dialogue in Tajikistan. (CORE Working Paper 12). URL: http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/CORE_Working_Paper_12.pdf

Cohen, Ariel (2014, March): Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus: Performance and Consequences. (SSI Monograph). URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1189

Committee on Homeland Security, Majority Staff (2014, March): The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings. (House Homeland Security Committee Report). URL:http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/homeland-security-committee-releases-report-boston-marathon-bombings

Cordesman, Anthony H. (2014, October): Losing the “Forgotten War”: The Need to Reshape US Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. (CSIS Report). URL: http://csis.org/publication/losing-forgotten-war-us-strategic-vacuum-afghanistan-pakistan-and-central-asia-0

Curtis, Glenn E. (2002, October): Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States Government). URL: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/RussianOrgCrime.pdf

Fayzullina, Karina (2014, September): Interpreting Russian Foreign Policy and Islam. (Aljazeera Center for Studies Report). URL: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/09/2014928101146511560.htm

Hahn, Gordon M. (2011, August): Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right. (CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program Report). URL:http://csis.org/files/publication/110930_Hahn_GettingCaucasusEmirateRt_Web.pdf

Hahn, Gordon M. (2014, April): Assessing Terrorism in the Caucasus and the Threat to the Homeland. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. Congress, on April 3, 2014. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-HahnG-20140403.pdf

Haines, John R. (2014, August): The Third Chechen War? The Islamic State’s Imagined Qoqaz Caliphate and Russia’s Fractious Ciscaucasia. (FPRI E-Notes). URL: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/09/third-chechen-war-islamic-states-imagined-qoqaz-caliphate-and-russias-fractious-ciscaucasia

Halbach, Uwe (2004, October): An Escalation of Violence in the Caucasus, Hardening in Russia. (SWP Comments 2004/C 30). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/escalating_violence_in_the_caucasus_hardening_in_russia.html

Halbach, Uwe (2008, November): The Regional Dimension: Georgia and the Southern Caucasus after the War. In: Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.): The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe.(SWP Research Paper 2008/RP 09), 19-22. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/the_caucasus_crisis.html

Halbach, Uwe (2010, November): Russia’s Internal Abroad: The North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe. (SWP Research Paper 2010/RP 05). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/russias_internal_abroad.html

Halbach, Uwe (2013, April): Muslime in der Russischen Föderation: Wie gefestigt ist die “Vielvölkerzivilisation” Russland? (SWP-Aktuell 2013/A 24). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/muslime_in_russland.html

Halbach, Uwe; Smolnik, Franziska (2014, January): Russlands Stellung im Südkaukasus. (SWP-Aktuell 2014/A 01). URL:http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/russlands_stellung_im_suedkaukasus.html

Hoffman, Bruce (2013, July): Assessing Attacks on the Homeland: From Fort Hood to Boston. Testimony presented before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security on July 10, 2013. URL:http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20130710/101108/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-HoffmanB-20130710.pdf

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009, December): Central Asia: Islamists in Prison. (Asia Briefing N°97). URL:http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/B097-central-asia-islamists-in-prison.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012, October): The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict. (Europe Report N°220). URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/220-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-i-ethnicity-and-conflict.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012, October): The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency. (Europe Report N°221). URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/221-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-ii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013, September): The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law. (Europe Report N°226). URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/226-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-iii-governance-elections-rule-of-law.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013, September): Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks. (Europe Briefing N°71). URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013, September): Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change. (Asia Report N°250). URL:http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kazakhstan/250-kazakhstan-waiting-for-change.aspx

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014, January): Too Far, Too Fast: Sochi, Tourism and Conflict in the Caucasus. (Europe Report N°228). URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/228-too-far-too-fast-sochi-tourism-and-conflict-in-the-caucasus.aspx

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (2013, September): Main Developments in Theaters of Jihad: Mali, North Africa, Somalia, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and the Northern Caucasus. (JWMG Insights). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=204

International Media Support (IMS); International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech “Adil Soz”; Public Association “Journalists” (2008, August): Political Extremism, Terrorism, and Media in Central Asia: The Examples of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Report). URL: http://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ims-political-extremism-kyrgyzstan-kazahkstan-2008.pdf

Katz, Rita; Foster, Margaret (2014, January): Marathon Bombing: Why Target the Boston Marathon? (SITE Articles & Analysis). URL: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-Analysis/marathon-bombing-why-target-the-boston-marathon.html

Kuchins, Andrew C. (2014, April): Terrorism in the Caucasus. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. Congress, on April 3, 2014. URL:http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-KuchinsA-20140403.pdf

Lang, Józef (2013, November): The Radical Islamic Militants of Central Asia. (OSW Report). URL:http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_the-radical-islamic-militants.pdf

Laub, Zachary (2014, February): Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region. (CFR Backgrounder). URL:http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/instability-russias-north-caucasus-region/p9021

Malashenko, Aleksei; Yarlykapov, Akhmed (2009, May): Radicalisation of Russia’s Muslim Community. (MICROCON Policy Working Paper 9). URL: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP9_AM_AY.pdf

Markedonov, Sergey (2010, November): Radical Islam in the North Caucasus: Evolving Threats, Challenges, and Prospects. (CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program Report). URL: http://csis.org/publication/radical-islam-north-caucasus

McDermott, Roger N. (2004, February): Countering Global Terrorism: Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of the Central Asian Militaries. (SSI Monograph). URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=370

McDermott, Roger N. (2013, May): Central Asian Security Post-2014: Perspectives in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (DIIS Report 2013:12). URL: http://subweb.diis.dk/sw129432.asp

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2014, January): Terrorism and the Olympics: Sochi, Russia 2014. (Background Report). URL:https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_TerrorisminOlympicsSochiRussia_Jan2014.pdf

Nichol, Jim (2005, February): Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications. (CRS Report for Congress RL32272). URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32272.pdf

Nichol, Jim (2010, December): Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and other Regions of the North Caucasus: Recent Developments. (CRS Report for Congress RL34613). URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34613.pdf

Nichol, Jim (2013, February): Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests. (CRS Report for Congress 97-522). URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-522.pdf

Nichol, Jim (2014, March): Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests. (CRS Report for Congress RL33458). URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf

Nichol, Jim (2014, April): Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests.(CRS Report for Congress RL33453). URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf

Oliker, Olga (2001): Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat. (RAND Monograph Reports, MR-1289-A). URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289.html

Oliker, Olga; Szayna, Thomas S. (2003): Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army. (RAND Monograph Reports, MR-1598-A). URL:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1598.html

Plater-Zyberk, Henry (2014, July): Russia’s Contribution as a Partner in the War on Terrorism. (SSI Monograph). URL:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1216

Reuter, John (2004, August): Chechnya’s Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout, or Deceived? (The Jamestown Foundation Report). URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Chechen_Report_FULL_01.pdf

Rhodes, Darion (2014, March): Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: The Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate. (The ICT Working Papers Series, 27). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate

Roggio, Bill (2014, April): Assessing Terrorism in the Caucasus and the Threat to the Homeland. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. Congress, on April 3, 2014. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-RoggioW-20140403.pdf

Schmitz, Andrea (2008, November): The Caucasus Conflict and the Future of the CIS. In: Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.):The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe. (SWP Research Paper 2008/RP 09), 23-25. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/the_caucasus_crisis.html

Schmitz, Andrea; Wolters, Alexander (2012, April): Political Protest in Central Asia: Potentials and Dynamics. (SWP Research Paper 2012/RP 07). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/central_asia_political_protest.html

Schröder, Hans-Henning (2008, November): “A Short, Victorious War”? Russian Perspectives on the Caucasus Crisis. In: Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.): The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe. (SWP Research Paper 2008/RP 09), 7-11. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/the_caucasus_crisis.html

Seifert, Arne C. (2012, November): Der politische Islam in Zentralasien: Gegner oder demokratischer Partner? (CORE Working Paper 25). URL: http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/CORE%20WP25.pdf

Shterin, Marat (2012, February): Religion, Extremism and Radicalisation in Post-Communist Russia: Issues, Public Policy and Research. RadicalisationResearch. URL: http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/shterin_2012_religion-2

Simons, Gregory (2006, January): The Use of Rhetoric and the Mass Media in Russia’s War on Terror. (Department of Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University Working Papers, No. 98). URL: http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:131143/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Snetkov, Aglaya (2011, June): Russia’s North Caucasus: An Arc of Insecurity. (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 95). URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-95-EN.pdf

Steinberg, Guido (2014, June): A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle.(SWP Comments 2014/C 31). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/tschetschenen_im_aufstand_in_syrien.html

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2004, April): The Challenge of Terrorism in Post-Saddam Iraq: A View from Russia. (CSIS Policy Memo No. 325). URL: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0325.pdf

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2004, November): From Dubrovka to Beslan: Who is Learning Faster? (PONARS Policy Memo 347). URL: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0347.pdf

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2013, July): The Boston Bombings: A Post-Qaeda Take on “Lone Wolves” and “Leaderless Jihad”.(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 268). URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm_268_Stepanova_July2013_0.pdf

Tsertsvadze, Tika (2012, July): The South Caucasus and Central Asia. (EUCAM Policy Brief). URL:http://www.fride.org/publication/1049/the-south-caucasus-and-central-asia

Vachagaev, Mairbek (2006, September): The Chechen Resistance: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. (The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Report). URL:http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/Recent_Reports/Trans_amd_Speaker_NCC09142006/Vachagaev-14Sep06.pdf

Vachagaev, Mairbek (2007, August): The Ingush Jamaat: Identity and Resistance in the North Caucasus. (The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper). URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Jamestown-VachagaevJamaat.pdf

Vachagaev, Mairbek (2014, September): Abu Muhammad Named new Dagestani Amir of Caucasus Emirate. Militant Leadership Monitor, 5(9). URL: http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42897&tx_ttnews[backPid]=762&no_cache=1#.VHjduoWpnFZ

Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas (2013, February): Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan. (SISA Report No. 1-2013). URL:http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-02-04_SISA1_Uzbek_Militancy_in_Pakistan_-_Syed_Manzar_Abbas_Zaidi.pdf

Zenn, Jacob; Kuehnast, Kathleen (2014, October): Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan. (USIP Special Report 355). URL: http://www.usip.org/publications/preventing-violent-extremism-in-kyrgyzstan

---

List of People and Organizations Financing Terrorism

March 3, 2015, 10:50 am

≫ Next: Internal divisions inside north Caucasus’ Islamist insurgency, by Giovanni Giacalone

≪ Previous: Bibliography: Terrorism Originating from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia

$

0

0

The following list is a 2011 one, compilled by Russian MFA and provides a good mapping of mostly Caucasus based terrorist networks.


From the 1510 individuals:

-117 from Grozny

-795 from areas of the Chechen–Ingush Autonomous SSR

The post Arab Spring period, should have changed/altered the records.


Originally the list was presented as "[Organizations and individuals included in the list by virtue of subsections 6 and 7 of paragraph 2.1 of Article 6 of the Federal Law of 7 August 2001 N 115-FZ “On Combating Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime and Terrorist Financing”]"


P.S. Complete database with all names and organizations in: http://rg.ru/2011/07/06/extremism-dok.html




1. ABU SAYYAF GROUP (Al Harakat Al Islamiyya)*.

2. AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (ASC) (Lajnat Ul Masa Eidatul Afghania; Jamiat Ayat-Ur-Rhas Al Islamiac; Jamiat Ihya Ul Turath Al Islamia; Ahya Ul Turas)*; Office Locations: Headquarters – G.T. Road (probably Grand Trunk Road), near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan; Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalabad, Afghanistan.

3. AL BARAKA EXCHANGE L.L.C.*; P.O. BOX 3313 Deira Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 20066, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Reported to be owned or controlled by Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’Ale (QI.J.41.01).

4. AL FURQAN (Dzemilijati Furkan; Dzem’ijjetul Furqan; Association for Citizens Rights and Resistance to Lies; Dzemijetul Furkan; Association of Citizens for the Support of Truth and Suppression of Lies; Sirat; Association for Education, Culture and Building Society-Sirat; Association for Education, Cultural, and to Create Society-Sirat; Istikamet; In Siratel; Citizens’ Association for Support and Prevention of lies – Furqan)*; 30a Put Mladih Muslimana (ex. Pavla Lukaca Street), 71 000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 42 Muhameda Hadzijahica, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 70 and 53 Strosmajerova Street, Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 72 ul. Strossmajerova, Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Zlatnih Ljiljana Street, Zavidovici, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a citizens’ association under the name of “Citizens’ Association for Support and Prevention of lies – Furqan” on 26 Sep. 1997. Al Furqan ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision number 03-054-286/97 dated 8 Nov. 2002). Al Furqan was no longer in existence as at Dec. 2008.

5. AL RASHID TRUST (Al-Rasheed Trust; Al Rasheed Trust; Al-Rashid Trust; Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan; Al Amin Welfare Trust; Al Amin Trust; Al Ameen Trust; Al-Ameen Trust; Al Madina Trust; Al-Madina Trust)*; 302b-40, Good Earth Court, Opposite Pia Planitarium, Block 13a, Gulshan -l Igbal, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 4979263; 617 Clifton Center, Block 5, 6th Floor, Clifton, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 587-2545; Jamia Maajid, Sulalman Park, Melgium Pura, Lahore, Pakistan; Jamia Masjid, Sulaiman Park, Begum Pura, Lahore, Pakistan; Phone 042-6812081; Kitab Ghar, Darul Ifta Wal Irshad, Nazimabad No. 4, Karachi, Pakistan, Phone 6683301; Phone 0300-8209199; Fax 6623814; Kitas Ghar, Nazimabad 4, Dahgel-Iftah, Karachi, Pakistan; Office Dha’rbi-M’unin ZR Brothers, Katcherry Road, Chowk Yadgaar, Peshawar, Pakistan; Office Dha’rbi-M’unin, Opposite Khyber Bank, Abbottabad Road, Mansehra, Pakistan; Office Dha’rbi-M’unin, Rm No. 3, Moti Plaza, Near Liaquat Bagh, Muree Road, Rawalpindi, Pakistan; Office Dha’rbi-M’unin, Top Floor, Dr. Dawa Khan Dental Clinic Surgeon, Main Baxae, Mingora, Swat, Pakistan; j) 605 Landmark Plaza, 11 Chundrigar Road, Opposite Jang Building, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 2623818-19. Headquarters are in Pakistan. Operations in Afghanistan: Herat Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar Sherif. Also operations in Kosovo, Chechnya. Has two account numbers (No. 05501741 and No. 06500138) in Habib Bank Ltd. (Foreign Exchange Branch), Pakistan. Involved in the financing of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Until 21 Oct. 2008, this entity appeared also as “Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan” under permanent reference number QE.A.73.02., listed on 24 Apr. 2002 and amended on 25 Jul. 2006. Based on information confirming that the two entries Al Rashid Trust (QE.A.5.01.) and Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan (QE.A.73.02.) refer to the same entity, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee decided on 21 Oct. 2008 to consolidate the relevant information contained in both entries in the present entry.

6. AL-AKHTAR TRUST INTERNATIONAL (Al Akhtar Trust; Al-Akhtar Medical Centre; Akhtarabad Medical Camp; Pakistan Relief Foundation; Pakistani Relief Foundation; Azmat-e-Pakistan Trust; Azmat Pakistan Trust)*; Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Block 12, Karachi, Pakistan; ST-1/A, Gulsahn-e-Iqbal, Block 2, Karachi, 25300, Pakistan. Regional offices in Pakistan: Bahawalpur, Bawalnagar, Gilgit, Islamabad, Mirpur Khas, Tando-Jan-Muhammad. Akhtarabad Medical Camp is in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.

7. AL-BARAKAAT*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia.

8. AL-BARAKAAT BANK*.

9. AL-BARAKAAT WIRING SERVICE*; 2940 Pillsbury Avenue, Suite 4, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408.

10. AL-BARAKAT BANK OF SOMALIA (BSS) (Barakat Bank of Somalia)*; Mogadishu, Somalia; Bossaso, Somalia.

11. AL-BARAKAT FINANCE GROUP*; Dubai, UAE; Mogadishu, Somalia.

12. AL-BARAKAT FINANCIAL HOLDING CO.*; Dubai, UAE; Mogadishu, Somalia.

13. AL-BARAKAT GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Barakaat Globetelcompany; Al Barakat Telecommunications Ltd.)*; P.O. Box 3313, Dubai, UAE; Mogadishu, Somalia; Hargeysa, Somalia.

14. AL-BARAKAT GROUP OF COMPANIES SOMALIA LIMITED (Al-Barakat Financial Company)*; Mogadishu, Somalia; P.O. Box 3313, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

15. AL-BARAKAT INTERNATIONAL (Baraco Co.)*; P.O. Box 2923, Dubai, UAE.

16. AL-BARAKAT INVESTMENTS*; P.O. Box 3313, Deira, Dubai, UAE.

17. AL-HAMATI SWEETS BAKERIES*; Al-Mukallah, Hadhramawt Governorate, Yemen.

18. AL-HARAMAIN & AL MASJED AL-AQSA CHARITY FOUNDATION (Al Haramain Al Masjed Al Aqsa; Al Haramayn Al Masjid Al Aqsa; Al-Haramayn and Al Masjid Al Aqsa Charitable Foundation; Al Harammein Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation)*; 14 Bihacka Street, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2A Hasiba Brankovica, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Описание: Branch Address; 64 Potur mahala Street, Travnik, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Used to be officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina under registry number 24. Al-Haramain & Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision on cessation of operation number 03-05-2-203/04). It was no longer in existence as at Dec. 2008. Its premises and humanitarian activities were transferred under Government supervision to a new entity called Sretna Buducnost.

19. AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (Indonesia) (Yayasan Al-Manahil-Indonesia)*; Jalan Laut Sulawesi Blok DII/4, Kavling Angkatan Laut Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur 13440 Indonesia; Tel: 021-86611265 and 021-86611266; Fax: 021-8620174; Jl. Jati padang II, No. 18-A, Jakarta Selatan 12540, Indonsia. Tel. 021-789-2870, fax 021-780-0188. Lembaga Pelayanan Pesantren & Studi Islam.

20. AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (Pakistan)*; House # 279, Nazimuddin Road, F-10/1, Islamabad, Pakistan.

21. AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (UNION OF THE COMOROS)*; 1652 Moroni, Union of the Comoros.

22. AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)*; 1257 Siskiyou Blvd. Ashland, OR 97520, United States of America; 2151 E Division St., Springfield, MO 65803, United States of America; 3800 Highway 99 S, Ashland, OR 97520, United States of America. The United States-based branch of Al-Haramain Foundation was formally established by Suliman Hamd Suleiman al-Buthe (QI.A.179.04) and another associate in 1997. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 19 Oct. 2009.

23. AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION (Vazir; Vezir)*; 64 Poturmahala, Travnik, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under criminal investigation by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of Nov. 2007. Employees and associates include Najib Ben Mohamed Ben Salem Al-Waz (listed under permanent reference number QI.A.104.03.) and Safet Durguti (listed under permanent reference number QI.D.153.03.).

24. AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION*; Somalia.

25. AL-HARAMAIN: AFGHANISTAN BRANCH*; Afghanistan.

26. AL-HARAMAIN: ALBANIA BRANCH*; Irfan Tomini Street, # 58, Tirana, Albania.

27. AL-HARAMAIN: BANGLADESH BRANCH*; House 1, Road 1, S-6, Uttara, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

28. AL-HARAMAIN: ETHIOPIA BRANCH*; Woreda District 24 Kebele Section 13, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

29. AL-HARAMAIN: THE NETHERLANDS BRANCH (Stichting Al Haramain Humanitarian Aid)*; Jan Hanzenstraat 114, 1053SV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

30. AL-HARAMAYN FOUNDATION (KENYA)*; Dadaab, Kenya; Garissa, Kenya; Nairobi, Kenya.

31. AL-HARAMAYN FOUNDATION (TANZANIA)*; P.O. Box. 3616; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Singida; Tanga.

32. AL-ITIHAAD AL-ISLAMIYA / AIAI*; Reported to operate in Somalia and Ethiopia. Leadership includes Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki (listed under permanent reference number QI.A.172.04.) and Hassan Dahir Aweys (listed under permanent reference number QI.D.42.01.).

33. AL-NUR HONEY PRESS SHOPS (Al-Nur Honey Center)*; Sanaa, Yemen. Established by Mohamed Mohamed A-Hamati from Hufash district, El Mahweet Governerate, Yemen.

34. AL-QAIDA (“The Base”; Al Qaeda; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Places; The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; Al Qa’ida; Islamic Army)*.

35. AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ (AQI; al-Tawhid; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; Al-Qaida of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Jama’at Al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; JTJ; Islamic State of Iraq; ISI; al-Zarqawi network)*.

36. AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP) (Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; Al-Qaida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the South Arabian Peninsula; Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY)*; AQAP is a regional affiliate of Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01) and an armed group operating primarily in Arabian Peninsula. Location: Yemen. Alternative location: Saudi Arabia (2004 – 2006). Formed in Jan. 2009 when Al-Qaida in Yemen combined with Saudi Arabian Al-Qaida operatives. Leader of AQAP is Nasir ‘abd-al-Karim ‘Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QI.A.274.10.) and his deputy is Said Ali Al-Shihri (QI.A.275.10.).

37. AL-SHABAAB (Al-Shabab; Shabaab; The Youth; Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement; MYM; Harakat Shabab Al-Mujahidin; Hizbul Shabaab; Hisb’ul Shabaab; Al-Shabaab Al-Islamiya; Youth Wing; Al-Shabaab Al-Islaam; Al-Shabaab Al-Jihaad; The Unity of Islamic Youth; Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin; Harakatul Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin; Mujaahidiin Youth Movement)*; Somalia.

38. AL-SHIFA, HONEY PRESS FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE*; P.O. Box 8089, Al-Hasabah, Sanaa, Yemen; By The Shrine Next To The Gas Station, Jamal Street, Ta iz, Yemen; Al- Arudh Square, Khur Maksar, Aden, Yemen; Al-Nasr Street, Doha, Qatar.

39. ANSAR AL-ISLAM (Devotees of Islam; Jund Al-Islam; Soldiers of Islam; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Supporters of islam in Kurdistan; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Kurdish Taliban; Soldiers of God; Ansar Al-Sunna Army; Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna; Ansar Al-Sunna)*; Associated with Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01.) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04). Located and primarily active in northern Iraq but maintains a presence in western and central Iraq.

40. ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (Al Jamm’ah Al-Islamiah Al-Musallah; GIA; Groupement Islamique Arme)*; Algeria.

41. ASAT TRUST REG.*; Altenbach 8, 9490 Vaduz Fl, Liechtenstein.

42. ASBAT AL-ANSAR*; Ein el-Hilweh camp, Lebanon.

43. BA TAQWA FOR COMMERCE AND REAL ESTATE COMPANY LIMITED (Hochburg AG; c/o Asat Trust reg.)*; Vaduz, Liechtenstein; (formerly c/o Astat Trust reg.).

44. BARAKAAT BANK OF SOMALIA (Barakaat Bank of Somalia Ltd.; Baraka Bank of Somalia; Barakat Banks and Remittances)*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia; Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Reported to be owned or controlled by Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’Ale (QI.J.41.01).

45. BARAKAAT BOSTON*; 266 Neponset Avenue, Apt. 43, Dorchester, Massachusetts 02122-3224, United States of America.

46. BARAKAAT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY*; P.O. Box 3313, Dubai, UAE.

47. BARAKAAT GROUP OF COMPANIES*; Mogadishu, Somalia.

48. BARAKAAT INTERNATIONAL, INC.*; 1929 South 5th Street, Suite 205, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States of America.

49. BARAKAAT NORTH AMERICA, INC.*; 925 Washington Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, United States of America; Inc., 925 Washington Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts; 2019 Bank Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

50. BARAKAAT RED SEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS*; Bossaso, Somalia; Nakhiil, Somalia; Huruuse, Somalia; Raxmo, Somalia; Ticis, Somalia; Kowthar, Somalia; Noobir, Somalia; Bubaarag, Somalia; Gufure, Somalia; Xuuxuule, Somalia; Ala Aamin, Somalia; Guureeye, Somalia; Najax, Somalia; Carafaat, Somalia.

51. BARAKAAT TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO. SOMALIA, LTD.*; P.O. Box 3313, Dubai, UAE. Reported to be owned or controlled by Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’Ale (QI.J.41.01).

52. BARAKAAT WIRE TRANSFER COMPANY*; 4419 South Brandon Street, Seattle, Washington, United States of America.

53. BARAKAT COMPUTER CONSULTING (BCC)*.

54. BARAKAT CONSULTING GROUP (BCG)*.

55. BARAKAT GLOBAL TELEPHONE COMPANY*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia.

56. BARAKAT INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES (BICO)*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia.

57. BARAKAT POST EXPRESS (BPE)*.

58. BARAKAT REFRESHMENT COMPANY*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia.

59. BARAKAT TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LIMITED (BTELCO)*; Bakara Market, Dar Salaam Building, Mogadishu, Somalia. Office closed and defunct in the Netherlands as at Aug. 2009.

60. BARAKO TRADING COMPANY, LLC (Baraka Trading Company)*; P.O. Box 3313, Dubai, UAE. Until 23 Mar. 2009 this entity was also listed as Baraka Trading Company (QE.B.54.01). Reported to be owned or controlled by Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’Ale (QI.J.41.01).

61. BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION (Al Bir Al Dawalia; BIF-USA; Mezhdunarodnyj blagotvoritl’nyl Fond; BIF)*; 14) Tbilisi, Georgia; 15) Nazran, Ingushetia; 16) Burgemeester Kessensingel 40, Masstricht, Netherlands; 17) Stichting Benevolence International Nederland (A.K.A. Benevolence International Nederland, A.K.A. BIN). Radeborg 14B, 6228 CV Maastricht, Netherlands. Chamber of commerce registration: 14063277; 18) House 111, First Floor, Street 64, F-10/3, Islamabad, Pakistan; 19) P.O. Box 1055, Peshawar, Pakistan; 20) Azovskaya 6, km. 3, off. 401, Moscow, Russia 113149; 21) Ulitsa Oktyabr”skaya, dom. 89, Moscow, Russia 127521; 22) P.O. Box 1937, Khartoum, Sudan; 23) P.O. Box 7600, Jeddah 21472, Saudi Arabia; 24) P.O. Box 10845, Riyadh 11442, Saudi Arabia; 25) Dushanbe, Tajikistan; 26) United Kingdom. Other locations of BIF Activities: 1) Afghanistan; 2) Bangladesh; 3) Gaza Strip; 4) Bosnia and Herzegovina; 5) Yemen; U.S. Locations: 1) 8820 Mobile Avenue, IA, Oak Lawn, Illinois, 60453 United States of America ; 2) P.O. Box 548, Worth, Illinois, 60482 United States of America; 3) (Formerly located at) 9838 S. Roberts Road, Suite 1W, Palos Hills, Illinois, 60465 United States of America; 4) (Formerly located at) 20-24 Branford Place, Suite 705, Newark, New Jersey, 07102 United States of America. Other Locations: 1) Bashir Safar Ugli 69, Baku, Azerbaijan; 2) 69 Boshir Safaroglu St., Baku, Azerbaijan; 3) Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 4) Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 5) (Last known address) 3 King Street, South Waterloo, Ontario, N2J 3Z6 Canada; 6) (Last known address) P.O. Box 1508 Station 1, Mississauga, Ontario, L4Y 4G2 Canada; 7) (Last known address) 2465 Cawthra Rd., #203, Mississauga, Ontario, L5A 3P2 Canada; 8) Ottawa, Canada; 9) Grozny, Chechnya; 10) 91 Paihonggou, Lanzhou, Gansu, China 730000; 11) Hrvatov 30, 41000, Zagreb, Croatia; 12) Makhachkala, Daghestan; 13) Duisi, Georgia. Employer Identification Number (United States of America) 36-3823186.

62. BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FUND (Benevolent International Fund)*; Locations: 1) (Last known address) 2465 Cawthra Rd., Unit 203, Mississauga, Ontario, L5A 3P2 Canada; 2) (Last known address) P.O. Box 1508, Station B, Mississauga, Ontario, L4Y 4G2 Canada; 3) (Last known address) P.O. Box 40015, 75 King Street South, Waterloo, Ontario, N2J 4V1 Canada; 4) (Last known address) 92 King Street, 201, Waterloo, Ontario, N2J 1P5 Canada.

63. BOSANSKA IDEALNA FUTURA (BIF-Bosnia; Bosnian Ideal Future)*; 1 Kanal Street, 72000 Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 12 Salke Lagumdzije Street, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 16 Hakije Mazica Street, 72000 Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 35 Hamze Celenke Street, Ilidza, Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Sehidska Street, Breza, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosanska Idealna Futura was officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an association and humanitarian organization under registry number 59. It was the legal successor of the Bosnia and Herzegovina offices of Benevolence International Foundation (listed under permanent reference number QE.B.93.02.), doing business as BECF Charitable Educational Center, Benevolence Educational Center. Bosanska Idealna Futura was no longer in existence as at Dec. 2008.

64. DJAMAT HOUMAT DAAWA SALAFIA (DHDS) (El-Ahouel; Djamaat Houmah Al-Dawah Al-Salafiat; Katibat el Ahouel)*; Located in western Algeria. A branch of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (QE.A.6.01.) formed as a result of the break that occurred in 1996 when Afghanistan veteran Kada Benchikha Larbi decided to oppose the head of GIA. As at 1999, the group was led by Mohammed Benslim. Yahia Djouadi (QI.D.249.08) subsequently made DHDS part of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QE.T.14.01). Estimated in Nov. 2007 to comprise approx. 50 members. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009.

65. EASTERN TURKISTAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah; Islamic Party of Turkestan; Djamaat Turkistan)*.

66. EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (Egyptian al-Jihad; Jihad Group; New Jihad; Al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Movement)*.

67. GLOBAL RELIEF FOUNDATION (GRF) (Fondation Secours Mondial (FSM); Secours Mondial de France (SEMONDE); Fondation Secours Mondial – Belgique a.s.b.l.; Fondation Secours Mondial v.z.w.; Stichting Wereldhulp – Belgie v.z.w.; Fondation Secours Mondial – Kosova; Fondation Secours Mondial “World Relief”; FSM)*; 49 rue du Lazaret, 67100 Strasebourg, France; 9935 South 76th Avenue, Unit 1, Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, United States of America; House 267 Street No. 54, Sector F – 11/4, Islamabad, Pakistan; P.O. Box 1406, Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, United States of America; P.O. Box 6, 1040 Etterbeek 2, Brussels, Belgium; Rr. Skenderbeu 76, Lagjja Sefa, Gjakova, Kosovo; Rruga e Kavajes, Building No. 3, Apartment No. 61, P.O. Box 2892, Tirana, Albania; Rue des Bataves 69, 1040 Etterbeek, Brussels, Belgium; Vaatjesstraat, 29, 2580 Putte, Belgium; Ylli Morina Road, Djakovica, Kosovo. Other Foreign Locations: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syria. Federal Employer Identification ( United States of America): 36-3804626. V.A.T. Number: BE 454,419,759. Belgian addresses incorrect: these are the addresses of Putte et Bruxelles de l association sans but lucratif since 1998.

68. HARAKAT UL JIHAD ISLAMI (HUJI; Movement of Islamic Holy War; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami; Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami; Harkat-ul-Jehad-al Islami; Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami; Harakat-ul-Ansar; HUA)*; Was established in Afganistan in 1980. In 1993, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami merged with Harakat ul-Mujahidin to from Harakat ul-Ansar. In 1997, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami split from Harakat ul-Ansar and resumed using its former name. Operations are in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

69. HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDIN / HUM (al-Faran; Al-Hadid; Al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Harakat ul-Mujahideen)*.

70. HEYATUL ULYA*.

71. INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, INDONESIA, BRANCH OFFICE (International Islamic Relief Agency; International Relief Organization; Islamic Relief Organization; Islamic World Relief; International Islamic Aid Organization; Islamic Salvation Committee; The Human Relief Committee of the Muslim League; World Islamic Relief Organization; Al Igatha Al-Islamiya; Hayat al-Aghatha al-Islamia al-Alamiya; Hayat al-Igatha; Hayat Al-‘Igatha; Ighatha; Igatha; Igassa; Igasa; Igase; Egassa; IIRO)*; International Islamic Relief Organization, Indonesia Office; Jalan Raya Cipinang Jaya No. 90; East Jakarta, 13410, Indonesia; P.O. Box 3654; Jakarta 54021, Indonesia.

72. INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANIZATION, PHILIPPINES, BRANCH OFFICES (International Islamic Relief Agency; International Relief Organization; Islamic Relief Organization; Islamic World Relief; International Islamic Aid Organization; Islamic Salvation Committee; The Human Relief Committee of the Muslim League; World Islamic Relief Organization; Al Igatha Al-Islamiya; Hayat al-Aghatha al-Islamia al-Alamiya; Hayat al-Igatha; Hayat Al-‘Igatha; Ighatha; Igatha; Igassa; Igasa; Igase; Egassa; IIRO)*; Basilan, Philippines; Cotabato City, Philippines; International Islamic Relief Organization, Philippines Office; 201 Heart Tower Building; 108 Valero Street; Salcedo Village, Makati City; Manila, Philippines; Marawi City, Philippines; Tawi Tawi, Philippines; Zamboanga City, Philippines.

73. ISLAMIC ARMY OF ADEN*.

74. ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (IIB) (The Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade; The Islamic Peacekeeping Army; The International Brigade; Islamic Peacekeeping Battalion; Islamic Peacekeeping International Brigade; International Battalion)*.

75. ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP (Jama’at al-Jihad; Jamiyat; Libyan Society; Kazakh Jama’at; Jamaat Mojahedin; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; al-Djihad al-Islami; Zamaat Modzhakhedov Tsentralnoy Asii; Islamic Jihad Union)*.

76. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU)*.

77. JAISH-I-MOHAMMED (Army of Moammed)*; Pakistan.

78. JAM’YAH TA’AWUN AL-ISLAMIA (Society of Islamic Cooperation; Jam’iyat al Ta’awun al Islamiyya; Jit)*; Qandahar City, Afghanistan.

79. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiya; Jemaah Islamiah; Jamaah Islamiyah; Jama’ah Islamiyah)*; The network in South-East Asia. Founded by the late Abdullah Sungkar.

80. LAJNAT AL DAAWA AL ISLAMIYA (LDI)*.

81. LASHKAR I JHANGVI (LJ)*.

82. LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA (Lashkar-e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Army of the Righteous; Al Mansoorian; Al Mansooreen; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; LET; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-I-Ahle-Hadith; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Pashan-e-ahle-Hadis; Lashkar e Tayyaba; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama,at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama,at-i-Dawat; Jamaiat-ud-Dawa; Jama,at-ud-Da,awah; Jama,at-ud-Da,awa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa)*.

83. LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP (LIFG)*.

84. MAKHTAB AL-KHIDAMAT (MAK; Al Kifah)*.

85. MAMOUN DARKAZANLI IMPORT-EXPORT COMPANY (Darkazanli Company; Darkazanli Export-Import Sonderposten)*; Uhlenhorsterweg 34 11 Hamburg, Germany.

86. MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain; GICM)*.

87. MOVEMENT FOR REFORM IN ARABIA (Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia; MIRA; Al Islah (Reform); MRA; Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah lil-Islah; Islamic Movement for Reform; Movement for (Islamic) Reform in Arabia Ltd; Movement for Reform in Arabia Ltd)*;BM Box: MIRA, London WC1N 3XX, United Kingdom; Safiee Suite, EBC House, Townsend Lane, London, NW 9 8LL, United Kingdom. Email address: info@islah.org, Tel: 020 8452 0303, Fax: 020 8452 0808, UK Company number 03834450.

88. NADA INTERNATIONAL ANSTALT*; Vaduz, Liechtenstein; (formerly c/o Asat Trust reg.). Liquidated and deleted from Commercial Registry.

89. PARKA TRADING COMPANY*; P.O. Box 3313, Deira, Dubai, UAE.

90. RABITA TRUST*; Room 9a, 2nd Floor, Wahdat Road, Education Town, Lahore, Pakistan; Wares Colony, Lahore, Pakistan.

91. RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT (Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement; Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement)*;Barangay Mal-Ong, Anda, Pangasinan Province, Philippines; Number 50, Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, Philippines; Sitio Dueg, Barangay Maasin, San Clemente, Tarlac Province, Philippines. Had its office at the Fi-Sabilillah Da’awa and Media Foundation Incorporated at number 50, Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, which is also the residence of the entity’s founder, Hilarion Del Rosario Santos III (listed under permanent reference number QI.S.244.08.). Associated with the Abu Sayyaf Group (listed under permanent reference number QE.A.1.01.) and Jemaah Islamiyah (listed under permanent reference number QE.J.92.02.) including explosives training and other support for terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 2004 and 2005. Received funding from the International Islamic Relief Organization, Philippines, branch offices (listed under permanent reference number QE.I.126.06.) through Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani (listed under permanent reference number QI.J.180.04.).

92. RED SEA BARAKAT COMPANY LIMITED*; Bakaara Market, Mogadishu, Somalia.

93. REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC HERITAGE SOCIETY (Jamiat Ihia Al-Turath Al-Islamiya; Revival of Islamic Society Heritage on the African Continent; Jamia Ihya ul Turath; RIHS)*;Afghanistan; Pakistan. NOTE: Only the Pakistan and Afghanistan offices of this entity are hereby designated.

94. RIYADUS-SALIKHIN RECONNAISSANCE AND SABOTAGE BATTALION OF CHECHEN MARTYRS (RSRSBCM) (Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion; Riyadh-as-Saliheen; The Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the Riyadh al-Salihin Martyrs; Firqat al-Takhrib wa al-Istitla al-Askariyah li Shuhada Riyadh al-Salihin; Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage battalion of Shahids (martyrs)*.

95. SANABEL RELIEF AGENCY LIMITED (Sanabel Relief Agency; Sanabel L’il-Igatha; SRA; Sara; Al-Rahama Relief Foundation Limited)*; 1011 Stockport Rd, Levenshulme, Manchester M9 2TB, United Kingdom; 54 Anson Road, London, NW2 6AD, United Kingdom; 63 South Rd, Sparkbrook, Birmingham B 111 EX, United Kingdom; 98 Gresham Road, Middlesbrough, United Kingdom; P.O. Box 50, Manchester M19 25P, United Kingdom. Charity number: 1083469. Registration number: 3713110. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 28 Sep. 2009.

96. SOMALI INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATION*; 1806 Riverside Avenue, 2nd Floor, Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States of America.

97. SOMALI INTERNET COMPANY*.

98. SOMALI NETWORK AB*; Hallybybacken 15, 70 Spanga, Sweden.

99. SPECIAL PURPOSE ISLAMIC REGIMENT (SPIR) (The Islamic Special Purpose Regiment; The al-Jiahad-Fisi-Sabililah Special Islamic Regiment; Islamic Regiment of Special Meaning)*.

100. TAIBAH INTERNATIONAL-BOSNIA OFFICES (Taibah International Aid Agency; Taibah International Aid Association; Al Taibah, Intl; Taibah International Aide Association)*; 26 Tabhanska Street, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 3 Velika Cilna Ulica, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 6 Avde Smajlovica Street, Novo Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2002-2004, Taibah International – Bosnia offices used premises of the Culture Home in Hadzici, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization was officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a branch of Taibah International Aid Association under registry number 7. Taibah International – Bosnia offices ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision on cessation of operation number 03-05-2-70/03).

101. THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (Le Groupe Salafiste Pour La Prediction et Le Combat; Salafist Group For Call and Combat)*; Estimated in Nov. 2007 to comprise approx. 700 members regrouped in cells in Algeria and northern Mali. Its Emir is Abdelmalek Droukdel (listed under permanent reference number QI.D.232.07.).

102. TUNISIAN COMBATANT GROUP (Groupe Combattant Tunisien; Groupe Islamiste Combattant Tunisien; GICT)*.

103. UMMAH TAMEER E-NAU (UTN)*; Street 13, Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan; Pakistan.

104. WAFA HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION (Al Wafa; Al Wafa Organization; Wafa Al-Igatha al-Islamia)*; Jordan House No. 125, Street 54, Phase II Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan.Offices in: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE.

Физические лица [Individuals]

1. ABD AL HAMID SULAIMAN AL-MUJIL (Dr. Abd al-Hamid Al-Mujal; Dr. Abd Abdul-Hamid bin Sulaiman Al-Mu’jil; Abd al-Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mu’jil; Dr. Abd Al-Hamid Al-Mu’ajjal; Abd al-Hamid Mu’jil; A.S. Mujel; Abu Abdallah; Abdulhamid Sulaiman M.Al Mojil)*; 28.04.1949 г.р., Kuwait. DOB: 29.04.1949.

2. ABD AL WAHAB ABD AL HAFIZ (Ferdjani Mouloud; Rabah Di Roma; Mourad; Abdel Wahab Abdelhafid; Said)*; 07.09.1967 г.р., Algiers, Algeria (30.10.1968 г.р., Algeria).

3. ABD AL-RAHMAN MUHAMMAD JAFFAR ‘ALI (Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Jaffir; Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Jafir ‘Ali; Abd al-Rahman Jaffir Ali; Abdul Rahman Mohamed Jaffer Ali; Abdulrahman Mohammad Jaffar; ‘Ali Al-Khal; Abu Muhammad Al-Khal)*; 15.01.1968 г.р., Muharraq, Bahrain.

4. ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB ABDEL RAHMAN (Abu Al-Khayr; Ahmad Hasan; Abu Jihad)*; 03.11.1957 г.р., Kafr Al-Shaykh, Egypt.

5. ABD EL KADER MAHMOUD MOHAMED EL SAYED (Es Sayed Kader)*; 26.12.1962 г.р., Egypt.

6. ABD-AL-MAJID AZIZ AL-ZINDANI (Abdelmajid Al-Zindani; Shaykh ‘Abd Al-Madjid Al-Zindani; Sheikh Abd Al-Meguid Al-Zindani)*; 1942 г.р., Yemen DOB: Approximately 1950.

7. ABDELGHANI MZOUDI (Abdelghani Mazwati; Abdelghani Mazuti)*; 06.12.1972 г.р., Marrakesh, Morocco.

8. ABDELHADI BEN DEBKA (Abd Al Hadi; Hadi; L’Hadi Bendebka; El Hadj Ben Debka)*; 17.11.1963 г.р., Algiers, Algeria.

9. ABDELHALIM HAFED ABDELFATTAH REMADNA (Abdelhalim Remadna; Jalloul)*; 02.04.1966 г.р., Biskra, Algeria.

10. ABDELKADER LAAGOUB*; 23.04.1966 г.р., Casablanca, Morocco.

11. ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL (Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud)*; 20.04.1970 г.р., Meftah, Wilaya of Blida, Algeria.

12. ABDERRAHMANE KIFANE*; 07.03.1963 г.р., Casablanca, Morocco.

13. ABDUL BAQI*; 1962 г.р., Jalalabad city, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.

14. ABDUL BARI AKHUND (Haji Mullah Sahib)*; 1953 г.р., Helmand province, Afghanistan.

15. ABDUL GHAFAR QURISHI (Abdul Ghaffar Qureshi)*.

16. ABDUL GHAFAR SHINWARY*; 29.03.1965 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

17. ABDUL GHAFOOR*; Kunar province, Afghanistan.

18. ABDUL GHANI BARADAR (Mullah Baradar Akhund)*; 1968 г.р., Weetmak villag, Dehrawood district, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1968.

19. ABDUL HAI HAZEM*; 1971 г.р., Ghazni.

20. ABDUL HAKIM MUJAHID MUHAMMAD AWRANG (Abdul Hakim Mojahed; Abdul Hakim Mujahid Moh Aurang)*; 1956 г.р., Khajakhel village, Sharan district, Paktika province, Afghanistan.

21. ABDUL HAKIM MURAD (Murad abdul Hakim Hasim; Murad Abdul Hakim Ali Hashim; Murad Abdul Hakim Al Hashim; Saeed Akman; Saeed Ahmed)*; 04.01.1968 г.р., Kuwait.

22. ABDUL HAQ (Maimaitiming Maimaiti; Abdul Heq; Abuduhake; Abdulheq Jundullah; ‘Abd Al-Haq; Memetiming Memeti; Memetiming Aximu; Memetiming Qekeman; Maiumaitimin Maimaiti; Abdul Saimaiti; Muhammad Ahmed Khaliq; Maimaiti Iman; Muhelisi; Qerman; Saifuding)*; 10.10.1971 г.р., Chele County, Khuttan Area, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China.

23. ABDUL JABBAR OMARI*; Zabul, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958.

24. ABDUL JALIL HAQQANI (Nazar Jan)*; 1963 г.р., Arghandaab district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

25. ABDUL KABIR MOHAMMAD JAN (A. Kabir)*; 1963 г.р., Zardran tribe, Paktja province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

26. ABDUL LATIF MANSUR (Abdul Latif Mansoor)*; 1968 г.р., Zurmat district, Paktia province, Afghanistan.

27. ABDUL LATIF SALEH (Abdul Latif A.A. Saleh; Abdyl Latif Saleh; Dr. Abd al-Latif Saleh; Abdul Latif A.A. Saleh Abu Hussein; Abd al-Latif Salih; Abu Amir)*; 05.03.1957 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq.

28. ABDUL MANAF KASMURI (Muhammad Al-Filipini; Intan)*; 28.05.1955 г.р., Selangor, Malaysia.

29. ABDUL MANAN*.

30. ABDUL MANAN NYAZI (Abdul Manan Nayazi; Abdul Manan Niazi; Baryaly; Baryalai)*; 1968 г.р., Pashtoon Zarghoon district, Herat province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1968.

31. ABDUL QADEER ABDUL BASEER*; 1964 г.р., Nangarhar, Afghanistan.

32. ABDUL RAHIM AL-TALHI ( Abdul-Rahim Hammad al-Talhi; Abd Al-Rahim Hamad al-Tahi; Abdulrheem Hammad A Altalhi; Abe Al-Rahim al-Talahi; Abd Al-Rahim Al Tahli; Abd al-Rahim al-Talhi; Abdulrahim Al Tahi; Abdulrahim al-Talji; Abd-Al-Rahim al Talji; Abdul Rahim; Abu Al Bara a Al Naji; Shuwayb Junayd; Abdul Rahim Hammad Ahmad Al-Talhi)*; 08.12.1961 г.р., Al-Shefa, Al-Taif, Saudi Arabia.

33. ABDUL RAHMAN AGHA*; 1958 г.р., Arghandab district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.

34. ABDUL RAHMAN AHMAD HOTTAK (Hottak Sahib)*; 1957 г.р., Ghazni province, Afghanistan.

35. ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN (Taha Abdul Rahman S.; Taher Abdul Rahman S.; Yasin Abdul Rahman Said; Yasin Aboud)*; 10.04.1960 г.р., Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America.

36. ABDUL RAHMAN ZAHED (Abdul Rehman Zahid)*; Logar province, Kharwar district, Afghanistan; Between 1963 and 1968.

37. ABDUL RAQIB TAKHARI*; Takhar province, Afghanistan; DOB: Between 1968 and 1973.

38. ABDUL RAUF KHADEM*; Uruzgan/Kandahar, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958-1963.

39. ABDUL RAZAQ*; 1958 г.р., Arghandab district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.

40. ABDUL RAZAQ AKHUND LALA AKHUND*; 1958 г.р., Spin Boldak District, Kandahar province, Afghanistan, in the area bordering Chaman district, Quetta, Pakistan.

41. ABDUL SALAM HANAFI ALI MARDAN QUL (Abdussalam Hanifi; Hanafi Saheb)*; 1968 г.р., Darzab district, Faryab district, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1968.

42. ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF (Abdussalam Zaeef)*; 1968 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

43. ABDUL SAMAD KHAKSAR*; Kandahar, Afghanistan DOB: Between 1958 and 1963.

44. ABDUL SATAR PAKTIN (Abdul Sattar Paktis)*; Paktia, Afghanistan.

45. ABDUL WAHAB*; 1973 г.р., Faryab province, Afghanistan.

46. ABDUL WAHED SHAFIQ*; 1968 г.р., Ningarhar province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1968.

47. ABDUL WASAY MU’TASIM AGHA (Mustasim Aga Jan; Agha Jan; Abdul Wasay Agha Jan Motasem)*; 1968 г.р., Kandahar city, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1968.

48. ABDUL-HAQ WASSIQ (Abdul-Haq Wasseq)*; 1975 г.р., Central Ghazni province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1975.

49. ABDULHAI MOTMAEN*; Zabul province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1973.

50. ABDULHAI SALEK*.

51. ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH EL ALFI (Abu Mariam; Al-Masri Abu Mohamed; Saleh)*; 06.06.1963 г.р., Gharbia, Egypt.

52. ABDULLAH ANSHORI (Abu Fatih; Thoyib Ibnu; Toyib Ibnu; Abu Fathi)*; 1958 г.р., Pacitan, East Java, Indonesia.

53. ABDULLAH HAMAD*; 1972 г.р., Helmand, Afghanistan.

54. ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN KAHIE*.

55. ABID HAMMADOU (Abdelhamid Abou Zeid; Youcef Adel; Abou Abdellah)*; 12.12.1965 г.р., Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, Algeria.

56. ABU BAKAR BA’ASYIR (Baasyir Abu Bakar; Bashir Abu Bakar; Abdus Samad; Abdus Somad)*; 17.08.1938 г.р., Jombang, East Java, Indonesia.

57. ABU BAKR AL-JAZIRI (Yasir Al-Jazari)*.

58. ABU RUSDAN (Abu Thoriq; Rusdjan; Rusjan; Rusydan; Thoriquddin; Thoriquiddin; Thoriquidin; Toriquddin)*; 16.08.1960 г.р., Kudus, Central Java, Indonesia.

59. ABU SUFIAN AL-SALAMABI MUHAMMED AHMED ABD AL-RAZZIQ (Abousofian Abdelrazek; Abousofian Salman Abdelrazik; Abousofian Abdelrazik; Abousofiane Abdelrazik; Sofian Abdelrazik; Abou El Layth; Aboulail; Abu Juiriah; Abu Sufian; Abulail; Djolaiba the Sudanese; Jolaiba; Ould El Sayeigh; Abu Sufian Abd Al Razeq)*; 06.08.1962 г.р., Al-Bawgah (Albaouga), Sudan.

60. ADEL ABDUL JALIL IBRAHIM BATTERJEE (Adil Al-Battarjee; Adel Batterjee; Adil Abd al Jalil Batarji; Adel AbdulJaleel I. Batterjee)*; 01.07.1946 г.р., Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. DOB: 01.06.1946.

61. ADEL BEN AL-AZHAR BEN YOUSSEF BEN SOLTANE (Zakariya)*; 14.07.1970 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

62. ADEM YILMAZ (Talha)*; 04.11.1978 г.р., Bayburt, Turkey.

63. ADIL MUHAMMAD MAHMUD ABD AL-KHALIQ (Adel Mohamed Mahmoud Abdul Khaliq; Adel Mohamed Mahmood Abdul Khaled)*; 02.03.1984 г.р., Bahrain.

64. AGHA JAN ALIZAI (Haji Agha Jan Alizai; Hajji Agha Jan; Agha Jan Alazai; Haji Loi Lala; Loi Agha)*; 15.10.1963 г.р., Hitemchai Village, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

65. AGUS DWIKARNA*; 11.08.1964 г.р., Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia.

66. AHMAD JAN AKHUNDZADA SHUKOOR AKHUNDZADA (Ahmad Jan Akhunzada; Ahmad Jan Akhund Zada)*; Uruzgan province, Afghanistan.

67. AHMAD ZERFAOUI (Abdullah; Abdalla; Smail; Abu Khaoula; Abu Cholder; Nuhr)*; 15.07.1963 г.р., Chrea, Algeria.

68. AHMADULLAH (Ahmadulla)*; 1975 г.р., Qarabah district, Ghazni province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1975.

69. AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED (Abu Zubeyr, Muktar Abdirahman; Abuzubair, Muktar Abdulrahim; Aw Mohammed, Ahmed Abdi; Aw-Mohamud, Ahmed Abdi; Godane; Godani; Mukhtar, Shaykh; Zubeyr, Abu)*; 10.07.1977 г.р., Hargeysa, Somalia.

70. AHMED DEGHDEGH (Abd El Illah)*; 17.01.1967 г.р., Anser, Wilaya (province) of Jijel, Algeria.

71. AHMED EL BOUHALI (Abu Katada)*; 31.05.1963 г.р., Sidi Kacem, Morocco (31.05.1963 г.р., Sidi Kacem, Morocco).

72. AHMED HOSNI RARRBO (Rarrbo Abdallah; Rarrbo Abdullah; Rarrbo Ahmed Hosni)*; 12.09.1974 г.р., Bologhine, Algeria (12.09.1974 г.р., France).

73. AHMED JAN AKHUND*; Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1953-1958.

74. AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI (Ahmad Abu Bakr; Ahmed Abubakar; Ahmed Abubakar K.; Ahmed Abubakar Khalfan; Ahmed Abubakary K.; Ahmed Ahmed Khalfan; Ghailani Abubakary Khalfan Ahmed; Ghailani Ahmed; Ghilani Ahmad Khalafan; Hussein Mahafudh Abubakar Ahmed Abdallah; Khalfan Ahmed; Mohammed Shariff Omar; Ahmed The Tanzanian; Foopie; Fupi; Ahmed A; Al Tanzani Ahmad; Bakr Abu; Khabar Abu; Ali Ahmed Khalfan; Haytham al-Kini)*; 14.03.1974 г.р., Zanzibar, Tanzania. Возможно г.р.: 13.04.1974, 14.04.1974, 01.08.1970.

75. AHMED MOHAMMED HAMED ALI (Abdurehman Ahmed Mohammed; Ahmed Hamed; Ali Ahmed Mohammed; Ali Hamed; Hemed Ahmed; Shieb Ahmed; Abu Fatima; Abu Islam; Abu Khadiijah; Ahmed The Egyptian; Ahmed Ahmed; Al-Masri Ahmad; Al-Surir Abu Islam; Shuaib)*; 13.01.1967 г.р., Badari, Asyout, Egypt.

76. AIMAN MUHAMMED RABI AL-ZAWAHIRI (Ayman Al-Zawahari; Ahmed Fuad Salim; Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabi Abdel Muaz; Al Zawahiri Ayman; Abdul Qader Abdul Aziz Abdul Moez Al Doctor; Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabi; Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabie; Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Robi; Dhawahri Ayman; Eddaouahiri Ayman; Nur Al Deen Abu Mohammed; Abu Fatma; Abu Mohammed; Ayman Al Zawahari; Ahmad Fuad Salim)*; 19.06.1951 г.р., Giza, Egypt.

77. AKHTAR MOHAMMAD MANSOUR SHAH MOHAMMED (Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Khan Muhammad; Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor; Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor)*; 1960 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan; Kalanko Joftian, Zurmat district, Paktia province, Afghanistan.

78. AKHTAR MOHAMMAD MAZ-HARI*; 1970 г.р., Kunduz, Afghanistan.

79. AKRAM TURKI HISHAN AL-MAZIDIH (Akram Turki Al-Hishan; Abu Jarrah; Abu Akram)*; 1974 г.р., DOB: a) 1974 b) 1975.

80. AL SAYYID AHMED FATHI HUSSEIN ELIWAH (Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwa; Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Alaiwah; Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Elaiwa; Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Elewah; Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Alaywah; El Sayed Ahmad Fathi Hussein Elaiwa; Hatim; Hisham; Abu Umar)*; 30.07.1964 г.р., Suez; Alexandria, Egypt. Возможно 30.01.1964г.р.

81. AL-AZHAR BEN KHALIFA BEN AHMED ROUINE (Salmane; Lazhar)*; 20.11.1975 г.р., Sfax, Tunisia.

82. AL-AZHAR BEN MOHAMMED BEN EL-ABED AL-TLILI (Lazar Ben Mohammed Tlili)*; 26.03.1969 г.р., Feriana, Al-Kasrain, Tunisia.

83. AL-MOKHTAR BEN MOHAMED BEN AL-MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA (Bushusha Mokhtar)*; 13.10.1969 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

84. ALI ABBAS ABDI*.

85. ALI AHMED NUR JIM’ALE (Ahmed Ali Jimale; Ahmad Nur Ali Jim’ale; Ahmed Nur Jumale; Ahmed Ali Jumali; Ahmed Ali Jumale; Sheikh Ahmed Jimale)*; 1954 г.р., Eilbur, Somalia.

86. ALI GHALEB HIMMAT*; 16.06.1938 г.р., Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic.

87. ALI MOHAMED EL HEIT (Kamel Mohamed; Alм Di Roma; Kamel Mohamed; Ali Il Barbuto)*; 20.03.1970 г.р., Rouiba, Algeria (30.01.1971 г.; 20.03.1970 г.р., Algeria).

88. ALI SAYYID MUHAMED MUSTAFA BAKRI (Ali Salim; Abd Al-Aziz; Al-Masri)*; 18.04.1966 г.р., Beni- Suef.

89. ALLAH DAD TAYEB WALI MUHAMMAD (Allah Dad Tayyab; Allah Dad Tabeeb)*; 1963 г.р., Kandahar city, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1963.

90. ALLAHDAD (Akhund)*; 1953 г.р., Spinboldak district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1953.

91. ALY SOLIMAN MASSOUD ABDUL SAYED (Ibn El Qaim; Mohamed Osman; adam)*; 1969 г.р., Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

92. AMIN MUHAMMAD UL HAQ SAAM KHAN (Al-Haq Amin; Amin Muhammad; Dr. Amin; Ul-Haq Dr. Amin)*; 1960 г.р., Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

93. AMINULLAH AMIN*.

94. AMIR ABDULLAH (Amir Abdullah Sahib)*; 1972 г.р., Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

95. AMIR KHAN MOTAQI (Amir Khan Muttaqi)*; Helmand province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1968.

96. AMRAN MANSOR (Henry)*; 25.05.1964 г.р., Johor, Malaysia.

97. ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD (Calib Trinidad; Kalib Trinidad; Abdul Khalil; Abdukahlil; Abu Khalil; Anis)*; 20.03.1978 г.р., Gattaran, Cagayan Province, Philippines.

98. ANWAR NASSER ABDULLA AL-AULAQI (Anwar al-Aulaqi; Anwar al-Awlaki; Anwar al-Awlaqi; Anwar Nasser Aulaqi; Anwar Nasser Abdullah Aulaqi; Anwar Nasser Abdulla Aulaqi)*; 21.04.1971 г.р., Las Cruces, New Mexico, United States of America. DOB: 22 Apr. 1971.

99. AQEEL ABDULAZIZ AQEEL AL-AQEEL (Aqeel Abdulaziz Al-Aqil; Ageel Abdulaziz A. Alageel)*; 29.04.1949 г.р., Unaizah, Saudi Arabia.

100. AREFULLAH AREF*; 1958 г.р., Zurmat district, Paktia province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958.

101. ARIF QASMANI (Muhammad Arif Qasmani; Muhammad ‘Arif Qasmani; Mohammad Arif Qasmani; Arif Umer; Qasmani Baba; Memon Baba; Baba Ji)*; 1944 г.р., Pakistan DOB: Approximately 1944.

102. ARIS MUNANDAR*; 01.01.1971 г.р., Sambi, Boyolali, Java, Indonesia. Дата рождения между 1962 и 1968 годами.

103. ARSALAN RAHMANI MOHAMMAD DAULAT (Arsala Rahmani)*; 1941 г.р., Khaleqdad village, Urgon district, Paktika province, Afghanistan.

104. ASCHRAF AL-DAGMA (Aschraf Al-Dagma; Aschraf Al Dagma; Aschraf Al Dagma; Aschraf Al Dagma)*; 28.04.1969 г.р., Absan, Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories (28.04.1969 г.р., Kannyouiz, Palestinian Territories; 28.04.1969 г.р., Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories; 28.04.1969 г.р., Palestinian Territories; 28.04.1969 г.р., Abasan, Gaza Strip).

105. ATA ABDOULAZIZ RASHID (Ata Abdoul Aziz Barzingy; Abdoulaziz Ata Rashid)*; 01.12.1973 г.р., Sulaimaniya, Iraq (01.12.1973 г.р.).

106. ATILLA SELEK (Muaz)*; 28.02.1985 г.р., Ulm, Germany.

107. ATIQULLAH*.

108. ATTIQULLAH AKHUND*; 1953 г.р., Shawali Kott district, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

109. AWEYS DAHIR UBEIDULLAHI*.

110. AZIZIRAHMAN*.

111. BADRUDDIN HAQQANI*; Approximately 1975-1979.

112. BASHIR MOHAMED MAHAMOUD (Bashir Mohamed Mahmoud; Bashir Mahmud Mohammed; Bashir Mohamed Mohamud; Bashir Mohamed Mohamoud; Bashir Yare; Bashir Qorgab; Gure Gap; Abu Muscab; Qorgab)*; 1982 г.р., DOB: Circa 1979-1982.

113. BEKKAY HARRACH (Abu Talha al Maghrabi; al Hafidh Abu Talha der Deutsche (“the German”)*; 04.09.1977 г.р., Berkane, Morocco.

114. BILAL BIN MARWAN*; 1947 г.р.

115. CHABAANE BEN MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED AL-TRABELSI (Chabaane Ben Mohamed Trabelsi)*; 01.05.1966 г.р., Menzel Temime, Nabeul, Tunisia.

116. CHIHEB BEN MOHAMED BEN MOKHTAR AL-AYARI (Hichem Abu Hchem)*; 19.12.1965 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

117. DAKI MOHAMMED*; 29.03.1965 г.р., Morocco.

118. DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER (Abdullah)*; 09.09.1985 г.р., Neunkirchen (Saar), Germany.

119. DAWOOD IBRAHIM KASKAR (Dawood Ebrahim; Sheikh Dawood Hassan; Hizrat; Abdul Hamid Abdul Aziz; Anis Ibrahim; Aziz Dilip; Daud Hasan Shaikh Ibrahim Kaskar; Daud Ibrahim Memon Kaskar; Dawood Ibrahim Memon; Dawood Sabri; Kaskar Dawood Hasan; Shaikh Mohd Ismail Abdul Rehman; Dowood Hassan Shaikh Ibrahim; Ibrahim Shaikh Mohd Anis; Shaikh Ismail Abdul)*; 26.12.1955 г.р., a) Bombai b) Ratnagiri, India.

120. DHOU EL-AICH (Abdel Hak)*; 05.08.1964 г.р., Blida, Algeria.

121. DIEMAN ABDULKADIR IZZAT (Deiman Alhasenben Ali Aljabbari)*; 04.07.1965 г.р., Kirkuk, Iraq (04.07.1965 г.).

122. DIN MOHAMMAD HANIF (Qari Din Mohammad)*; 1955 г.р., Badakhshan province, Afghanistan.

123. DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA (Johnny Pareja; Khalil Pareja; Mohammad; Akmad; Mighty; Rash)*; 19.07.1981 г.р., Cebu City, Philippines.

124. DJAMEL LOUNICI (Jamal Lounici)*; 01.02.1962 г.р., Algiers, Algeria.

125. DJAMEL MOUSTFA (Ali Barkani; Kalad Belkasam; Mostafa Djamel; Mostefa Djamel; Mustafa Djamel; Balkasam Kalad; Bekasam Kalad; Belkasam Kalad; Damel Mostafa; Djamal Mostafa; Djamal Mostafa; Djamel Mostafa; Djamel Mostafa; Fjamel Moustfa; Djamel Mustafa; Djamel Mustafa; Mustafa)*; 28.09.1973 г.р., Tiaret, Algeria (22.08.1973 г.р., Morocco; 31.12.1979 г.; 31.12.1979 г.р., Maskara, Algeria; 26.09.1973 г.р., Mahdia, Algeria; 31.12.1979 г.р., Mascara, Algeria; 26.08.1973 г.р., Algiers, Algeria; 26.08.1973 г.р., Algiers, Algeria; 26.08.1973 г.р., Algiers, Algeria; 31.12.1979 г.р., Algiers, Algeria; 31.12.1979 г.р., Maskara, Algeria; 10.06.1982 г.; 31.12.1979 г.р., Maskara, Algeria; 31.12.1979 г.р., Algiers, Algeria; 28.09.1973 г.р., Tiaret, Algeria; 31.12.1979 г.; 31.12.1979 г.р., Mascara, Algeria).

126. DOKU KHAMATOVICH UMAROV*; 12.05.1964 г.р., Kharsenoy Village, Shatoyskiy (Sovetskiy) District, Chechenskaya Respublika, Russian Federation.

127. DOST MOHAMMAD (Doost Mohammad)*; Daman district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan DOB: Between 1968 and 1973.

128. EHSANULLAH SARFIDA*; Qarabagh district, Ghazni province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

129. EZATULLAH HAQQANI*; 1957 г.р., Laghman province, Afghanistan.

130. FAHD MOHAMMED AHMED AL-QUSO (Fahd al-Quso; Fahd Mohammed Ahmen al-Quso; Abu Huthaifah; Abu Huthaifah al-Yemeni; Abu Huthaifah al-Adani; Abu al-Bara; Abu Huthayfah al-Adani; Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Awlaqi; Huthaifah al-Yemeni; Abu Huthaifah al-Abu al-Bara; Fahd Muhammad Ahmad al-Kuss)*; 12.11.1974 г.р., Aden, Yemen.

131. FAHD MUHAMMAD ABD AL- AZIZ AL-KHASHIBAN (Fahad H. A. Khashayban; Fahad H. A. al-Khashiban; Fahad H. A. Kheshaiban; Fahad H. A. Kheshayban; Fahad H. A. al-Khosiban; Fahad H. A. Khasiban; Fahd Muhammad Abd Al- Aziz al-Khashayban; Fahd Muhammad Abd al- Aziz al-Khushayban; Fahad al-Khashiban; Fahd Khushaiban; Fahad Muhammad A. al-Khoshiban; Fahad Mohammad A. al-Khoshiban; Abu Thabit; Shaykh Abu Thabit; Shaykh Thabet; Abu Abdur Rahman; Abdur Abu Rahman; Fahad Mohammad Abdulaziz Alkhoshiban)*; 16.10.1966 г.р., Oneiza, Saudi Arabia.

132. FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM (Fahid Mohammed Ally; Fahad Ally Msalam; Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam; Mohammed Ally Msalam; Fahid Mohammed Ali Musalaam; Fahid Muhamad Ali Salem; Usama Al-Kini; Fahid Mohammed Aly; Ahmed Fahad; Ali Fahid Mohammed; Fahad Mohammad Ally; Fahad Mohammed Ally; Fahid Mohamed Ally; Msalam Fahad Mohammed Ally; Msalam Fahid Mohammad Ally; Msalam Fahid Mohammed Ali; Msalm Fahid Mohammed Ally; Mohammed Ally Mohammed; Ally Fahid M)*; 19.02.1976 г.р., Mombasa, Kenya.

133. FAIZ*; 1969 г.р., Ghazni province, Afghanistan.

134. FAOUZI BEN MOHAMED BEN AHMED AL-JENDOUBI (Said; Samir)*; 30.01.1966 г.р., Beja, Tunisia.

135. FARES MOHAMMED MANA’A (Faris Mana’a; Fares Mohammed Manaa)*; 08.02.1965 г.р., Sadah, Yemen.

136. FARHAD KANABI AHMAD (Kaua Omar Achmed; Kawa Hamawandi)*; 01.07.1971 г.р., Arbil, Iraq.

137. FARID AIDER (Achour Ali; Terfi Farid; Abdallah)*; 12.10.1964 г.р., Algiers, Algeria.

138. FAYCAL BOUGHANEMI (Faical Boughanmi; Faysal al-Bughanimi)*; 28.10.1966 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

139. FAZEEL-A-TUL SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED AMEEN AL-PESHAWARI (Shaykh Aminullah; Sheik Aminullah; Abu Mohammad Aminullah Peshawari; Abu Mohammad Amin Bishawri; Abu Mohammad Shaykh Aminullah Al-Bishauri; Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen al-Peshawari; Shaykh Aminullah Al-Peshawari)*; Konar Province, Afghanistan DOB: a) Approximately 1967 b) Approximately 1961 c) Approximately 1973.

140. FAZL MOHAMMAD MAZLOOM (Molah Fazl; Fazel Mohammad Mazloom)*; Uruzgan, Afghanistan; DOB: Between 1963 and 1968.

141. FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED (Abdalla Fazul; Abdallah Fazul; Ali Fadel Abdallah Mohammed; Fazul Abdalla; Fazul Abdallah; Fazul Abdallah Mohammed; Fazul Haroon; Fazul Harun; Haroun Fadhil; Mohammed Fazul; Mohammed Fazul Abdalahi; Mohammed Fouad; Muhamad Fadil Abdallah; Abu Aisha; Abu Seif Al Sudani; Haroon; Harun; Abu Luqman; Abdullah Fazhl; Fazhl Haroun; Fazil Haroun; Faziul Abdallah; Fazul Abdalahi Mohammed; Haroun Fazil; Harun Fazul; Khan Fazhl; Farun Fahdl; Harun Fahdl; Haroun; Abdulah Mohamed Fadl; Fadil Abdallah Muhammad; Abdallah Muhammad Fadhul; Fedel Abdullah Mohammad Fazul; Fadl Allah Abd Allah; Haroon Fadl Abd Allah; Mohamed Fadl; Harun Al-Qamry; Abu Al-Fazul Al-Qamari; Haji Kassim Fumu; Yacub)*; 25.08.1972 г.р., Moroni, Comoros Islands. Возможно г.р. 25.12.1974, 25.02.1974, 1976, Feb. 1971.

142. FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES JR. (Abubakar Abdillah; Abdul Abdillah)*; 04.11.1963 г.р., Arco, Lamitan, Basilan, Philippines.

143. FETHI BEN AL-RABEI BEN ABSHA MNASRI (Fethi Alic; Amor; Abu Omar; Mnasri Fethi ben Rebai; Mnasri Fethi ben Rebai; Mnasri Fethi ben al-Rabai; Mnasri Fethi ben Rebaj; Omar Tounsi; Amar)*; 06.03.1969 г.р., Al-Sanadil Farm, Nefza, Governorate of Baja, Tunisia (06.03.1963 г.р., Tunisia; 03.06.1969 г.р., Algeria; 06.03.1969 г.р., Algeria; 06.03.1963 г.р., Tunisia).

144. FETHI BEN HASSEN BEN SALEM AL-HADDAD (Fethi ben Assen Haddad; Fathy Hassan Al Haddad)*; 28.06.1963 г.р., Tataouene, Tunisia. DOB: a) 28 Jun. 1963 b) 28 Mar. 1963.

145. FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ (Robert Konars; Markus Gebert; Malik; Benzl; Bentley)*; 01.09.1979 г.р., Munich, Germany (10.04.1979 г.р., Liege, Belgium).

146. FUAD MOHAMED KHALAF (Fuad Mohamed Khalif; Fuad Mohamed Qalaf; Fuad Mohammed Kalaf; Fuad Mohamed Kalaf; Fuad Mohammed Khalif; Fuad Khalaf; Fuad Shongale; Fuad Shongole; Fuad Shangole; Fuad Songale; Fouad Shongale; Fuad Muhammad Khalaf Shongole)*.

147. GHAZY FEZZA HISHAN AL-MAZIDIH (Ghazy Fezzaa Hishan; Mushari Abd Aziz Saleh Shlash; Abu Faysal; Abu Ghazzy)*; 1974 г.р., DOB: a) 1974 b) 1975.

148. GUL AGHA ISHAKZAI (Mullah Gul Agha; Mullah Gul Agha Akhund; Hidayatullah; Haji Hidayatullah; Hayadatullah)*; 1972 г.р., Band-e-Timor, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

149. GUL AHMAD HAKIMI*.

150. GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR (Gulabudin Hekmatyar; Golboddin Hikmetyar; Gulbuddin Khekmatiyar; Gulbuddin Hekmatiar; Gulbuddin Hekhmartyar; Gulbudin Hekmetyar)*; 01.08.1949 г.р., Konduz Province, Afghanistan.

151. GUN GUN RUSMAN GUNAWAN (Gunawan Rusman; Abd Al-Hadi; Abdul Hadi; Abdul Karim; Bukhori; Bukhory)*; 06.07.1977 г.р., Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia.

152. HABIB BEN AHMED AL-LOUBIRI*; 17.11.1961 г.р., Menzel Temime, Tunisia.

153. HABIB BEN ALI BEN SAID AL-WADHANI*; 01.06.1970 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

154. HABIBULLAH FAWZI (Habibullah Faizi; Habibullah Fauzi)*; 1961 г.р., Atal village, Ander district, Ghazni, Afghanistan.

155. HABIBULLAH RESHAD*; Ghazni province, Afghanistan; DOB: Between 1968 and 1973.

156. HACENE ALLANE (Hassan the Old; Al Sheikh Abdelhay; Boulahia; Abu al-Foutouh; Cheib Ahcene)*; 17.01.1941 г.р., Medea, Algeria.

157. HAFIZ MUHAMMAD SAEED (Hafiz Muhammad; Hafiz Saeed; Hafiz Mohammad Sahib; Hafez Mohammad Saeed; Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed; Hafiz Mohammad Sayid; Tata Mohammad Syeed; Mohammad Sayed; Hafiz Ji; Muhammad Saeed)*; 05.06.1950 г.р., Sargodha, Punjab, Pakistan.

158. HAJI MUHAMMAD ASHRAF (Haji M. Ashraf)*; 01.03.1965 г.р.

159. HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD (Hakeemullah Mehsud; Zulfiqar)*; 1979 г.р., Pakistan.

160. HAMADI BEN ABDUL AZIZ BEN ALI BOUYEHIA (Gamel Mohmed)*; 29.05.1966 г.р., Tunisia (25.05.1966 г.р., Morocco).

161. HAMDULLAH*.

162. HAMDULLAH NOMANI*; 1968 г.р., Ghazni province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1968.

163. HAMID ABDALLAH AHMAD AL-ALI (Dr. Hamed Abdullah Al-Ali; Hamed Al-‘Ali; Hamed bin ‘Abdallah Al-‘Ali; Hamid ‘Abdallah Al-‘Ali; Hamid ‘Abdallah Ahmad Al-‘Ali; Hamid bin Abdallah Ahmed Al-Ali; Abu Salim; Hamid Abdallah Ahmed Al-Ali)*; 20.01.1960 г.р., Kuwait.

164. HAMIDULLAH AKHUND*; 1968 г.р., Kandahar province, Afghanistan.

165. HANI AL-SAYYID AL-SEBAI (Hani Yousef Al-Sebai; Hani Youssef; Hany Youseff; Hani Yusef; Hani al-Sayyid Al-Sabai; Hani al-Sayyid El Sebai; Hani al-Sayyid Al Siba’i; Hani al-Sayyid El Sabaay; El-Sababt; Abu Tusnin; Abu Akram; Hani El Sayyed Elsebai Yusef; Abu Karim; Hany Elsayed Youssef)*; 01.03.1961 г.р., Qaylubiyah, Egypt. Возможно 16.06.1960 г.р.

166. HASSAN ABDULLAH HERSI AL-TURKI (Hassan Turki; Hassen Abdelle Fihiye; Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Fahaih; Hassan Al-Turki; Hassan Abdillahi Hersi Turki; Sheikh Hassan Turki; Xasan Cabdilaahi Xirsi; Xasan Cabdulle Xirsi)*; 1944 г.р., Region V, Ethiopia (the Ogaden Region in eastern Ethiopia). DOB: Approximately 1944.

167. HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS (Ali Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys; Awes Shaykh Hassan Dahir; Hassen Dahir Aweyes; Ahmed Dahir Aweys; Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim; Aweys Hassan Dahir; Hassan Tahir Oais; Hassan Tahir Uways; Hassan Dahir Awes; Sheikh Aweys; Sheikh Hassan; Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys)*; 1935 г.

168. HIDAYATULLAH (Abu Turab)*; 1968 г.р., Arghandab district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1968.

169. HILARION DEL ROSARIO SANTOS III (Akmad Santos; Ahmed Islam; Ahmad Islam Santos; Abu Hamsa; Hilarion Santos III; Abu Abdullah Santos; Faisal Santos; Lakay; Aki; Aqi)*; 12.03.1966 г.р., 686 A. Mabini Street, Sangandaan, Caloocan City, Philippines.

170. IBRAHIM ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED BOYASSEER (Abu Al-Banaan; Ibrahim Bouisir; Ibrahim Buisir)*; 1961 г.р., Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

171. IBRAHIM ALI ABU BAKR TANTOUSH (Al-Libi; Abd al-Muhsin; Ibrahim Ali Muhammad Abu Bakr; Abdul Rahman; Abu Anas; Ibrahim Abubaker Tantouche; Ibrahim Abubaker Tantoush; ‘Abd al-Muhsi; ‘Abd al-Rahman)*; 1966 г.р., al Aziziyya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

172. IBRAHIM BEN HEDHILI BEN MOHAMED AL-HAMAMI*; 20.11.1971 г.р., Koubellat, Tunisia.

173. IBRAHIM HASSAN TALI AL-ASIRI (Ibrahim Hassan Tali Asiri; Ibrahim Hasan Talea Aseeri; Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri; Ibrahim Hasan Tali Asiri; Ibrahim Hassan Tali Assiri; Ibrahim Hasan Tali’A ‘Asiri; Ibrahim Hasan Tali al-‘Asiri; Ibrahim al-‘Asiri; Ibrahim Hassan Al Asiri; Abu Saleh; Abosslah; Abu-Salaah)*; 19.04.1982 г.р., Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. DOB: 18 Apr. 1982; 24/26/1402 (Hijri Calendar).

174. IBRAHIM MOHAMED KHALIL (Khalil Ibrahim Jassem; Khalil Ibrahim Mohammad; Khalil Ibrahim Al Zafiri; Khalil)*; 02.07.1975 г.р., Mosul, Iraq (02.05.1972 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq; 03.07.1975 г.р., Mosul, Iraq; 1972 г.р.; 02.05.1975 г.р.).

175. IMAD BEN AL-MEKKI BEN AL-AKHDAR AL-ZARKAOUI (Zarga; Nadra)*; 15.01.1973 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

176. IMAD BEN BECHIR BEN HAMDA AL-JAMMALI*; 25.01.1968 г.р., Menzel Temine, Tunisia.

177. ISAM ALI MOHAMED ALOUCHE (Mansour Thaer)*; 21.03.1974 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq, 1972 (21.03.1974 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq).

178. ISMAIL ABDALLAH SBAITAN SHALABI (Ismain Shalabe; Ismail Abdallah Sbaitan Shalabi)*; 30.04.1973 г.р., Beckum, Germany (30.04.1973 г.р., Beckum; 30.04.1973 г.р., Beckum).

179. ISMAIL MOHAMED ISMAIL ABU SHAWEESH*; 10.03.1977 г.р., Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

180. ISNILON TOTONI HAPILON (Isnilon Hapilun; Isnilun Hapilun; Abu Musab; Salahudin; Tuan Isnilon)*; 18.03.1966 г.р., Bulanza, Lantawan, Basilan, the Philippines. Возможно 10.03.1967 г.р.

181. JABER ABDALLAH JABER AHMAD AL-JALAHMAH (Jaber Al-Jalahmah; Abu Muhammad Al-Jalahmah; Jabir Abdallah Jabir Ahmad Jalahmah; Jabir ‘Abdallah Jabir Ahmad Al-Jalamah; Jabir Al-Jalhami; Abdul-Ghani; Abu Muhammad)*; 24.09.1959 г.р., Al-Khitan area, Kuwait.

182. JAINAL ANTEL SALI JR. (Abu Solaiman; Abu Solayman; Apong Solaiman; Apung)*; 01.06.1965 г.р., Barangay Lanote, Bliss, Isabela, Basilan, the Philippines.

183. JALALUDDIN HAQQANI (Jalaluddin Haqani; Jallalouddin Haqqani; Jallalouddine Haqani)*; 1942 г.р., Khost province, Zadran district, Afghanistan.

184. JAMAL HOUSNI (Djamel Il maroccino; Jamal Al Maghrebi; Hicham)*; 22.02.1983 г.р., Morocco.

185. JAN MOHMMAD MADANI*.

186. JANAN AGHA*; 1958 г.р., Central Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958.

187. KAMAL BEN MAOELDI BEN HASSAN AL-HAMRAOUI (Kamel; Kimo)*; 21.10.1977 г.р., Beja, Tunisia.

188. KAMAL BEN MOHAMED BEN AHMED DARRAJI (Kamel Darraji)*; 22.07.1967 г.р., Menzel Bouzelfa, Tunisia.

189. KAMEL DJERMANE (Bilal; Adel; Fodhil; Abou Abdeljalil)*; 12.10.1965 г.р., Oum el Bouaghi, Algeria.

190. KHADAFI ABUBAKAR JANJALANI (Khadafy Janjalani; Khaddafy Abubakar Janjalani; Abu Muktar)*; 03.03.1975 г.р., Isabela, Basilan, Philippines.

191. KHAIRULLAH KHAIRKHWAH (Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwah)*; 1963 г.р., Arghistan district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1963.

192. KHALID ABD AL-RAHMAN HAMD AL-FAWAZ (Al-Fauwaz Khaled; Al-Fauwaz Khaled A.; Al Fawwaz Khalik; Al-Fawwaz Khaled; Al Fawwaz Khaled; Al-Fawwaz Khalid; Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz)*; 24.08.1962 г.р., Kuwait.

193. KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIY (Khalifa Mohd Turki Alsubaie; Khalifa Mohd Turki al-Subaie; Khalifa Al-Subayi; Khalifa Turki bin Muhammad bin al-Suaiy)*; 01.01.1965 г.

194. KHALIL AHMED HAQQANI (Khalil Al-Rahman Haqqani; Khalil ur Rahman Haqqani; Khaleel Haqqani)*; 01.01.1966 г.р., DOB: a) 1 Jan. 1966 b) Between 1958 and 1964.

195. KHALIL BEN AHMED BEN MOHAMED JARRAYA (Khalil Yarraya; Ben Narvan Abdel Aziz; Amro; Omar; Amrou; Amr; Abdel Aziz Ben Narvan)*; 08.02.1969 г.р., Sfax, Tunisia (15.08.1970 г.р., Sereka, former Yugoslavia; 15.08.1970 г.р., Sereka, former Yugoslavia).

196. LIONEL DUMONT (Jacques Brougere; Bilal; Abu Hamza; Di Karlo Antonio; Merlin Oliver Christian Rene; Arfauni Imad Ben Yousset Hamza; Imam Ben Yussuf Arfaj; Hamza; Abou Hamza; Arfauni Imad; Koumkal; Kumkal; Merlin; Tinet; Brugere; Dimon)*; 21.01.1971 г.р., Robaix , France.

197. LOTFI BEN ABDUL HAMID BEN ALI AL-RIHANI (Abderrahmane; Lofti Ben Abdul Hamid Ben Ali Al-Rihani)*; 01.07.1977 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

198. MADHAT MURSI AL-SAYYID UMAR (Abu Hasan; Abu Khabab; Abu Rabbab)*; 19.10.1953 г.р., Alexandria, Egypt.

199. MAHFOUZ OULD AL-WALID (Abu Hafs the Mauritanian; Khalid Al-Shanqiti; Mafouz Walad Al-Walid)*; 01.01.1975 г.

200. MAHMOOD SULTAN BASHIR-UD-DIN (Mahmood Sultan Bashiruddin; Mehmood Dr. Bashir Uddin; Mekmud Sultan Baishiruddin)*; 1937 г.р., Возможно г.р. 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945.

201. MAHMOUD MOHAMMAD AHMED BAHAZIQ (Bahaziq Mahmoud; Abu Abd al-‘Aziz; Abu Abdul Aziz; Shaykh Sahib)*; 17.08.1943 г.р., India.

202. MAJEED ABDUL CHAUDHRY (Majeed Abdul; Majeed Chaudhry Abdul; Majid Abdul)*; 15.04.1939 г.р., DOB: a) 15 Apr. 1939 b) 1938.

203. MAMOUN DARKAZANLI (Abu Ilyas; Abu Ilyas Al Suri; Abu Luz; Abu Al Loh; Abu Ylias)*; 04.08.1958 г.р., Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic.

204. MATIULLAH*; 1973 г.р., Daman district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1973.

205. MAXAMED CABDULLAAH CIISE (Maxamed Cabdullaahi Ciise; Maxammed Cabdullaahi; Cabdullah Mayamed Ciise)*; 08.10.1974 г.р., Kismaayo,Somalia.

206. MAZEN SALAH MOHAMMED (Issa Salah Muhamad; Mazen Ali Hussein)*; 18.05.1981 г.р., Arbil, Iraq (01.01.1980 г.; 01.01.1982 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq).

207. MEHDI BEN MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED KAMMOUN (Salmane)*; 03.04.1968 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

208. MEHREZ BEN MAHMOUD BEN SASSI AL-AMDOUNI (Fabio Fusco; Mohamed Hassan; Abu Thale)*; 18.12.1969 г.р., Asima-Tunis, Tunisia.

209. MERAI ZOGHBAI (F’raji di Singapore; F’raji il Libico; Mohamed Lebachir; Meri Albdelfattah Zgbye; Zoghbai Merai Abdul Fattah; Lazrag Faraj; Larzg Ben Ila; Farag; Fredj; Muhammed El Besir)*; 04.04.1969 г.р., Bengasi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. DOB: a) 04.04.1969 b) 04.04.1960 c) 04.06.1960 (14.01.1968 г.р., Morocco; 04.06.1960 г.р., Bengasi, Libya; 13.11.1960 г.р., Libya; 11.08.1960 г.р., Libya; 13.11.1960 г.р., Libya).

210. MOHAMAD IQBAL ABDURRAHMAN (Rahman Mohamad Iqbal; A Rahman Mohamad Iqbal; Abu Jibril Abdurrahman; Fikiruddin Muqti; Fihiruddin Muqti; Abu Jibril)*; 17.08.1958 г.р., Tirpas-Selong Village, East Lombok, Indonesia.

211. MOHAMED AMIN MOSTAFA*; 11.10.1975 г.р., Karkuk, Iraq.

212. MOHAMED AMINE AKLI (Akli Amine Mohamed; Killech Shamir; Kali Sami; Elias)*; 30.03.1972 г.р., Bordj el Kiffane, Algeria.

213. MOHAMED AOUANI (Lased Ben Heni; Mohamed Abu Abda; Al-As’ad Ben Hani; Mohamed Ben Belgacem Awani; Abu Obeida)*; 05.02.1970 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia (05.02.1969 г.р., in Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 05.02.1969 г.р., in Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).

214. MOHAMED BELKALEM (Abdelali Abou Dher; El Harrachi)*; 19.12.1969 г.р., Hussein Dey, Algiers, Algeria.

215. MOHAMED BEN BELGACEM BEN ABDALLAH AL-AOUADI (Aouadi Mohamed Ben Belkacem; Fathi Hannachi)*; 11.12.1974 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

216. MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED BEN KHALIFA ABDELHEDI (Mohamed Ben Mohamed Abdelhedi)*; 10.08.1965 г.р., Sfax, Tunisia.

217. MOHAMED EL MAHFOUDI*; 24.09.1964 г.р., Agadir, Morocco.

218. MOHAMED GHASSAN ALI ABU DHESS (Yaser Hassan; Abu Ali Abu Mohamed Dhees; Mohamed Abu Dhess)*; 22.06.1966 г.р., Irbid, Jordan (01.02.1966 г.р., Hasmija; 01.02.1966 г.р., Hasmija; 01.02.1966 г.р., Hashmija, Iraq).

219. MOHAMED SA’ID (Atom; Mohamed Sa’id Atom; Mohamed Siad Atom)*; 1966 г.р., Galgala, Somalia.

220. MOHAMMAD ABBAS AKHUND*; 1963 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

221. MOHAMMAD AHMADI*; 1963 г.р., Daman district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

222. MOHAMMAD ALEEM NOORANI*.

223. MOHAMMAD AZAM ELMI*; 1968 г.р.

224. MOHAMMAD DAUD*; 1956 г.р., Kabul.

225. MOHAMMAD ESHAQ AKHUNZADA*; Qarabajh district, Ghazni province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963-1968.

226. MOHAMMAD ESSA AKHUND*; 1958 г.р., Spinboldak district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958.

227. MOHAMMAD HAMDI MOHAMMAD SADIQ AL-AHDAL (Al-Hamati Muhammad; Muhammad Muhammad Abdullah Al-Ahdal; Abu AsimAl-Makki; Mohamed Mohamed Abdullah Al-Ahdal; Ahmed)*; 19.11.1971 г.р., Medina, Saudi Arabia.

228. MOHAMMAD HASAN RAHMANI*; Panjwae district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

229. MOHAMMAD HASSAN AKHUND*; 1958 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

230. MOHAMMAD HOMAYOON*.

231. MOHAMMAD HUSAYN MUSTAS’ID (Mohammad Hassan Mastasaeed; Mstasaeed; Mostas’eed; Mohammad Husayn Mastasaeed)*; 1964 г.р.

232. MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM OMARI*; Zadran valley, Khost province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958.

233. MOHAMMAD ILYAS KASHMIRI (Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri; Elias al-Kashmiri; Ilyas, Naib Amir)*; 02.01.1964 г.р., Bhimber, Samahai Valley, Pakistan-administered Kashmir. DOB: 10 Feb. 1964.

234. MOHAMMAD JAWAD WAZIRI*.

235. MOHAMMAD MOSLIM HAQQANI (Moslim Haqqani)*; 1958 г.р., Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

236. MOHAMMAD NAIM (Mullah Naeem)*.

237. MOHAMMAD RABBANI*; 1961 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

238. MOHAMMAD RASUL*; Spinboldak district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1958-1963.

239. MOHAMMAD SADIQ AMIR MOHAMMAD*; 1934 г.р., Ghazni, Afghanistan.

240. MOHAMMAD SALIM HAQQANI*; 1967 г.р.

241. MOHAMMAD SARWAR SIDDIQMAL*.

242. MOHAMMAD SEDIQ AKHUNDZADA*; Kabul province, Afghanistan DOB: Between 1953 and 1958.

243. MOHAMMAD SHAFIQ AHMADI*.

244. MOHAMMAD SHAFIQ MOHAMMADI*; Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1948.

245. MOHAMMAD SHARIF*.

246. MOHAMMAD SOHAIL SHAHEEN*.

247. MOHAMMAD TAHIR HAMMID (Abdekhamid Al Kurdi)*; 01.11.1975 г.р., Poshok, Iraq.

248. MOHAMMAD WALI*; Kandahar province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1965.

249. MOHAMMAD YAQOUB*.

250. MOHAMMAD ZAHID*; 1971 г.р., Logar, Afghanistan.

251. MOHAMMADULLAH MATI*; Arghandab district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.

252. MOHAMMED AHMED SHAWKI AL ISLAMBOLLY (Abu Khalid; Abu Ja’far)*; 21.01.1952 г.р., El-Minya, Egypt.

253. MOHAMMED AL GHABRA*; 01.06.1980 г.р., Damascus, Syria.

254. MOHAMMED OMAR*; Uruzgan province, Adehrawood village; DOB: Approximately 1966.

255. MOHAMMED TUFAIL (Tufail S. M.; Tuffail Sheik Mohammed)*; 05.05.1930 г.р.

256. MOHAMMED YAHYA MUJAHID (Mohammad Yahya Aziz)*; 12.03.1961 г.р., Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan.

257. MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR (Abou Abbes Khaled; Belaouar Khaled Abou El Abass; Belaouer Khaled Abou El Abass; Belmokhtar Khaled Abou El Abes; Khaled Abou El Abass; Khaled Abou El Abbes; Khaled Abou El Abes; Khaled Abulabbas Na Oor; Mukhtar Balmukhtar; Belaoua; Belaour)*; 01.06.1972 г.р., Ghardaia, Algeria.

258. MONDHER BEN MOHSEN BEN ALI AL-BAAZAOUI (Hamza; Manza Mondher; Hanza Mondher; Al Yamani Noman; Abdellah)*; 18.03.1967 г.р., Kairouan, Tunisia (18.08.1968 г.р., Tunisia; 18.08.1968 г.р., Tunisia; 28.05.1961 г.р., Yemen).

259. MOSTAFA KAMEL MOSTAFA IBRAHIM (Mustafa Kamel Mustafa; Adam Ramsey Eaman; Abu Hamza Al-Masri; Al-Masri Abu Hamza; Al-Misri Abu Hamza; Kamel Mustapha Mustapha; Mustapha Kamel Mustapha; Abu Hamza; Mostafa Kamel Mostafa)*; 15.04.1958 г.р., Alexandria, Egypt.

260. MOUNIR BEN HABIB BEN AL-TAHER JARRAYA (Yarraya)*; 25.10.1963 г.р., Sfax, Tunisia.

261. MOUNIR EL MOTASSADEQ (Mounir el Moutassadeq)*; 03.04.1974 г.р., Marrakesh, Morocco.

262. MOURAD BEN ALI BEN AL-BASHEER AL-TRABELSI (Abou Djarrah)*; 20.05.1969 г.р., Menzel Temime, Tunisia.

263. MOUSSA BEN OMAR BEN ALI ESSAADI (Dah Dah; Abdelrahmman; Bechir)*; 04.12.1964 г.р., Tabarka, Tunisia.

264. MOUSTAFA ABBES (Mostafa Abbes; Mostafa Abbas; Mustafa Abbas; Moustapha Abbes)*; 05.02.1962 г.р., Osniers, Algeria (05.02.1962 г.р., France).

265. MUBARAK MUSHAKHAS SANAD MUBARAK AL-BATHALI (Mubarak Mishkhis Sanad Al-Bathali; Mubarak Mishkhis Sanad Al-Badhali; Mubarak Al-Bathali; Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali; Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bazali; Mobarak Meshkhas Sanad Al-Bthaly; Abu Abdulrahman)*; 01.10.1961 г.р., Kuwait.

266. MUFTI RASHID AHMAD LADEHYANOY (Ludhianvi Mufti Rashid Ahmad; Armad Mufti Rasheed; Wadehyanoy Mufti Rashid Ahmad)*.

267. MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN ABU-AL-KHAYR (Mohammed Abdullah Hassan Abul-Khair; Muhammad Abdallah Hasan Abu-al-Khayr; Muhammad Bin-‘Abdullah Bin-Hamd Abu -al-Khayr; Abdallah al-Halabi; ‘Abdallah al-Halabi al-Madani; Abdallah al-Makki; Abdallah el-Halabi; Abdullah al-Halabi; Abu ‘Abdallah al-Halabi; Abu Abdallah al-Madani; Muhannad al-Jaddawi)*; 19.06.1975 г.р., Al-Madinah al-Munawwarah, Saudi Arabia.

268. MUHAMMAD ISLAM MOHAMMADI*; Rori-Du-Aab district, Samangan province, Afghanistan; DOB: Between 1953 and 1958.

269. MUHAMMAD TAHER ANWARI (Mohammad Taher Anwari; Haji Mudir)*; 1961 г.р., Zurmat district, Paktia province, Afghanistan.

270. MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH SALIH SUGHAYR (Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Sughayir; Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Sughaier; Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Sughayer; Mohd Al-Saghir; Muhammad Al-Sugayer; Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Sughair; Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Sugair; Muhammad Abdallah Salih Al-Suqayr; Abu Bakr; Abu Abdullah; Mohammad Abdullah S Ssughayer)*; 20.08.1972 г.р., 10.08.1972г.р., Al-Karawiya, Oneiza, Saudi Arabia.

271. MUHSIN FADHIL AYED ASHOUR AL-FADHLI (Muhsin Fadhil ‘Ayyid al Fadhli; Muhsin Fadil Ayid Ayshur al Fadhli; Abu Majid Samiyah; Abu Samia)*; 24.04.1981 г.р., Kuwait.

272. MUHSIN MOUSSA MATWALLI ATWAH DEWEDAR (Al-Muhajir Abdul Rahman; Al-Namer Mohammed K.A.; Abdel Rahman; Abdul Rahman)*; 19.06.1964 г.р., Dakahliya, Egypt.

273. MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL (Al Masri Abd Al Wakil; Ali Hassan; Anis Abu; Elbishy Moustafa Ali; Fadil Mustafa Muhamad; Fazul Mustafa; Mohammed Mustafa; Al-Nubi Abu; Hussein; Jihad Abu; Khalid; Man Nu; Yussrr Abu; Mustafa Ali Elbishy)*; 23.06.1976 г.р., Cairo, Egypt. DOB: 01.01.1976.

274. MUSTAPHA AHMED MOHAMED OSMAN ABU EL YAZEED (Shaykh Sai’id; Mustapha Mohamed Ahmed)*; 27.02.1955 г.р., El Sharkiya, Egypt.

275. MUTHANNA HARITH AL-DARI (Dr. Muthanna Al Dari; Muthana Harith Al Dari; Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari; Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dhari; Muthanna Hareth Al-Dhari; Muthana Haris Al-Dhari; Doctor Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al Dari Al-Zawba'; Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari Al-Zobai; Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari al-Zawba’i; Muthanna Hareth al-Dari; Muthana Haris al-Dari; Doctor Muthanna al-Dari; Dr. Muthanna Harith al-Dari al-Zowbai)*; 16.06.1969 г.р., Iraq.

276. NABIL BEN MOHAMED BEN ALI BEN ATTIA (Abu Salim)*; 11.05.1966 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

277. NAJIB BEN MOHAMED BEN SALEM AL-WAZ (Ouaz Najib)*; 12.04.1960 г.р., Hekaima Al-Mehdiya, Tunisia.

278. NAJIBULLAH HAQQANI HYDAYETULLAH (Najibullah Haqani)*; 1964 г.р.

279. NAJIBULLAH MUHAMMAD JUMA (Najib Ullah)*; 1954 г.р., Farah.

280. NAJMIDDIN KAMOLITDINOVICH JALOLOV*; 1972 г.р., Andijan Region, Uzbekistan.

281. NAJMUDDIN FARAJ AHMAD (Mullah Krekar; Fateh Najm Eddine Farraj; Faraj Ahmad Najmuddin)*; 07.07.1956 г.р., Olaqloo Sharbajer, Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq. DOB: 17.07.1963.

282. NASHWAN ABD AL-RAZZAQ ABD AL-BAQI (Abdal Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi; Abu Abdallah; Abd Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi)*; 1961 г.р., Mosul, Iraq.

283. NASIR ‘ABD-AL-KARIM ‘ABDULLAH AL-WAHISHI (Nasir al-Wahishi; Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi; Naser Abdel Karim al-Wahishi; Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wuhayshi; Abu Basir Nasir Al-Wuhayshi; Nasser Abdul-karim Abdullah al-Wouhichi; Abu Baseer al-Wehaishi; Abu Basir Nasser al-Wuhishi; Abdul Kareem Abdullah Al-Woohaishi; Nasser Abdelkarim Saleh Al Wahichi; Abu Basir; Abu Bashir)*; 01.10.1976 г.р., Yemen. DOB: a) 1 Oct. 1976 b) 08/10/1396 (Hijri Calendar).

284. NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI (Naseer Haqqani; Dr. Naseer Haqqani; Nassir Haqqani; Nashir Haqqani; Naseruddin; Dr. Alim Ghair)*; Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1970-1973.

285. NASR FAHMI NASR HASSANNEIN (Muhammad Salah; Naser Fahmi Naser Hussein)*; 30.10.1962 г.р., Cairo, Egypt.

286. NAYIF BIN-MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI (Nayif Bin-Muhammad al-Qahtani; Nayef Bin Muhammad al-Qahtani; Nayif Muhammad al-Qahtani; Nayf Mohammed al-Qahtani; Naif Mohammad Said al-Qahtani Alkodri; Naif Mohammed Saeed al-Kodari al-Qahtani; Nayef Bin Mohamed al-Khatani; Mohammed Naif al-Khatani; Nayef bin Mohamed al-Khatany; Al-Qahtani Abohemem; Abi Hamam; Abu-Hamam; Abu-Humam; Abu-Hammam; Abu Hammam al-Qahtani)*; 25.03.1988 г.р., Saudi Arabia.

287. NAZAR MOHAMMAD*.

288. NAZIH ABDUL HAMED NABIH AL-RUQAI’I (Anas Al-Liby; Anas Al-Sibai; Nazih Abdul Hamed Al-Raghie)*; 30.03.1964 г.р., Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. DOB: a) 30 Mar. 1964 b) 14 May 1964.

289. NAZIRULLAH HANAFI WALIULLAH (Nazirullah Aanafi Waliullah)*; 1962 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

290. NEDAL MAHMOUD SALEH (Hitem; Nedal Mahmoud N. Saleh; Salah Nedal; Hasim; Tarek Naser)*; 26.03.1972 г.р., Tunisia.

291. NESSIM BEN MOHAMED AL-CHERIF BEN MOHAMED SALEH AL-SAADI (Abou Anis; Nassim Saadi)*; 30.11.1974 г.р., Haidra Al-Qasreen, Tunisia.

292. NESSIM BEN ROMDHANE SAHRAOUI (Dass; Nasim al-Sahrawi)*; 03.08.1973 г.р., Bizerta, Tunisia.

293. NIK MOHAMMAD*.

294. NOOR JALAL (Nur Jalal)*; 1960 г.р., Kunar province, Afghanistan.

295. NOOR MOHAMMAD SAQIB*; Bagrami district, Kabul province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1958.

296. NOORDIN MOHAMMAD TOP (Nordin Mohd. Top)*; 11.08.1969 г.р., Johor, Malaysia.

297. NOORUDDIN TURABI MUHAMMAD QASIM (Noor ud Din Turabi)*; 1963 г.р., a)Kandahar, Afghanistanb) Chora district, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1963.

298. NOUREDDINE BEN ALI BEN BELKASSEM AL-DRISSI*; 30.04.1964 г.р., Tunis, Tunisia.

299. NURJAMAN RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN (Hambali; Nurjaman; Isomuddin Nurjaman Riduan; Hambali Bin Ending; Encep Nurjaman; Hambali Ending Hambali; Isamuddin Riduan; Isamudin Ridwan)*; 04.04.1964 г.р., Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia.

300. NURULLAH NURI*; Shahjoe district, Zabul province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1958.

301. OMAR MAHMOUD UTHMAN (Al-Samman Uthman; Umar Uthman; Abu Qatada Al-Filistini; Abu Umr Takfiri; Abu Omar Abu Umar; Abu Umar Umar; Abu Ismail; Omar Mohammed Othman)*; 30.12.1960 г.р., Bethlehem, West Bank, Palestinian Territories. DOB: a) 30 Dec. 1960 b) 13 Dec. 1960.

302. OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-GHAMDI*; 27.05.1979 г.р., Saudi Arabia.

303. OTHMAN DERAMCHI (Abou Youssef)*; 07.06.1954 г.р., Tighennif, Algeria.

304. PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR (Siregar Parlin; Siregar Saleh Parlindungan)*; 25.04.1957 г.р., Indonesia. Возможно г.р. 25.04.1967.

305. PIO ABOGNE DE VERA (Ismael De Vera; Khalid; Ismael; Ismail; Manex; Tito Art; Dave; Leo)*; 19.12.1969 г.р., Bagac, Bagamanok, Catanduanes, Philippines.

306. QALAMUDIN SAR ANDAZ (Qalamuddin)*; Baraki Barak district, Logar province, Afghanistan. примерный г.р. 1958-1963.

307. QARI ABDUL WALI SEDDIQI*; 1974 г.р., Ghazni, Afghanistan.

308. QASIM YAHYA MAHDI AL-RIMI (Qasim Al-Rimi; Qasim al-Raymi; Qassim al-Raymi; Qasim al-Rami; Qasim Yahya Mahdi ‘Abd al-Rimi; Abu Hurayah al-Sana’ai; Abu ‘Ammar)*; 05.06.1978 г.р., Sanaa, Yemen.

309. QUDRATULLAH JAMAL (Haji Sahib)*; 1963 г.р., Gardez, Pakti provincea, Afghanistan.

310. RACHID FETTAR (Amine del Belgio; Djaffar)*; 16.04.1969 г.р., Boulogin, Algeria.

311. RADI ABD EL SAMIE ABOU EL YAZID EL AYASHI (Mera’I)*; 02.01.1972 г.р., El Gharbia, Egypt.

312. RADULAN SAHIRON (Radullan Sahiron; Radulan Sahirun; Radulan Sajirun; Commander Putol)*; 1955 г.р., Kaunayan, Patikul, Jolo Island, the Philippines. Возможно г.р. 1952.

313. RAFIK MOHAMAD YOUSEF (Mohamad Raific Kairadin)*; 27.08.1974 г.р., Baghdad, Iraq.

314. RAFIULLAH MUAZEN*; Paktia province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1943.

315. RAHIMULLAH ZURMATI*; Zurmat district, Paktia province, Afghanistan; Between 1953 and 1958.

316. RAHMATULLAH KAKAZADA (Rehmatullah; Kakazada; Mullah Nasir)*; 1968 г.р., Ghazni, Afghanistan.

317. RAHMATULLAH WAHIDYAR FAQIR MOHAMMAD (Ramatullah Wahidyar)*; 1957 г.р., Kotakhel village, Zormat district, Paktika province, Afghanistan.

318. RAMZI MOHAMED ABDULLAH BINALSHIBH (Binalshibh Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah; Ramzi Binalshib; Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah Omar Hassan Alassiri; Binalshibh Ramsi Mohamed Abdullah; Abu Ubaydah; ‘Umar Muhammad ‘Abdallah Ba’ Amar; Binalsheidah, Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah; Bin Al Shibh, Ramzi; Omar, Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah; Mohamed Ali Abdullah Bawazir; Binalsheidah, Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah; Bin Al Shibh, Ramzi; Omar, Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah; Mohamed Ali Abdullah Bawazir; Binalshibh Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah; Ramzi Binalshib; Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah Omar Hassan Alassiri; Binalshibh Ramsi Mohamed Abdullah; Abu Ubaydah; ‘Umar Muhammad ‘Abdallah Ba’ Amar; Ramzi Omar)*; 01.05.1972 г.р., a) Gheil Bawazir, Hadramawt, Yemen b) Khartoum, Sudan. DOB: 16 Sep. 1973.

319. REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA (Abu Ilonggo; Brandon Berusa; Abu Muadz; Arnulfo Alvarado; Habil Ahmad Dellosa; Uthman; Dodong; Troy)*; 15.05.1972 г.р., Punta, Santa Ana, Manila, Philippines.

320. REDOUANE EL HABHAB (Abdelrahman)*; 20.12.1969 г.р., Casablanca, Morocco.

321. RI’AD (RAED) MUHAMMAD HASAN MUHAMMAD HIJAZI (Hijazi Raed M.; Al-Hawen Abu-Ahmad; Al-Shahid Abu-Ahmad; Al-Maghribi Rashid; Al-Amriki Abu-Ahmad)*; 30.12.1968 г.р., California, United States of America.

322. RIADH BEN BELKASSEM BEN MOHAMED AL-JELASSI*; 15.12.1970 г.р., Al-Mohamedia, Tunisia.

323. RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS (Abdul Kareem Ayeras; Abdul Karim Ayeras; Ricky Ayeras; Jimboy; Isaac Jay Galang Perez; Abdul Mujib)*; 15.09.1973 г.р., 24 Paraiso Street, Barangay Poblacion, Mandaluyong City, Philippines.

324. RUBEN PESTANO LAVILLA, JR (Reuben Lavilla; Sheik Omar; Mile D Lavilla; Reymund Lavilla; Ramo Lavilla; Mike de Lavilla; Abdullah Muddaris; Ali Omar; Omar Lavilla; Omar Labella; So; Eso; Junjun)*; 04.10.1972 г.р., Sitio Banga Maiti, Barangay Tranghawan, Lambunao, Iloilo, Philippines.

325. RUSTUM HANAFI HABIBULLAH (Rostam Nuristani)*; 1963 г.р., Dara Kolum, Do Aab district, Nuristan province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1963.

326. SA’D ABDULLAH HUSSEIN AL-SHARIF*; 1969 г.р., Al-Medinah, Saudi Arabia, DOB: 1963; 11.02.1964.

327. SAAD RASHED MOHAMMAD AL-FAQIH (Abu Uthman Sa’d Al-Faqih; Sa’ad Al-Faqih; Saad Alfagih; Sa’d Al-Faqi; Saad Al Faqih; Saad Al-Fagih; Saad Al-Fakih; Saad Al-Faqih; Sa d Rashid Muhammed Al-Fageeh)*; 01.02.1957 г.р., Al-Zubair, Iraq. DOB: a) 1 Feb. 1957 b) 31 Jan. 1957.

328. SADUDDIN SAYYED (Sadudin Sayed; Sadruddin)*; 1968 г.р., Chaman district, Pakistan. DOB: Approximately 1968.

329. SAID AHMED SHAHIDKHEL*; 1975 г.р., Central Ghazni province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1975.

330. SAID ALI AL-SHIHRI (Sa id Ali Jabir al-Kathim al-Shihri; Said Ali Al Shahri; Said Ali Jaber Al Khasaam Al Shahri; Said Ali Jaber Al Khassam; Abu-Sayyaf; Abu-Sufyan al-Azidi; Abu-Sayyaf al-Shihri; Abu Sufian Kadhdhaab Matrook; Salah; Salah Abu Sufyan; Salah al-Din; Abu Osama; Abu Sulaiman; Nur al-Din Afghani Azibk; Alahhaddm; Akhdam; Abu Sufian Al Azadi; Abu Asmaa)*; 12.09.1973 г.р., Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

331. SAID BAHAJI (Zouheir Al Maghribi; Mohamed Abbattay; Abderrahmane Al Maghribi)*; 15.07.1975 г.р., Haselunne, Lower Saxony, Germany.

332. SAID BEN ABDELHAKIM BEN OMAR AL-CHERIF (Djallal; Youcef; Abou Salman)*; 25.01.1970 г.р., Menzel Temine, Tunisia.

333. SAID JAN ‘ABD AL-SALAM (Sa’id Jan ‘Abd-al-Salam; Dilawar Khan Zain Khan; Qazi ‘Abdallah; Qazi Abdullah; Ibrahim Walid; Qasi Sa’id Jan; Said Jhan; Farhan Khan; Aziz Cairo; Nangiali)*; 05.02.1981 г.р. (01.01.1972 г.р.).

334. SAID YOUSSEF ALI ABU AZIZA (Abdul Hamid; Abu Therab)*; 1958 г.р., Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

335. SAIFI AMMARI (El Para; Abderrezak Le Para; Abou Haidara; El Ourassi; Abderrezak Zaimeche; Abdul Rasak ammane Abu Haidra; Abdalarak)*; 01.01.1968 г.р., Kef Rih, Algeria; Guelma, Algeria.

336. SAIYID ABD AL-MAN (Abdul Manan; Agha Haji; Am)*.

337. SAJID MOHAMMED BADAT (Abu Issa; Saajid Badat; Sajid Badat; Muhammed Badat; Sajid Muhammad Badat; Saajid Mohammad Badet; Muhammed Badet; Sajid Muhammed Badet; Sajid Mahomed Badat)*; 28.03.1979 г.р., Gloucester, United Kingdom. Возможно дата рождения: 08.03.1976.

338. SALAH GASMI (Abou Mohamed Salah; Bounouadher)*; 13.04.1971 г.р., Zeribet El Oued, Wilaya (province) of Biskra, Algeria.

339. SALEH MOHAMMAD KAKAR (Saleh Mohammad)*; 1962 г.р., Nulgham Village, Panjwai District, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

340. SALEM NOR ELDIN AMOHAMED AL-DABSKI (Abu Al-Ward; Abdullah Ragab; Abu Naim)*; 1963 г.р., Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

341. SALIM AHMAD SALIM HAMDAN (Saqr Al-Jaddawi; Saqar AL Jadawi; Saqar Aljawadi; Salem Ahmed Salem Hamdan)*; 1965 г.р., POB: a) Al-Mukalla, Yemen b) Al-Mukala, Yemen.

342. SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN JULKIPLI (Kipli Sali; Julkipli Salim)*; 20.06.1967 г.р., Tulay, Jolo Sulu, Phillippines.

343. SAMI BEN KHAMIS BEN SALEH ELSSEID (Omar El Mouhajer; Saber)*; 10.02.1968 г.р., Menzel Jemil, Bizerte, Tunisia.

344. SAMIR ABD EL LATIF EL SAYED KISHK*; 14.05.1955 г.р., Gharbia, Egypt.

345. SANANI*; Zabul province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1923.

346. SAYED ALLAMUDDIN ATHEER (Sayed Allamuddin Athear)*; 15.02.1955 г.р., Badakhshan, Afghanistan.

347. SAYED ESMATULLAH ASEM (Esmatullah Asem)*; 1967 г.р., Ningarhar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1967.

348. SAYED MOHAMMAD AZIM AGHA (Sayed Mohammad Azim Agha; Agha Saheb)*; 1966 г.р., Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1966.

349. SAYEEDUR RAHMAN HAQANI (Sayed Urrahman)*; 1952 г.р., Kunar province, Afghanistan.

350. SAYF-AL ADL (Saif Al-‘Adil)*; 1963 г.р., Egypt.

351. SAYYED GHIASSOUDDINE AGHA (Sayed Ghias; Sayed Ghiasuddin Sayed Ghousuddin; Sayyed Ghayasudin)*; Faryab province, Afghanistan.

352. SAYYED MOHAMMED HAQQANI (Sayyed Mohammad Haqqani)*; 1965 г.р., Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

353. SHAFIQ BEN MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED AL-AYADI (Bin Muhammad Ayadi Chafiq; Ayadi Chafic Ben Muhammad; Aiadi Ben Muhammad; Aiady Ben Muhammad; Ayadi Shafig Ben Mohamed; Ben Mohamed Ayadi Chafig; Abou El Baraa; Chafiq Ayadi; Chafik Ayadi; Ayadi Chafiq; Ayadi Chafik; Ajadi Chafik)*; 21.01.1963 г.р., Sfax, Tunisia.

354. SHAHABUDDIN DELAWAR*; 1957 г.р., Logar province, Afghanistan.

355. SHAMS UR-RAHMAN SHER ALAM (Shamsurrahman; Shams-u-Rahman)*; Suroobi district, Kabul province, Afghanistan.

356. SHAMSUDIN*; Keshim district, Badakhshan province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1968.

357. SHAMSULLAH KMALZADA (Shamsalah Kmalzada)*.

358. SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN (Ahmed Ally; Sheikh Ahmad Salem Suweidan; Sheikh Swedan; Sheikh Ahmed Salem Swedan; Ahmed The Tall; Bahamad; Sheik Bahamad; Sheikh Bahamadi; Ally Ahmad; Muhamed Sultan; Sheik Ahmed Salim Sweden; Sleyum Salum; Sheikh Bahamad; Sheikh Ahmed Salam)*; 09.04.1969 г.р., Mombasa, Kenya. DOB: a) 9 Apr. 1960 b) 9 Apr. 1969 c) 4 Sep. 1969.

359. SHER MOHAMMAD ABBAS STANEKZAI*; Logar province, Afghanistan. Примерный г.р. 1963.

360. SIRAJUDDIN JALLALOUDINE HAQQANI (Siraj Haqqani; Serajuddin Haqani; Siraj Haqani; Saraj Haqani; Khalifa)*; 1977 г.р., a) Danda, Miramshah, North Waziristan, Pakistan b) Srana village, Garda Saray district, Paktia province, Afghanistan c) Neka district, Paktika province, Afghanistan d) Khost province, Afghanistan. DOB: approximately 1977/1978.

361. SOBHI ABD AL AZIZ MOHAMED EL GOHARY ABU SINNA (Sheik Taysir Abdullah; Mohamed Atef; Abu Hafs Al Masri; Abu Hafs Al Masri El Khabir; Taysir)*; 17.01.1958 г.р., El Behira, Egypt.

362. SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV*; 1983 г.р., Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

363. SULAIMAN JASSEM SULAIMAN ALI ABO GHAITH (Abo Ghaith)*; 14.12.1965 г.р., Kuwait.

364. SULAYMAN KHALID DARWISH (Abu Al-Ghadiya)*; 1976 г.р., Outside Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic. Approximately 1974.

365. SULIMAN HAMD SULEIMAN AL-BUTHE (Soliman H.S. Al Buthi)*; 08.12.1961 г.р., Cairo, Egypt.

366. TAHA*; 1963 г.р., Ningarhar province, Afghanistan. DOB: Approximately 1963.

367. TAHIS*.

368. TAREK BEN HABIB BEN AL-TOUMI AL-MAAROUFI (Abu Ismail; Abou Ismail el Jendoubi; Abou Ismail Al Djoundoubi)*; 23.11.1965 г.р., Ghardimaou, Tunisia.

369. TARIQ ANWAR EL SAYED AHMED (Hamdi Ahmad Farag; Amr Al-Fatih Fathi)*; 15.03.1963 г.р., Alexandria, Egypt.

370. TAUFIK RIFKI (Refke Taufek; Rifqi Taufik; Rifqi Tawfiq; Ami Iraq; Ami Irza; Amy Erja; Ammy Erza; Ammy Izza; Ami Kusoman; Abu Obaida; Abu Obaidah; Abu Obeida; Abu Ubaidah; Obaidah; Abu Obayda; Izza Kusoman; Yacub Eric)*; 29.08.1974 г.р., Dacusuman Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia. Dacusuman Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia. Возможно г.р.: 09.08.1974 or 19.08.1974 or 19.08.1980.

371. TAYEB NAIL (Djaafar Abou Mohamed; Abou Mouhadjir; Mohamed Ould Ahmed Ould Ali)*; 1972 г.р., Faidh El Batma, Djelfa, Algeria. DOB: Approximately 1972 (1976 г.р.).

372. THARWAT SALAH SHIHATA (Tarwat Salah Abdallah; Salah Shihata Thirwat; Shahata Thirwat; Tharwat Salah Shihata Ali)*; 29.06.1960 г.р., Egypt.

373. UBAIDULLAH AKHUND (Obaidullah Akhund; Obaid Ullah Akhund)*; 1968 г.р., Kandahar, Afghanistan.

374. USAMA MUHAMMED AWAD BIN LADEN (Usama Bin Laden; Usama Bin Muhammed Bin Awad Osama Bin Laden; Abu Abdallah Abd Al-Hakim; Ben Laden Osama; Ben Laden Ossama; Ben Laden Usama; Bin Laden Osama Mohamed Awdh; Bin Laden Usamah Bin Muhammad; Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin; Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin; Al Qaqa; Usama bin Ladin; Osama bin Ladin; Usamah bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin)*; 30.07.1957 г.р., 1) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 2) Yemen. DOB: 28.07.1957; 10.03.1957; 01.01.1957; 1956; 1957.

375. WA’ EL HAMZA ABD AL-FATAH JULAIDAN (Wa’il Hamza Julaidan; Wa’el Hamza Jalaidan; Wa’il Hamza Jalaidan; Wa’il Hamza Jaladin; Abu Al-Hasan Al Madani; Wa’el Hamza Jaladin; Wail H.A. Jlidan)*; 22.01.1958 г.р., Al-Madinah, Saudi Arabia. DOB: 20.01.1958.

376. WALI UR REHMAN*; 1970 г.р., Pakistan.

377. WALIJAN*; Quetta, Pakistan; DOB: Approximately 1968.

378. WAN MIN WAN MAT (Abu Hafis; Wan Halim; Abu Hidayah)*; 23.09.1960 г.р., Kelantan, Malaysia.

379. YACINE AHMED NACER (Yacine Di Annaba; Il Lungo; Naslano)*; 02.12.1967 г.р., Annaba, Algeria.

380. YAHIA DJOUADI (Yahia Abou Ammar; Abou Ala)*; 01.01.1967 г.р., M’Hamid, Wilaya (province) of Sidi Bel Abbes, Algeria.

381. YAR MOHAMMAD RAHIMI*; Panjwaee district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan; DOB: Approximately 1953.

382. YASIN ABDULLAH EZZEDINE QADI (Kadi Shaykh Yassin Abdullah; Kahdi Yasin; Yasin Al-Qadi)*; 23.02.1955 г.р., Cairo, Egypt.

383. YASIN ALI BAYNAH (Ali, Yasin Baynah; Ali, Yassin Mohamed; Baynah, Yasin; Baynah, Yassin; Baynax, Yasiin Cali; Beenah, Yasin; Beenah, Yassin; Beenax, Yasin; Beenax, Yassin; Benah, Yasin; Benah, Yassin; Benax, Yassin; Beynah, Yasin; Binah, Yassin; Cali, Yasiin Baynax)*; 1966 г.

384. YASSER MOHAMED ISMAIL ABU SHAWEESH (Yasser Mohamed Abou Shaweesh)*; 20.11.1973 г.р., Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

385. YASSIN SYWAL (Salim Yasin; Mochtar Yasin Mahmud; Abdul Hadi Yasin; Muhamad Mubarok; Muhammad Syawal; Abu Seta; Mahmud; Abu Muamar)*; 1972 г.р.

386. YASSINE CHEKKOURI*; 06.10.1966 г.р., Safi, Morocco.

387. YAZID SUFAAT (Joe; Abu Zufar)*; 20.01.1964 г.р., Johor, Malaysia.

388. YOUCEF ABBES (Giuseppe)*; 05.01.1965 г.р., Bab el Oued, Algeria.

389. YOUSSEF BEN ABDUL BAKI BEN YOUCEF ABDAOUI (Abu Abdullah; Abdellah; Abdullah; Abou Abdullah; Abdullah Youssef)*; 04.09.1966 г.р., Kairouan (Tunisia).

390. YULDASHEV TOHIR (Yuldashev Takhir)*.

391. YUNOS UMPARA MOKLIS (Muklis Yunos; Saifullah Mukhlis Yunos; Mukhlis Yunos; Saifulla Moklis Yunos; Hadji Onos)*; 07.07.1966 г.р., Lanao del Sur, Philippines.

392. ZABIHULLAH HAMIDI*.

393. ZAINI ZAKARIA (Ahmad)*; 16.05.1967 г.р., Kelantan, Malaysia.

394. ZAKARYA ESSABAR*; 13.04.1977 г.р., Essaouria / Morocco.

395. ZAKI EZAT ZAKI AHMED (Rif’at Salim; Abu Usama)*; 21.04.1960 г.р., Sharqiyah, Egypt.

396. ZAKI-UR-REHMAN LAKHVI (Zakir Rehman Lakvi; Zaki Ur-Rehman Lakvi; Kaki Ur-Rehman; Zakir Rehman; Abu Waheed Irshad Ahmad Arshad; Chachajee)*; 30.12.1960 г.р., Okara, Pakistan.

397. ZAYN AL-ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN (Abd Al-Hadi Al-Wahab; Zain Al-Abidin Muhammad Husain; Abu Zubaydah; Tariq Hani; Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn; Zeinulabideen Muhammed Husein Abu Zubeidah; Abu Zubaida)*; 12.03.1971 г.р., Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

398. ZIA-UR-RAHMAN MADANI (Ziaurrahman Madani; Zaia u Rahman Madani; Madani Saheb)*; 1960 г.р., Taliqan, Takhar province, Afghanistan.

399. ZULKARNAEN (Zulkarnan; Zulkarnain; Zulkarnin; Arif Sunarso; Aris Sumarsono; Aris Sunarso; Ustad Daud Zulkarnaen; Murshid)*; 1963 г.р., Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia.

400. ZULKEPLI BIN MARZUKI*; 03.07.1968 г.р., Selangor, Malaysia.

401. ZULKIFLI ABDUL HIR (Musa Abdul Hir; Muslimin Abdulmotalib; Salim Alombra; Armand Escalante; Normina Hashim; Henri Lawi; Hendri Lawi; Norhana Mohamad; Omar Salem; Ahmad Shobirin; Bin Abdul Hir Zulkifli; Abdulhir Bin Hir; Hassan; Hogalu; Hugalu; Lagu; Marwan)*; 05.01.1966 г.р., MuarJohor, Malaysia. DOB: a) 5 Jan. 1966 b) 5 Oct. 1966.

Internal divisions inside north Caucasus’ Islamist insurgency, by Giovanni Giacalone

March 4, 2015, 2:23 am

≫ Next: The Future of the Middle East, by Thierry Meyssan

≪ Previous: List of People and Organizations Financing Terrorism

$

0

0

In the summer of 2014 ISIS released a video containing a threat to start a war in Russia’s Chechen Republic and the whole Caucasus region. The footage showed an insurgent speaking from a fighter’s cockpit at the al-Tabaka Airbase near the city of Raqqa, Syria, claiming that the extremist group was going to “liberate” Chechnya and the Caucasus.[1]

In October 2014 Omar al-Shishani, one of ISIS’ military commanders, threatened that Russia would become one of the group’s next targets. On the phone with his father in Georgia, al-Shishani said that he would have revenge on Vladimir Putin and that he would infiltrate Russia with thousands of followers. [2]

 Following the report in late December 2014 that several jamaat in Daghestan and Chechnya had left the Caucasus Emirate in order to pledge alliance to ISIS, some analysts speculated about the possibility that ISIS was trying to infiltrate the northern Caucasus with the objective of waging jihad against Russia. Is this a plausible hypothesis?

In order to find a possible answer to such question it is important to consider several elements:

1. In February 2015, during a U.S.-chaired summit against violent extremism in Washington DC, the head of FSB, Alexander Boratnikov, said that about 1,700 Russian citizens are currently fighting in Iraq and that the number has nearly doubled since the previous year. [3]

A relevant number of these north-Caucasian jihadists do not come directly from their home countries but they are rather members of the Chechen and Daghestani diaspora in Turkey and Europe, as recent arrests made in Austria and Germany show. [4][5]

Jihad in Syria and Iraq seems to be far more appealing for Chechen and Daghestani militants who have a hard time waging war on Russia in their areas of origin and this is an important exogenous element with one clear implication: the chance that foreign fighters from the various north-Caucasian republics succeed in bringing jihad back home is strictly related to the possibility of their return back home, which so far seems unlikely to take place in high numbers.

The Russian security services seem well aware of the numbers and the identities of north-Caucasian jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq and in fact last month Russian authorities released another partial list of Daghestani, Chechen and Ingush jihadists currently with ISIS, including date and place of birth and even the month that they joined the ranks. [6]  This could be read as a clear sign that Moscow knows exactly what it’s doing on the foreign fighter issue.

2. The second element is endogenous as several Chechen and Daghestani jamaat commanders have recently retracted their oath of alliance (bayat) to Caucasus Emirate leader, Ali Abu-Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), and pledged loyalty to ISIS leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Various sources published lists of jamaat leaders that are now allied with ISIS, six out of the eleven cited. [7]Among them Sultan Zaynalabidov (Emir of Aukhovsky jamaat), Rustam Aselderov (Emir of Vilayat Daghestan), Arslan-Ali Kambulatov (Emir of Shamil’kalinsky sector) and Makhran Saidov (Emir of the Vedeno sector). [8][9]

On December 28^th 2014, the leader of Caucasus Emirate, Ali Abu-Muhammad, released a video where he warned other organization members from siding with ISIS and expanding the “fitna” inside the Emirate. A problem that has reached north-Caucasian militants even in Syria, as explained by the website “Chechensinsyria”:

“Rivalry between North Caucasian factions of IS in Syria and the CE began as far back as late summer 2013 when Umar Shishani and his faction in Jaish alMuhajireen wal-Ansar grew closer to then-ISIS, with Umar being appointed ISIS’s military emir in northern Syria. Umar and his faction broke away from JMA in December 2013 and went over to ISIS, with JMA openly aligning itself as the Syrian branch of the CE. Since then, the rivalry between the two groups in Syria has continued to develop, based in the main on a power struggle for control of North Caucasian militants in Syria but also partly based on ideology: some IS North Caucasians have accused the CE of nationalism and asserted that, with the establishment of the “Caliphate”, all jihadis should fight with IS”. [10]

On one hand this clearly shows that the Caucasus Emirate, already weakened by the elimination of its former historical leader, Doku Umarov, by the total failure of putting into practice the Sochi Olympics threat and the counter-terror operations of the Federal security forces, now has to deal with an additional loss of forces due to jamaat who are fleeing for ISIS. This flow of militants can be related in part to different approaches to jihad that have emerged since 2012, to ideological frictions that can be summarized in “nationalism vs Caliphate” but also in a progressive weakening of the Caucasus Emirate that has brought disappointment among younger and more radical jamaat leaders, who decided to embrace the ideology of ISIS.

On the other hand, the fact that some jamaat are joining ISIS does not necessarily imply that al-Baghdadi’s group is gaining strength or that ISIS is actually infiltrating Chechnya and Daghestan. It is plausible to state that at this moment the internal divisions seem to be leading more towards a dispersion of forces on both sides.

In addition it is important to consider that Daghestan, which is considered Russia’s most problematic republic in relation to terrorism, has seen a decrease by 20% of terrorist incidents in 2014, with more than 180 jihadists eliminated and 200 arrests.

The Daghestani militias have recently shown lack of high strategic capabilities by focusing mainly on ambush of police officers, judges and security personnel and with the consequences of being subjected to strong counter-terror operations. In Chechnya the militants didn’t achieve much either and beyond the December 4^th 2014 attacks in Grozny, there haven’t been any significant terrorist attacks reported.[11][12]

In conclusion, it is plausible to state that due to internal ideological and strategic divisions, lack of common goals, dispersion and leakage of forces among north-Caucasian jamaats which must be summed to the heavy counter-terror measures taken by the Federal security forces, it is unlikely that in the short-medium term ISIS or Caucasus Emirate will succeed in trying to carry out substantial jihadist campaigns against Russia.

 Giovanni Giacalone is an Italian researcher and analyst in Islamic radicalism, lives in Milan where he studies political Islam in Europe with a close look at issues linked to integration, radicalism and relations between the various European Institutions and the Islamic organizations present in Europe.He wrote this article in English for RIMSE.

---

[1]http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/09/03/isis-militants-threaten-to-launch-caucasus-campaign.html

[2]http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/chechen-isis-fighters-under-omar-alshishani-threaten-to-take-fight-to-putin-9787809.html

[3]http://www.newsweek.com/1700-russians-fighting-isis-says-head-russian-secret-service-308206

[4] In January 2015 German police arrested in Berlin two individuals of Turkish origin who were accused of recruiting Russian and Turkish nationals for jihad in Syria and Iraq.  (Ibidem)

[5]In January 2015 Austrian police in Krems arrested a Russian national from Chechnya accused of fighting with Islamic State. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/two-men-arrested-berlin-isis-syria

[6]http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/72337

[7]http://i1.wp.com/www.chechensinsyria.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Screen-Shot-2014-12-27-at-08.37.25.png

[8]http://counterjihadreport.com/2015/01/15/whither-caucasus-emirate/

[9]http://counterjihadreport.com/2015/01/02/six-north-caucasus-insurgency-commanders-transfer-allegiance-to-islamic-state/

[10]http://www.chechensinsyria.com/

[11]On December 4^th 2014 a group of jihadists attacked a police check-point, entered the city and occupied the "Press House" building in the city center and a nearby school. 14 policemen and 11 terrorists were killed. Aslam Byutukayev and his militia claimed responsibility.

[12]https://news.vice.com/article/chechnyas-islamist-insurgency-rears-its-head-once-again-in-deadly-grozny-gunfight

The Future of the Middle East, by Thierry Meyssan

March 7, 2015, 4:08 am

≫ Next: Νέες έρευνες για Τζιχαντιστές στη Βοσνία, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

≪ Previous: Internal divisions inside north Caucasus’ Islamist insurgency, by Giovanni Giacalone

$

0

0

For several months, Barack Obama has been trying to change US policy in the Middle East in order to eliminate the Islamic Emirate with the help of Syria. But he cannot do this, partly because he has been saying for years that President Assad must go, and secondly because his regional allies support the Islamic Emirate against Syria. However, things are slowly evolving so he should be able to do so soon. Thus, it appears that all States that supported the Islamic Emirate have ceased to do so, opening the way for a redistribution of the cards.

The world awaits the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran -under the ridiculous pretext of ending a military nuclear program that has not existed since the end of the war waged by Iraq (1980-1988) -. It would focus on the protection of Israel in exchange for recognition of Iranian influence in the Middle East and Africa.

However, this should only take effect after the Israeli elections of March 17, 2015. The supposed defeat of Netanyahu would renew ties between Washington and Tel Aviv and facilitate agreement with Tehran.
In this context, the US elite are trying to agree on future policy, while the European allies of the United States are preparing to align with what will be the new US policy.

The search for consensus in the US

After two years of inconsistent policy, Washington is trying to develop a consensus on what should be its policy in the "extended Middle East".
 1. On October 22, 2014, the Rand Corporation, main think tank of the military-industrial lobby, dramatically changed its position. After campaigning for the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic, it said that now, the worst thing that can happen to the United States and Israel is the fall of President Assad. [1]
 2. On January 14, 2015, Leslie Gleb, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, the club of the US elite, warned against divisions of the Obama administration that threaten its authority in the world. He advocated a kind of new "Baker-Hamilton Commission" to review foreign policy top to bottom. [2]
 3. On January 24, the New York Times published an editorial supporting the new direction of the Rand Corporation and calling for a complete policy change vis-à-vis Syria [3].
 4. On February 6, the Obama administration published its new strategic doctrine. It would no longer guarantee Israel’s security by destroying Syria but by creating a regional military alliance with zionist Muslim monarchies. At most, the Islamic Emirate ("Daesh") could be used to prevent Syria from holding its head high and replaying a regional political role. [4]
 5. On February 10, the National Security Network (NSN), a bipartisan think tank that tries to explain geopolitics in the United States, published a report on all the possible options regarding the Islamic Emirate. It reviewed forty expert opinions and concluded the need to "contain and destroy" the Islamic Emirate first by relying on Iraq, then Syria’s Bashar el Assad. NSN was founded by Rand Beers, a former adviser to John Kerry, today Secretary of Homeland Security. [5]
 6. On February 11, the Obama administration introduced to Congress a request to use military force against the Islamic Emirate which relegated to oblivion the idea to overthrow President Assad and destroy Syria [6].
 7. On 23 February, the new Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, brought together experts for a working dinner. He took their advice for 5 hours without revealing his own point of view. Mr. Carter intended to investigate for himself the work of the CSN. Among his guests were not only former US ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, and oldies think tanks, but Clare Lockhart, known for her links with the world of finance; as well as the president of the Columbia School of Journalism, Steve Coll, to assess possible media reactions. [7]

What has changed on the ground

During the last months, several factors have changed in the field.
 The "moderate Syrian opposition" has completely disappeared. It has been absorbed by Daesh to the point that the United States cannot find fighters to train to build a "new Syria." The former ambassador, Robert S. Ford (now an employee of the AIPAC think tank), who organized the 2011 protests and supported to the end the "moderate opposition" has officially changed his position. He now thinks the only real opposition in Syria is composed of jihadists that it would be extremely dangerous to arm further. [8] In retrospect, it appears that the terminology "moderate opposition" meant, not civilized fighters, but the Syrians ready to betray their country in alliance with Israel. They in fact made no mystery of this. [9] From the beginning, this opposition was led de facto by members of al-Qaeda (as the Libyan Abdel Hakim Belhaj, and the Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and indulged in the worst atrocities (including cannibalism) [10]. Now all these leaders are responsible for the Islamic Emirate.
 On January 28, 2015 (Hezbollah response to the assassination of several leaders in Syria), Israel stopped support for jihadi organizations in Syria. For three and a half years, Tel Aviv supplied them with weapons, nursed their wounded in military hospitals, supported their operations with its aviation - all the while pretending to fight against arms transfers to the Lebanese Hezbollah - and, ultimately, entrusting to them the security of its border in the Golan to the detriment of the UN forces.
 The new king of Saudi Arabia, Salman, dismissed Prince Bandar on January 30, 2015 and forbade any person to support the Islamic Emirate. The Kingdom has thus ceased to play a role in the handling of international terrorism; a role that had been entrusted to it by the CIA after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and which was its mainstay for 35 years.
 Identically, Turkey also appears to have stopped supporting the jihadists since February 6 and the resignation of the head of MIT, its secret services, Hakan Fidan. Moreover, on the night of February 21st to 22nd, the Turkish army illegally entered Syria, about thirty kilometers, to remove the ashes of Suleiman Shah, the grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, the reliquary it holds by virtue of the Treaty of Ankara (1921). Despite an impressive display of force, the Turkish army did not fight the Islamic Emirate which controls the area. The remains of Suleiman Shah were not repatriated but deposited a little further, still in Syrian territory. In this way, Turkey showed that it does not intend to take action against the Islamic Emirate and retains its anti-Syrian ambitions.

Possible US Options

Six options are being discussed in Washington:
 Destroy the Islamic Emirate and destroy Syria; this is the point of view of the Raytheon firm, the world’s leading producer of missiles, defended by its lobbyist Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to George W. Bush. The idea is to wage war for war without regard to national interests. This maximalist view is not supported by any political leader; it’s just formulated in the media to tip the scales in favor of the widest possible war.
 Building on the Islamic Emirate to destroy Syria, on the model of alliances concluded during the Vietnam War. This is the view of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, despite the memory of the fall of Saigon in 1975. It is extremely expensive (20 to 30 billion dollars a year for very long years), risky and unpopular. Immediately there would be a direct intervention of Iran and Russia and the conflict would go global. No one, not even Mr. McCain, is able to explain why the United States should engage in such an operation which would benefit only the state of Israel.
 To weaken and destroy the Islamic Emirate, coordinating US bombings and allied ground troops, including groups of the "moderate Syrian opposition" (which no longer exists). Then use these opposition groups (?) just to maintain pressure on Syria. This is the current counter-terrorism position in the Obama administration. It is budgeted at 4 to 9 billion per year. However, assuming that it created a "moderate Syrian opposition" is not clear how the US Air Force could successfully eliminate Daesh when it found itself unable to destroy the Taliban in Afghanistan despite already 13 years of war, not to mention the examples of Somalia or the current French stalemate in Mali.
 To weaken and destroy the Islamic Emirate, coordinating US bombing with the only forces capable of defeating it on the ground: the Syrian and Iraqi armies. This is the most interesting position because it can be supported by both Iran and Russia. It would restore the US global leadership position, as in "Desert Storm" against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and win without fail. However, this would require stopping the demonization campaigns against Syria, Iran and Russia. This option is supported by the CSN and clearly corresponds to what the Obama administration would like to do.
 Containment of the Islamic Emirate and its progressive degradation to reduce it to an acceptable size. In this option, the priority would be to protect Iraq, the major fighting would be moved to Syria.
 The siege. The idea would no longer be to fight the Islamic Emirate, but to isolate it to avoid its spread. People under its control would then be left to their fate. It is the most economical solution, but the least honourable, defended by Kenneth Pollack.

Conclusion

These elements allow one to easily predict the future : in a few months, maybe even as early as late March, Washington and Tehran would reach an overall agreement. The United States will renew contact with Syria, closely followed by the European states, including France. We will discover that the el-Assad is neither a dictator nor a torturer. Therefore, the war against Syria will come to an end, while the main jihadist forces would be eliminated by a true international coalition. When this is all over, the surviving jihadists would be sent by the CIA to the Russian Caucasus and Chinese Xinjiang.


[1] Alternative Futures for Syria. Regional Implications and Challenges for the United States, Andrew M. Liepman, Brian Nichiporuk, Jason Killmeyer, Rand Corporation, October 22, 2014.
[2] “This Is Obama’s Last Foreign Policy Chance”, Leslie Gelb, The Daily Beast, January 14, 2015.
[3] “Shifting Realities in Syria”, The Editorial Board, The New York Times Sunday Review, 24 janvier 2015.
[4] National Security Strategy, White House, February 6, 2015.
[5] Confronting the Islamic State. An Assessment of U.S. Strategic Options, Policy Report by J. Dana Stuster & Bill French, Foreword by Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, National Security Network, February 10, 2015.
[6] “Joint resolution to authorize the limited use of the United States Armed Forces against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Proposal)”, by Barack Obama, Voltaire Network, 11 February 2015.
[7] “Ash Carter Seeks Fresh Eyes on Global Threats”, Dion Nissenbaum, Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2015.
[8] “Ex-Ambassador: CIA Wrong On Not Wanting To Arm Syrian Rebels”, Akbar Shahid Ahmed, The Huffington Post, October 22, 2014.
[9] « Leader Sees New Syria, Without Iran Ties», Jay Solomon et Nourmalas, Wall Street Journal, 2 décembre 2011.
[10] Abbou Sakkar, commandant d’une brigade de l’Armée syrienne libre mange le cœur et le foie d’un soldat syrien sur une vidéo qu’il diffuse en mai 2013. Sur les exactions de l’Armée syrienne libre dont la presse occidentale n’a jamais rendu compte, voir la conférence de la journaliste russe Anastasia Kopova.

 Source: http://www.voltairenet.org/article186957.html

Νέες έρευνες για Τζιχαντιστές στη Βοσνία, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

March 7, 2015, 8:04 am

≫ Next: Albanian Islamists smuggled Italy's "Lady Jihad" to Syria, by Aleksandra Bogdani

≪ Previous: The Future of the Middle East, by Thierry Meyssan

$

0

0

Το κράτος της Βοσνίας-Ερζεγοβίνης,αντιμετωπίζει νέες προκλήσεις σε σχέση με τη Τζιχαντιστική απειλή, καθόσον, έρευνες την παρούσα περίοδο αποκαλύπτουν μεγαλύτερα δίκτυα εξτρεμιστών, τα οποία μάλιστα έχουν άμεση σχέση και με την Ιταλία, μία χώρα που πλέον απειλείται ανοιχτά, μεταξύ των άλλων και από το λεγόμενο "Ισλαμικό Κράτος".








Συγκεκριμένα η υπηρεσία πληροφοριών της Βοσνίας, διεξάγει έρευνες για επιπλέον 250 τζιχαντιστές  εντός της επικράτειας της που αποτελούν κύρια σημεία επαφής μεταξύ των τρομοκρατών στη Μέση Ανατολή και αυτών στην υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη. Οι ερευνώμενοι εδρεύουν στις κάτωθι περιοχές: Ozren, Vlasic and Majevica, Zenica, Kalesije, Maglaj, Teslić, Žepče. 



Ως βασικοί συντονιστές, ερευνώνται οι ύποπτοι :Mehmedalija Hadzic, Armin Gazibegović, Muharem Omerovic, Kenan Bijedić, Edin Spahović, Amar Varupa, Fahrudin Šuvalija, Abdulmalik Basic (Στο Σεράγεβο) Amel Arnautovic (Σεράγεβο), Faris Nanić, and Nedim Haračić (Zenica).




Επίσης σε δευτερεύοντες εσωτερικούς ρόλους οι: Izet Hadzic (Στο Maglaj) Nusret Brkic (Maglaj), Asmir Gostevcic (Livno), Edina Babunovići (Mostar), O. Mujkanovi (Vlasenica), Zulfo Alajbegovića (Rogatica), Emir Alispahić (Srebrenica), Samedin Arnautovic (Visegrad) and Sheriff Vrapčevića (Tuzla), Salko Šahman (Gorazde), Amar Adrovic  (Lead), Muris Ljubunčić (Novi Travnik), Suad Mujačić (Trebinje) Sead Zekotic (Gornji Vakuf).  




Επιπλέον εταιρείες και ΜΚΟ της περιοχής, αποτελούν αγωγούς μεταφοράς χρημάτων και τρόπους κάλυψης των Τζιχαντιστών που επιστρέφουν προς την Ευρώπη, όπως το ίδρυμα Μποσφίν του Σεράγεβο, η ΜΚΟ Ανσάρ της Ζένιτσα, η εταιρεία Αλμτζ της Ζένιτσα, ενώ τα προαναφερθέντα συνδέονται άμεσα με μια ΜΚΟ Τζαμαάτ στην Ολλανδία και με το θρησκευτικό σωματείο Νούρ στη Λίντζ της Αυστρίας.




Στην Ιταλία ερευνώνται 60 Τζιχαντιστές που έφυγαν από εκεί για να πολεμήσουν στη Συρία με τη βοήθεια Βαλκανικών και δη Βοσνιακών κυκλωμάτων. Οι 50 περίπου εξ'αυτών είναι προσήλυτοι ντόπιοι Ιταλοί που στην ουσία 
στρατολογήθηκαν τα τελευταία τρία έτη από ακραίους Ισλαμικούς κύκλους και κατέφυγαν στη Συρία διαμέσου Βοσνίας, Αλβανίας και εν συνεχεία Τουρκίας. 




Σχεδόν όλοι αυτοί προέρχονται από το Τορίνο,Μιλάνο, Ραβένα, Μπολόνια, και Κρεμόνα. Στην Ιταλία υπάρχουν σύμφωνα με τις εκτιμήσεις του εκεί υπουργείου εσωτερικών, 200 "Στρατολόγοι"και εν γένει υποστηρικτές τζιχαντιστών που πλέον έχει χαρτογραφηθεί η δικτύωση τους και παρακολουθούνται επισταμένως. Έχουν επαφές πέρα των Δυτικών Βαλκανίων και με την Ελβετία και Αυστρία. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι οι δύο τελευταίες χώρες βρίσκονται και αυτές σε "συναγερμό"λόγω των εξελίξεων και δίνουν μεγάλη έμφαση πλέον στην εξακρίβωση των κινήσεων και των προθέσεων των Τζιχαντιστών στον άξονα "Άλπεων-Αδριατικής-Δειναρικών Οροσειρών"που εντοπίζεται μέχρι στιγμής μείζονα απειλή για την ασφάλεια ολόκληρης της Ευρωπαικής ηπείρου σε σχέση με το Ισλαμικό Κράτος και των Τζιχαντιστών εν γένει. 




Στην πόλη Κρεμόνα που προαναφέρθηκε δρούσε ο Βόσνιος εξτρεμιστής Bilal Bosnić, με κύριο σκοπό τη δημιουργία βάσεως για την αποστολή "εθελοντών"στη Συρία και για την επιστροφή τους πίσω. Επίσης πρέπει να αναφερθεί ότι αρκετοί από τους 200 στρατολόγους που αναφέρθηκαν διέμεναν για ένα διάστημα στην πόλη,ενώ οι περισσότεροι είχαν έρθει στην Ιταλία παράνομα είτε μέσω Βαλκανίων είτε μέσω Βορείου Αφρικής.



Εν κατακλείδι, η κατάσταση στην Ν.Α Ευρώπη είναι σε ευαίσθητο σημείο σε ότι αφορά την ικανότητα Τζιχαντιστών να εξαπολύσουν τρομοκρατική επίθεση, με τους επόμενους μήνες να είναι κρίσιμοι για την περαιτέρω εξακρίβωση και 'χαρτογράφηση"των δικτύων που αναφέρθηκαν καθώς και άλλων. 




Οι μητροπολιτικές περιοχές του Σεράγεβο, Βιέννης και Μιλάνου αποτελούν βασικά σημεία προσοχής κυρίως για την λογιστική προετοιμασία των Τζιχαντιστών και λιγότερο για την εκδήλωση επιθέσεων.

Albanian Islamists smuggled Italy's "Lady Jihad" to Syria, by Aleksandra Bogdani

March 13, 2015, 3:37 pm

≫ Next: France mulls ban on Gulf funding of mosques

≪ Previous: Νέες έρευνες για Τζιχαντιστές στη Βοσνία, του Ιωάννη Μιχαλέτου

$

0

0

BIRN,Tirana


Aldo Kobuzi was an average teenager in a forgotten village of central Albania before he took the fateful path towards Islamic radicalization and joined Islamic State, or ISIS.

Before then, his main passions were motorbikes and Tony Montana, the lead character of the 1983 crime flick Scarface.



On the other side of the Adriatic, in Italy, Maria Giulia Sergio, was a Neapolitan Catholic who, after converting to Islam in 2007, appeared in TV shows under the name of Fatima az Zahra, defending the wearing of the veil.



In the summer of 2013, Kobuzi, 23, and Sergio, 25, met in Milan through common contacts and married. The wedding photos, which made the rounds of Italian magazines, show the bride covered from head to toe from a white satin hijab.








Last September, the couple left Italy for Turkey and traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State, the militant terror group that controls large swaths of Syria and Iraq and has proclaimed an Islamic caliphate ruled under Sharia law.

Sergio was the first woman among 59 Italian residents, many of them migrants from North Africa and the Balkans, to travel from Italy to Syria to join the Islamic State. The Italian press have dubbed her “Lady Jihad”.

The couple’s move to Syria is the target of a probe launched by prosecutors in Milan, reflecting growing concern felt in Italy about the recruiting activities of radical Islamic cells.

In Kobuzi’s home village of Germenj, near Lushnja, in central Albania, Kobuzi’s uncle, Bledar Coku, says they are in a safe place and he often talks to them on Skype.

“I talked a month ago with them,” said Coku, seated at the village’s only coffee shop. “They are safe and sound and told me not to worry,” he added.

Italian authorities suspect that radical Islamic cells in Albania linked to Kobuzi arranged the couple’s move to Syria.

Such ties run deep in Kobuzi’s family, BIRN can reveal.

His path towards radical Islam apparently started after his father abandoned the family in the late 1990s.

Forced to leave her husband’s house and return to her paternal home, Kobuzi’s mother, Donika Kobuzi, found solace in religion and became a practicing Muslim.

Kobuzi’s uncle says his sister converted her children. “She would always talk to us about God,” said Coku, who sports a long beard and is himself a practicing Muslim of the hardline Salafi sect,

According to Kobuzi’s former neighbours in the village, Donika first converted her daughter, Serjola, and married in her in 2011, when she was only 15, through a middleman to Mariglen Dervishllari, a Muslim from the village of Rremenj near Pogradec in southwest Albania.

According to documents obtained by BIRN, Dervishllari travelled to Syria in 2013 and joined the al-Nusra front, a militant Islamic group linked with al-Qaeda.

Serjola and her infant daughter joined Dervishllari in Syria in 2014, before he died, possibly while fighting with the radical group.


Pandi Janko, the owner of garage where Aldo Kobuzi once worked, says he became an ardent Muslim following a three-month visit in 2012 to his sister’s family to Pogradec. “When he returned, he had beard down to his chest,” Janko recalled.

Fatjon, a neighbour and childhood friend of Aldo’s, agreed, noting that before the trip to Pogradec in 2012, Aldo was just an average teenager.

“We would ride a motorbike, work when we had the chance and drink a beer or two in the village bar,” Fatjon recalled.

Following the visit to Pogradec, Kobuzi changed into a different person, Fatjon said.

“He would talk about death and paradise,” he added. “He described paradise as a place with seven floors, and those who took a bullet in the forefront would occupy the highest floor,” Fatjon continued.

Janko said Kobuzi moved in 2012 to the village of Scansano, near Grosseto, in Italy, where an older uncle had been living since the 1990s.

The register of the municipality of Scansano first lists Kobuzi as a resident at his uncle’s home in the spring of 2012. His residency permit was renewed in 2013.

According to an interview she gave to the Italian newspaper L’espresso, Sergio converted to Islam in 2007 and married a man from Morocco who she divorced soon after because he did “not interpret the faith properly”.

At the time when Kobuzi moved to Italy, Sergio, originally from Naples, was living with a family in an area between Milan and Bergamo.

She met Kobuzi in Milan in 2013 though the mediation of other Muslims. Kobuzi’s uncle says his nephew traveled from Grossetto to see her in Milan and they immediately liked each other.

They then married in a mosque in Milan and returned to live in Grosseto until September 2014.




That summer, Kobuzi returned to his home village of Germenj in Albania, more radical than when he had left.

Milan prosecutors believe Kobuzi went to Albania to reactivate contacts with radical Islamists in order to arrange his move to Syria.

Kobuzi’s brother-in-law, Dervishllari, shows up in an investigation into an Albanian network of recruiters, which was headed by two Tirana imams, under the name “Halit from Pogradec.”

Albanian police arrested the imams, Bujar Hysa and Abdurrahman Balla, in March 2014. They are currently on trial, accused of recruiting more than 70 Albanian jihadists for the al-Nusra front and ISIS.

Dervishllari first traveled to Syria on January 28, 2013 but returned home soon, after being wounded at the front. Two other Albanian jihadists lost their lives in the incident where he was wounded.

In October 2013, he traveled again to Syria, never to return.

Neighbours in Rremenj, near Porgradec, says his wife and infant daughter joined him a few months after the second trip to Syria.

The date and cause of his death is not clear. Family members insist he died from leukemia and not while fighting at the front.

Kobuzi and Sergio traveled to Syria in September 2014, when Dervishllari was already dead.

A few weeks before he left through Rome airport, Kobuzi posted an ISIS flag and a note in his Facebook profile. “Death comes once in life, and so it should be in the path of Allah,” the note read.